Educational Considerations, vol. 6(1) Full Issue by Litz, Charles E. & Sparks, Mary Kahl
Educational Considerations 
Volume 6 Number 1 Article 12 
9-1-1978 
Educational Considerations, vol. 6(1) Full Issue 
Charles E. Litz 
Kansas State University 
Mary Kahl Sparks 
Kansas State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations 
 Part of the Higher Education Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 
License. 
Recommended Citation 
Litz, Charles E. and Sparks, Mary Kahl (1978) "Educational Considerations, vol. 6(1) Full Issue," 
Educational Considerations: Vol. 6: No. 1. https://doi.org/10.4148/0146-9282.1978 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Educational Considerations by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please 
contact cads@k-state.edu. 
e ucotiono 
consi erotions 
ISS N O 4 9282 
I published ot konsos stote university college of educotion 
1
Litz and Sparks: Educational Considerations, vol. 6(1) Full Issue
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017
Viewpoint 
Values, politics 
and the schools 
Who would deny that values are inherent In schooling or that politics plays an Important part 
In the process of formal education? Yet as obvious as these facts would appear, many otherwise 
knowledgeable people would deny any essential connection between the two. While they might 
go so far as to say that schooling, now and In the past, has beeri frequently infected by political 
considerations, they would not see these considerations as either necessary or desirable. Thus, 
the way Is cleared for those who would get down to the practical business of teaching, as If 
hesitating to consider the whys and wherefores of the case were some sort of crime against the 
young. 
The most recent large scale example of this can be found in the swing of American schooling 
to the political right. Educational research is now turning up results that support a more con· 
servative social climate, Just as In the 1960's it uncovered results that sustained an atmosphere of 
reform. It Is no more accidental that educators are (re)dlscovering the need for "basic subjects" 
(to say nothing of moral training) and are pondering the importance of mental discipline and 
civility, than It was that a decade ago they found out (once again) that "flexibility" and "open-
ness" are essential for sound psychological development and the emergence of an independent 
and cri tical mind. 
It would be easy to despair, looking at the cyclical nature of these trends. Where normally we 
would like our values to dictate our politics , It seems that in this case the reverse Is true. That Is 
to say, the virtues we promote In the schools appear to be a mere reflection of prevailing political 
forces. Is there any hope founded on reason that it might be otherwise? 
While there may be no simple answer to this question, we need not conclude that the 
situation warrants cynicism. In the first place, we should recognize the perennial tension In 
education between Its adjustment function and Its liberating function. On the one hand, 
education helps the learner to adapt to the world, to "flt in," so to speak. On the other hand, 
education works to free the learner from environmental constraints. to develop an inquisitive and 
critical Intelligence that will generate an aptitude for change. An education that could not fulfill 
both of these functions would be hardly worthy or the name. Yet, In recognizing this, we are 
acknowledging a conflict which normally we can neither understand nor resolve In purely rational 
terms. 
Living with these circumstances, what alternative do we have other than to trust the dialec-
tical workings of the poli tical process? Where we are unable to achieve a conceptual integration 
of the contradictory forces in education, where a philosophical synthesis is unattainable, we 
might still be able to bring about a political synthesis. This would demand, of course, that the 
political process be appropriately democratic, that political power be distributed and used In a 
manner that is scrupulously fair. But given this proviso, we might not only find practical solutions 
to practical problems, but, perhaps too, a basis for deali ng with the phil osophic al perplexities 
that accompany our Involvement In this wondrous business of education. 
P.L. Smith 
The Ohio State University 
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When teaching and learning become 
divorced from ends, problems arise. 
Generic 
behavior 
and human 
conduct: 
Reflections 
on an 
educational 
dilemma 
by Frederick C. Nt\ff 
Wayne State University 
Detroit, Michigan 
No special clairvoyance Is required to perceive that 
American education Is presently In considerable dls~rray. 
The confusion is partly due to piecemeal attempts to 
respon-0 to '"ou tside"' or nonprofessional critics, many of 
whom have urged that the schools become more flexible 
In their academic and curriculum requirements, make 
greater provision for Individual differences, promot~ self· 
realization and self ·identity, and give greater attention to 
moral and social values-In short, that education become 
less rigid and more humane. Equally vocal are those 
critics who would have the schools become primarily pur· 
veyors of skills and knowledge, go '"back to basics." in-
stitute stricter scholastic standards, and establish more 
uniform criteria of achievement. Neohumanlsts have 
called for various kinds of alt ernative schools, while 
neoconservatives have advocated more discipline and 
greater regimentation within the existing school struc· 
tu re. 
But there is also a more "'sophisticated" kind of con· 
fusion that emanates from among professional educators 
themselves who are undecided between conceiving 
education ~s an art and conceiving It as a science- with 
all the ramifications lhat such a choice enta ils. To con· 
celve education as an art is to recognize those "non· 
scientific" aspects of teaching and learning that have to 
do with theory, aims, norms and Ideals that are continually 
created and reconstructed within the ongoing educational 
enterprise and that dO not readily lend themselves to 
quantitative assessment. To conceive education as a 
science is to emphasize the kinds of predictability, unlfor· 
mity and precision In teaching and lear~i ng Iha! am 
characteristic of the " exact" sciences. of which physics 1s 
perhaps the paradigm.• What is overlooked when the 
dilemma is stated in either-or terms is that education may 
be viewed as neither exclusively an art nor exclusively a 
science but .as a combination of both, each contributing 
its proper share. 
It should go without saying that the process of 
education is dependent upon the process of teaching, the 
process of teaching is linked with the process of learning, 
and the process of learnin g is shaped by the purposes for 
which It is designed. Despite the apparent relatedness of 
these factors. it is nonetheless possible to have been 
taught without being educated and to have learned to no 
purpose. One may, for example, have been taught how to 
use a screwdriver without for that reason being cal led 
educated; or one may have learned a mathematical 
theorem that serves no purpose In one•s dally life. 
Coalescence of teaching and learning with the ends that 
education is designed to serve precludes artificial 
lragmentation of the educational enterprise and allows for 
its being conceived as a whole. It Is when teaching and 
learn ing become divorced from ends that problems arise. 
Notwithstanding, attention to the nature of learning qua 
learnin g is needed before its relationship to both teaching 
and education can be fully understood. 
I. From Mentallsm to Behaviorism 
During the first two or three decades of this cenlury 
psychology was struggling to shed Its metaphysical garb 
in order to become a " true" science. It did not wi sh to 
remain, as its name Implied, a " science of mind." The 
classical notion of education as a matter of intellectual 
development or of mind training simply wouldn't do. for 
mentallsm was suggestive of nothing that was amenable 
to empirical investigation. The then-current dictum that 
only what was observable was a fit object ol scientific 
scrutiny led psychologists to abandon pursuit o f an 
elusive mind In favor of an almost exclusive concern with 
behavior. Ontological problems of being were dismissed 
by contending that whatever exists at all exists in some 
amount; and ii It exists in some amount. II can be 
measured. Recognition that mental states are nearly 
alwa\'S a reflection of bodily states-for example, that eye 
strain can cause a headache, that physical faligue can 
d imin ish mental alertness, or that a severe blow on the 
head can cause amnesia-prompted psychologists to per· 
ceive that mind and body are not two separate entities, 
each operating under Its own independent laws, but that 
they function interdependently. Attesting to such 
recognition was the rise of the whole field of 
psychosomatic medicine. Physiological psychology lhus 
began to replace mentalistlc psychology, and the notion 
ol a mind-body dualism was on Its way out. In its urgency 
to dispose of all traces of mysticism and metaphysics and 
move toward becoming a "true .. science, psychology em· 
braced the thesis that all human behavior was explainable 
F.OUC:/\ llON/\L CONSIOERA TIONS. Vol. 6, No." I all, 1978 
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Jn physiological terms. " The tendency to make 
psychology a study of behavior rather than an in· 
trospectlve analysis of mental states eventually made 
considerable headway and became known as 
Behaviorism. ''2 
Instead of being an exclusively mental affair, learning 
was now understood as a process o f physiological con-
ditioning. It meant establishing neural connections by 
means of which a particular stimulus became associated 
with a "correct" response. Based upon the findings of the 
Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, most conditioning ex-
periments were performed on rats, dogs, cats, guinea 
pigs, chicks and pigeons. Although John B. Watson is 
generally credited as being the founder of American 
behaviorism, most pioneer learning experiments in this 
field were performed by Edward Lee Thorndike, who set 
forth the thesis that learning was governed primarily by 
the Law of Exercise and the Law of Effect. The Law of 
Exercise accounted for the strengthening of stimulus-
response (S·R) bonds through repetition; whereas the Law 
of Effect meant that neural connections were 
strengthened when a response was pleasant, weakened 
when it was not. Learning thus became a matter of con· 
ditloning the subject (the learner) to supply whatever 
response the conditioner (the teacher) deemed desirable. 
Mind was either ignored entirely or reduced to synaptic 
connections, and even purposes were regarded as merely 
mechanical. In Thorndike's own words: 
I read the facts which psychologists report about ad· 
justment, configuration, drives, integration, pur-
poses, tensions and the like, and al I of these seem to 
me to be reducible, so far as concerns their powers 
to Influence the course of thought or feeling or ac-
tion, to connections and readiness. Learning is con-
necting. The mirid is man's connecting system. Pur-
poses are as mechanical in their nature as anything 
else is.• 
Intelligence, insight, understanding, intention and any 
sort of abstract or affective thought were placed in limbo, 
for they were not directly observable; while the con-
ditioned response or the reflex arc, as it came to be called, 
became the matrix of learning. Education thus became a 
matter of conditioning, which in some areas of learning 
amounted to no less than indoctrination, and the schools 
were expected to turn out prespecilied products in much 
the same fashion as factories turn out automobiles. 
II. Perception and Meaning 
Behaviorism has undergone certain modifications 
since the days of Watson and Thorndike. Phrases such as 
"positive and negative reinforcement," ''operant con· 
ditioning," "Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation," "aversive 
stimuli" and the like have been added to its vocabulary. 
What remain, however, are the notions that (1) all behavior 
is specific and identifiable in terms of its causal factors; 
(2) human behavior Is essentially no different from 
nonhuman behavior except in degree of complexity; (3) 
human beings, llke all other animals, lack freedom; and (4) 
choice Is nonexistent. 
What the behaviorist fai ls to recognize is that all 
human acts are whole, and not merely the sum of their 
separate parts. Fragmentation of human acts into their 
sensory stimulus, ideatlonal and response com-
ponents- although tempting for analytic reasons-is 
both arbitrary and artificial. In so far as human acts are 
joined with and engaged In for a purpose, they are not sim· 
FALl, ·1•)78 
ply motor responses to stimuli. The act of seeing, for 
example, is all one with purposiveness. The object seen is 
viewed in terms of its meaning, how it is interpreted, the 
purposes for which it may be used. To see is to-see-for-a· 
purpose. Viewing the Grand Canyon may mean for the 
tourist seeing-for-picture·taking purposes; the geologist 
may view it for the purpose of observing the erosive 
processes of nature; while Ferde Grofe's "Grand Canyon 
Suite" may represent its meaning to a composer of music. 
No object or set of condlt ions constitutes a stimulus 
per se. It becomes a stimulus by being caught up in the 
process of ideation and response, of which it is an integral 
part. Stimuli are responses in their incipien t stage. Nor are 
responses merely to s11mu1;; ·they constitute stimuli trans, 
formed, mediated by the motor phase of the so·called 
reflex arc . Response requires a reconstitution of stimulus, 
i.e., an assignment or reassignment of meaning. A 
stimulus responded to, acted upon, undergoes trans-
formation in terms of the interpretation it is given. Nor 
can any ob;ect or phenomenon be considered a stimulus 
apart from the eliciting of a response or without a taking 
into account of the peculiar context in which it appears. A 
sudden, staccato sound is ordinarily perceived as a 
stimulus. It alerts us, it annoys us, it commands our at· 
tention . We attempt to locate and identity it, to determine 
whether i t is cause for alarm. But if circumstances were 
such that what is ordinarily perceived as a loud noise Is 
obscured by a steady drone of sti ll louder sounds, it Is 
unlikely that any observable response or motor activity 
would occur, in which case it would be unwarranted tocafl 
the noise a stimulus. 
Listening to high· pitched notes being played on a plc· 
co
lo 
might be pleasing to the ear of a flut ist, and so might 
be judged as pleasant. A dog hearing the same high· 
pitched notes responds also, but not with enjoyment. It 
gives indication that the sounds are unpleasant by 
whining or withdrawing. We are wont to say that the 
musician and the dog are responding d ifferently to the 
same stimulus, thus dissociating stimulus from response. 
But is this truly the case? Are the musician and the dog ac-
tually responding to the " same" stimu lus? Or, as in the 
first example, is the warrant of calli ng something a 
stimulus contingent upon the presence or absence of a 
response and, as in the second example, is the nature of 
the stimulus part and parcel of the nature of both the re· 
sponse and the responder? As Spinoza once observed, 
"One and the same thing can at the same time be good, 
bad and Indifferent: e.g., music Is good to the melancholy, 
bad to those who mourn and neither good nor bad to the 
deaf."• 
If the synergetlc relationship between stimulus and 
response Is still not clearly seen, the question might be 
raised as to where a stimulus ends and where a response 
begins. If no satisfactory answer to this question is 
possible, the only conclusion to be drawn is that a 
stimulus Is one with its response-just as a cause Is one 
with its effect and an organism Is one with its en-
vironment. In commenting upon the inadequacy of the 
reflex arc concept, John Dewey has written: 
What we have is a circuit; not an arc or broken 
segment of a circle. Th is circuit is more truly termed 
organic than reflex, because the motor response 
determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory 
stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the 
movement is on ly for the sake of determining the 
5
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stimulus, ot fixing what kind of a stimulus It is, of in-
terpreting ii.' 
This Is to say tl\at a stimulus and a response are not 
separate segments of an arc but are reciprocal, each a 
determinant of and determined by the other. Instead of 
representing a linear progression, they constitute a cir· 
cult. In the language of Dewey: 
The stimulus is that phase of the forming co-
ord ination which represents the conditions which 
have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue; 
the response Is that phase of one and the same form-
ing co·ordlnation which gives the key to meeting 
these conditions, which serves as Instrument In ef-
fecting the successful co-ordination. They are 
therefore strictly corr elative and contemporaneous.• 
To suppose that a given stimulus always presumes a 
fixed response Is to presuppose certainty where un· 
certainty may exist. To be confronted with an uncertain 
response-not to know how to respond-is to be con· 
fronted with an uncertain stimulus-not to know how to 
interpret It. A knock on the door ordinari ly elicits the 
response of opening it. But if one has had a prior ex· 
perience of opening the door to an Intruder, both the 
stimulus and the response take on a character ol In· 
determinacy. The qualitative nature of both Is in question, 
and a choosing among alternatives is called tor. Should 
the knock be Interpreted as that of a friend (Stimulus A), In 
which case the door would likely be opened (Response A); 
or should it be Interpreted as the knock of an intruder 
(Stimulus B), in which case the door would likely be bolted 
(Response B)? Or are sti ll o ther interpretations possible, 
which might call for still o ther kinds o f response? As 
Dewey states it: 
Generalized, sensation as stimulus is always that 
phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that 
a co-ordination may be completed. What the sen-
sation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, 
will depend entirely upon the way in which an ac· 
tivity is being directed. It has no fixed quality of Its 
own. The search tor the stimulus Is the search for 
exact conditions of action; that Is, tor the state of 
things which decides how a beginning co·ordinatlon 
should be completed.' 
To the nonplayer or the overly tired, a tennis court, racquet 
and ball are not a stimulus to play tennis; to the non-
smoker, a cigarette Is not a stimulus to smoke; to the 
satiated, food is not a stimulus to eat. " ... what makes 
some physical thing or trait a sti mulus Is the cond ition of 
the whole organism at the time, its needs and the kind of 
behavior in which It is already engaged."' 
Ill
. 
Conditioning and Intelligence 
The argumen t is sometimes advanced that human 
beings and the so-called higller animals have more in com. 
mon than they have differences. Indeed, a strong case 
could be made for the contention that the physiological 
equipment of all mammals Is basically the same. All 
engage in eating, sleeping, loco motion, procreation, riving 
and dying. All likewise confront and resolve problems, i.e., 
all are capable of exercising intelligence. Alt hough 
nonhuman forms of animal llfe rely to a considerable ex-
tent upon inherited or genetically programmed behavior 
patterns, commonly referred to as instinct, i t cannot be 
said that human behavior Is without its Instinctive com-
ponent. For present purposes, instinct may be taken to 
mean those special kinds of behavior that are not a result 
o f learning or reasoning but are native to a specles-e. g., 
the web·buildlng Instinct of spiders, the nest-building in-
stinct of birds or the storing-of.nuts Instinct of squirrels. 
The fact that squirrels have been observed to store nuts 
persistently even In regions where nuts are available the 
year round tends to d iscount th e notion that such 
behavior is consciously purposeful or intelligently di -
rected. It is not a result of reasoning or learning but is en-
demic to a species, which is largely what is meant by 
call ing it instinctive. The human infant likewise displays 
such Instinctive forms of behavior as crying, reaching 
and grasping, restlessness, yawning, sleeping, etc. The 
homely remark that a baby is a yell at one end and com· 
plete irresponsibility at the other is nonetheless descrip-
tive ol an instinctive rather than a learned behavior pat-
tern . However sophisticated, however subtly or gran-
diloquently manifested in adult life th rough the media of 
art, philosophy, science and religion, it might be main-
tained that most human endeavors are but hig hly refined 
ex tensions of our inborn tendencies Jo seek pleasure and 
satisfaction and to avoid pain and annihilation. 
The foregoing argument has its merits, but It also has 
Its share ol flaws. One of its merits consists in Its com-
pellingly simplistic explanation of human behavior in terms 
of analogous nonhuman behavior. Its major flaw lies in 
a confounding of the necessary with the sufficient con-
ditions ol human behavior. Physiological equipment is a 
necessary requirement tor thought, judgment, choice, 
Ideation and the like-just as concrete and steel may be 
necessary requ irements tor the construction of a buildi ng. 
But physiology itsel f does not constitute thought, any 
more than concrete and steel them se lves constitute a 
building. II Is what human beings are capable of doing 
with their physiological equipment that represents their 
distinctiveness, just as what they may have decided to do 
with concrete and steel consti tutes the distinctiveness or 
a building. As Psychoanalyst Robert Stroller puts it, 
"Anatomy is not destiny. Destiny is what people make of 
anatomy." Nature furnishes the raw materials, but man 
creates the patterns. The tact that the physiological equip-
ment with which we -are born is a necessary condition tor 
intelligence is no guarantee of how or even whether It will 
be exercised. Intelligence is not an autonomous 
possession of human beings which manifests Itself in 
vacuo; nor can it be written off as merely responsive be-
havior to environing situations. What role, then, does in· 
tell lgence play In the behavioristic framework? 
If, in the words of Dewey, "to act with an aim is all one 
with acting Intelligently," It could scarcely be argued that 
to respond to the strongest stimulus is all one with 
responding Intelligently. Lewi s Terman once defined in-
telligence as the ability of an organism to adapt to a new 
sl luation. In his later years he said that he reg relied having 
used the term "adapt," for It suggested passive response 
Instead of active control. If choice Is understood to mean 
deliberate se lection f a preferred course of action, and if 
Intelligent choice impli es selection on the basis of con-
sidered ends In view, then the absence of choice-making 
ablllt y is tantamount to the absence of Intelligence. To put 
the matter differently, if by intelligence is meant the abil-
ity to choose dlscriminately among alternative courses 
of action, then to the extent that ability to choose is 
diminished or eliminated altogether, Intelligence Is 
likewise diminished or eliminated altogether. Whereas 
selective ablllty-or what Darwin called " natural selec-
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tlon"-is a common trait of all matter and all l ife, at the 
human level such selective ability has been sufficiently 
refined as to warrant the term choice, implying that 
peculiar kind of selectivity that is conscious, deliberate, 
reflective and undertaken for the purpose of realizing a 
fore seeable end. If by conditioning Is meant the 
preprogramming of a response, then it becomes a sub· 
stltute for deliberation, intelligence, and purposiveness. It 
leaves out of account the "inner being" of things and 
deals instead with external relationships only. If not to In· 
telligence, to what do we resort in coping with situations 
for which we have no preprogrammed response? 
As John Hott has rightly pointed out, " The true test of 
intelligence is not how much we know how to do, but how 
we behave when we don't know what to do."' The young 
man who, having read a book on etiquette, began con-
versation with his girl friend by asking, "How's your 
mother and little things like that?" and who started his 
business letters with " Dear Sir or Madam as the Case May 
Be:" may serve as a prime example of rote learn ing but 
scarcely of intelligence. To suppose that conditioning will 
provide for acting intelligently requires either a 
redefinition of intelligence or acceptance of the premise 
that life presents no uncertainties. Moreover, it is con· 
celvable that persistent conditioning can lead to chronic 
anxiety, flattened emotions, depression and feelings of 
guilt. Men have been conditioned in some cultures to 
believe that weeping in time of sorrow is an unmanly trait 
that should be suppressed. Conditioning an affective 
response deprives it of its genuinely emotional quality and 
substitutes instead only a shallow, overt kind of behavior. 
Joys and sorrows are not merely forms of behavior; rather, 
they are deep-seated emotions that may or may not 
manifest themselves in behaviora l terms. Behavior is but 
the tip of the Iceberg we know as self. To regard the tip as 
constituting the whole is to construct a human 
psychology that ignores all but the most trivial and overt 
elements of the nature of man. 
To conceive man as primarily a responding organism 
is to cast him In a passive role. Such a conception relieves 
him of responsibility for his actions and excuses him for 
his failures, for he has been victimized by external cir · 
cumstances or genetic endowment-or both. To conceive 
man as capable of exercising initiative casts him in an ac· 
tive role, responsible for the choices he makes. Both 
classical id ealism and modern existentialism have at-
tributed to humans a kind of self-sufficiency that per-
mitted them to rise above the exigencies of circumstance. 
In the language of Milton, "The mind is i ts own place, and 
in itsell/Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." The 
human mind was thought to be autonomous, capable of 
rendering itself immune to external conditions. The power 
of humans through the inescapabllity of choice to become 
what they will themselves to be is echoed by Jean-Paul 
Sartre: 
If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is In· 
definable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only al · 
terward wl II he be somethl ng, and he himself will 
have made what he will be .... Not only is man what 
he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what 
he wills himself to be after this thrust toward 
existence. 10 
" Condemned to be free,'' man is at every turn of his life 
confronted with choice, without which he is nothing. Such 
is the nature of the human predicament. Man becomes 
human at that point in his life when he realizes that from 
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the burden of choosing, there is no escape. Whereas 
classical idealis m and modern existentialism have con-
ceived humans as largely self·determined and self. 
directed, behaviorism views them as other-determined 
and other-directed. What we are accustomed to call 
selfhood is nonexistent. Since there is no self as such, it 
becomes nonsense to speak of self-realization, self-
actualization, self-fulfilment, or self-control. What we are 
offered instead is a kind of mechanism that responds to 
extraneous factors, i.e., to causes outside our control. The 
self, in short, cannot act, for it is capable only of reac-
tion-if, indeed, there be any such entity as self at all. 
IV. Was Dewey a Behaviorist? 
It was stated earlier that much of the present con· 
fusion in education is traceable to indecision as to 
whether education shou Id be conceived as an art or as a 
science-or as both. The argument might even be ad· 
vanced that science itself is an art In the sense that it is an 
artifact, i.e., a humanly devised, created or contrived 
means tor dealing with phenomena. Matters of ethics and 
morality would certainly fall within the rubric of art so 
defined, for they represent human constructs rather than 
raw data. If by art is meant the whole gamut of human 
creations as distinguished from what exists in the natural 
world apart from human intervention, the argument takes 
on a semblance of plausibility. The so-called social sciences 
in general and psychology in particular might then be 
viewed from a different perspective and seen in a different 
l ight. Obsession with measurement and quantification 
might give way to concern for seeing life whole. It Is 
recounted that Dewey, once found with a copy of the 
Psychological Review in his hands, threw i t down, ex-
claiming, " I despair of psychologists! They have no un-
derstanding of what science is. They think it has to do 
v1ith measuring and counting.'' 11 
To De"fey and other pragmatists, to be scientific in 
the true sense of the term Is to be critical-minded, and 
critical mindedness is not limited to physical concerns 
but applies across the board. They viewed the term science 
in broader perspective than those who fail to see the 
woods for the trees, i.e., whose preoccupation with bits 
and pieces of knowledge prevents them from seeing life 
whole. Both Dewey and present·day behaviorists have 
rejected mentalism, or what Gilbert Ryle has called "the 
myth of the dogma of the ghost in the machine." 
Piecemeal and out·of-context reading of Dewey might 
even suggest that he embraced behaviorism, as when he 
wrote: 
.. . instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of 
thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is 
literally something which we do; that analysis is 
ultimately physical and active; that meanings in their 
logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and 
methods of behaving toward facts, and that active 
experimentation is essential to verification. >i 
Context aside, does the above passage qualify Dewey as a 
behaviorist? The answer is that Dewey was a behaviorist 
in the sense that he rejected the notion of thought as an 
arcane process of noesis with no necessary issue in con· 
duct, for he held that the whole purpose of thinking is to 
provide warrant for a given course of action. Behaving or 
acting he regarded as proving grounds for hypotheses. 
Behavior is not an end in itself but a means for testing the 
adequacy of a formulated course of action, for deter· 
mining the justification of a theory by observing how It 
5 
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works out in pracllce. Dewey was not a behaviorist to the 
~xtent that he joined theory with practice, thought with ac· 
hon. thus obv1ahng any need for viewing reflection in 
1solallon from behaviOf or behavior apart from reflection. 
Whereas behaviorism has little concern for reflection to 
Dewey reflection was viewed as the indispensable me~ns 
for rendering action intelligent and purposeful, thus 
preventing It from becoming random, accidental or blind· 
while action was seen as intelligent and purposefu l only 
as It represen ted a consummation of thought. 
V. Some Caveats re Social Engineering 
Both behaviorism and pragmatism reject the notion 
or absolute human autonomy, i.e., the Idea that human 
beings have some kind of inner will that enables them to 
cut themselves ott from environing circumstances or past 
experience and to act in vacuo. There is a dlfterence 
however. between rejecting absolute autonomy and 
recognizing a degree of autonomy that provides for the 
exercise of intelligence in circumstances that are highly 
Indeterminate and hence unpredictable in their outcomes. 
But whereas In the writings of Dewey the role o f in· 
telllgence is nearly everywhere paramount, It Is significant 
to note that virtually no mention Is made of Intelligence in 
the writings of the behaviorists. To Dewey, the learner is 
brought to maturity through the cultivation of critical 
social Intelligence. Every conception or the good 1~ 
ullfmately social, which is to say that ii has to do with how 
we conduct ourselves in reference not simply to our own 
individual or selfish desires but to the general or social 
welfare; this, in turn, creates conditions whereby in-
dlvlduar freedoms may be more fu lly realized. This is to 
say that an Individual is no more or less free than the 
society in which he lives either restric ts or protects his 
abi lity to exercise choice. Dewey likewise believed that 
scientific inquiry Itself is a basically moral and social un· 
dertaking and therefore laden with moral and social 
obligations. 
Except in a strictly biological sense, human nature is 
not given at birth; rather, it consists of those specific 
traits o f character that have been deliberately cultivated 
through the medium of education. Human beings at blrlh 
are predisposed to act neither morally nor Immorally. 
Moral conduct is learned rather than innate, and It Is 
socially oriented rather than privately intuited. Nor Is that 
kind of behavior that has been conditioned or In· 
doctrinated in accordance with some set of rules govern· 
Ing "propriety" worthy of being labeled moral, for It lacks 
the undergirding of reflective accountability. In Dewey's 
thought moral intelligence is neither reifled nor auton· 
omlzed. Rather than referring to a person as having, 
owning, or possessing intelligence. Dewey prefers to 
speak of an individual as conducting himself Intelligently. 
Use of the adverbial form prevents viewing intelligence as 
a thing or entity possessed and shifts the emphasis to Its 
practical issue, i.e., to its consequences in action. 
Behaviorist B.F. Skinner, on the other hand, ap· 
parently rejects intelligence as an avenue to the good me. 
Distinctions between gOOd and evil are to be accounted 
for In terms of positive and negative reinforcement. 
Whatever reinforces us positively-1.e ., elicits a pleasant 
response-is good, moral and right; whatever reinforces 
us negatively-1.e., elicits an unpleasant response-is 
bad, immoral and wrong. The survival of good over evil is 
thus guaranteed in the scheme of things, for, according to 
Skinner, ii Is our ''nature" to seek positive reinforcements 
and to avoid negative ones." This sounds as though it is 
"na.tural" f<!r human beings to seek what is good and to 
avood what 1s ev il. Reminiscent of the romantic naturalism 
of Rousseau, it Implies some sort of built·in mechanism 
instinctive moral sense, or Kantian "immanence" thai 
enables man to select positive reinforcements and to 
avoid negative ones-the very thing that behaviorists have 
elsewhere denied in claiming that all behavior is con-
ditioned behavior. Moreover, ii fails to note that many ex· 
periences may be satisfying that are not at all moral, and 
that many others may be unpleasant that are not for that 
reason evil. Acts of brutality may be gratifying to those of 
sadistic inclination, but are they for that reason good? 
Acts of self -sacrifice and deprivation may be unpleasan t 
because of the hardships they entail, but are they for such 
reason bad? As Max Wingo states it, " If we grant .. . that 
goods are positive relnforcers ... how do we know that 
those things that reinforce us positively are really 
good-that 1s, thal they are desirable and worthy of being 
prized and sought after?"" The ultimate criterion that 
Skinner employs In determining the worth of a culture is 
survival. A culture survives to the extent that control is 
exercised over the behavior or Its membe rs." In view of 
the fact that few social orders can be cited wherein 
greater control was exercised over the behavior of their 
members than that which prevailed during the Nazi 
regime, this appears to be a rather odd contention. 
Perhaps Skinner had best confine his efforts to ex· 
periments with rats and pigeons. When he undertakes 10 
pl~y social engineer, he Is venturing into a domain that Is 
ahen to nonhuman animals, viz., culture. His social 
utopias convey no profound recognition of what Unamuno 
has called "the tragic sense or fife," but appear to be spun 
out of a cotton.candy kind o f euphoria. Nor can his 
utopias in any way be regarded as guaranteed outcomes 
of the methods he emp loys; Indeed, identical methods 
can be and have been used to produce and maintain 
human bondage. The notion that only "good" cultures sur· 
vive-that is, that survival is the test for the worth of a 
culture- is belied by the fact that tyrannical monarchies 
oligarchies and other forms of predemocratic soclai 
arrangement have a far longer history or survival than does 
democracy. The power of chol~e which democracy prizes 
has always been understood as ability to select freely 
a~on~ alternatives and to act accordingly. Only in 
sotuahons where no alternative exists is choice denied as 
i~ ~he drudging I.ire of the slave or the slrictured living c'on-
d1hons o.f the pnsoner, for such lives require no more than 
conformity 10 rules already laid down. At authoritarian 
political levels what In simple psychological terms has 
been called stimulus becomes the prod of brute force, and 
response be.comes submission to the whip of authority. 
Although Skinner carefully avoids reference to tyranny in 
rejecting all semblances or human autonomy, what 
0
he 
substitutes are external controls as formulated by 
"enlightened" social engineers-which amounts to a 
euphemistic phrasing of authoritarianism. That such a 
view is sharply at odds with a fundamental precept of 
democracy is illustrated In the following passage from 
Dewey: 
Since a democratic society repudiates the principle 
of external authority, II must find a substitute In 
voluntary disposition and interest; these can be 
created only by education. But there Is a deeper ex· 
planation. A democracy Is more than a form of govern· 
ment; ii is primarily a mode or associated living, of 
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conjoint communicated experience. The extension 
in space of the number of individuals who par· 
tlcipate in an interest so that each has to refer his 
own action to that of others, and to consider the ac-
tion of others to give point and direction to his own, 
is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers 
of class, race and national territory which kept men 
from perceiving the full import of their activity.•• 
VI. "The Hypothesis That Man Is Not Free . .. " 
Frequently overlooked in discussions of Skinner's 
brand of behaviorism is a key premise upon the warrant of 
which much of his psychological structure stands or falls. 
He stales it as follows: ' 'The hypothesis that man is not 
free is essential to the application of scientific method to 
the study of human behavior."" In the first place, it should 
be noted that this is a hypothesis, an assumption without 
proof, a provisional or suppositional statement, 
verification of which has never been es tab I ished. In the 
second place, the assertion begs the question, for it 
requires us to assume the warrant of a statement that is it· 
self open to question, viz., that scientific method is ap· 
plicable to a study of human behavior only If It is first 
hypothesized that human beings are not free. This is 
equivalent to holding that scientific study is not only ham· 
pered but impossible where the object studied behaves 
unpredictably, thus vlolaling humanly formulated laws 
governing its behavior. In the third place, despite in· 
clusion of the word scientific, the statement Itself is 
patently unscientific, for i t flies in the face of a major 
requirement of all scientific propositions, viz., that they be 
in fact or in principle testable. Untestable hypotheses for 
this reason cannot be viewed as truly scientific. In the 
fourth place, application of scientific method to a study of 
human or any other kind of behavior would begin, not with 
a prejudgment-in this case, that human beings are not 
free- but with impartial inquiry. Indeed, not to do so 
would be the antithesis of scientific method. In the fifth 
place, the assertion is covertly prescriptive in Its claim 
that the hypothesis must be accepted ("is essential" ) 
before study of human behavior can be undertaken, and so 
is hortatory rather than descriptive. It shows, to 
paraphrase Bertrand Russell, that the worse your premise, 
the more curious the conclusions to which it gives rise. 
If human beings were not free to act in unanticipated 
ways, their behavior would of course more easily lend it · 
self to study and prediction. What Skinner may be thinking 
is-to phrase it In the vernacular-that accepting the 
hypothesis that man is not free would make the study of 
human behavior a helluva lot easier. " Sit still! Don't 
move!" the professional photographer often says to his 
subject, meaning that the photograph will be clearer ii the 
subject engages In no unpredictable movements. The por-
trait painter makes a simi lar request of his subject. This is 
suggestive of Michael Scriven's remark that "the 
logic ian's perennial temptation is to make the portrait 
neat and perhaps the sitter will become neat."" Just as it 
is easier to take aim at a nonmoving target, so It is simpler 
to s tudy an object that " stays put." Whether it is of the 
nature of the object to stay put is conveniently Ignored. In-
stead of beginning with disinterested inquiry Into human 
behavior, we are asked to begin with an assumption about 
human nature that is not only unsupported by the evi-
dence but, indeed, is denied by it. Even so exact a science 
as physics recognizes the indeterminacy of atomic par· 
ticles, to say nothing of the questionableness of the 
il\ll, 197& 
cause-effect principle as an adequate explanation of 
natural phenomena. Moreover, theorizing about human 
nature is a different undertaking from studying human 
behavior and, if engaged in on a scientific basis, would 
properly follow rather than precede the latter. 
Only a wholly static universe would be entirely pre· 
dictable. Hence, predictability is related not only to sim· 
plicity and mechanism but also to fixity, not to mention its 
reliance upon an outmoded physics. If, as William James 
once observed, ours is "a universe with the lld off," if 
universal processes are charged with novelty and 
burgeoning with change, if life is an ongoing and dynamic 
affair, if novelty Is in the scheme of things and not merely 
superimposed upon it, then a radically different approach 
to a study of human nature and life processes ls called for. 
Mechanism needs to be supplanted by field theory, and 
prejudicial hypotheses by inquiry. To hold that It Is essen· 
tial that we begin a study of human behavior by 
hypothesizing that human beings lack freedom is 
equivalent to assuming without question that they have 
no ability to engage in acts of choice. Since the only kinds 
of choice that deserve the name are those that are freely 
undertaken, choice Is essential to democracy, for the 
ability to choose without undue restraint and to act ac-
cordingly is precisely what is meant by freedom. 
If there is to be a science of human behavior-and If II 
is to be truly a science and not merely an 
apologetics-then it is obligated to divest i tself of Its 
biased premises in order to become descriptive, objective 
and impartial. Inquiry into the nature of human behavior 
will need to displace " the hypothesis that man is not 
free," for the former is open-ended, whereas the latter 
begs the question. The question, " Is man free to behave in 
unpredictable ways?" Is thus bypassed; and the 
hypothesis remains undisturbed. This is not unlike saying 
that the hypothesis that ghosts exist is essential to 
studying their behavior, thus circumventing any question 
as to their actual existence. To begin with the hypothesis 
that man is not free demands corollary acceptance of 
human beings as capable of no more than responsive 
behavior- as devoid of choice, as deprived of any k ind of 
self.control, and as essentially no diflerent from 
nonhumans. Yet, even a trapped animal struggles to be 
free, just as animals in captivity are restricted in what they 
are free to do. As the noted prlmatologist Scott Lindbergh 
has observed: ' 'Monkeys in zoos are like convicts. They 
have no choice in anything. And choice is essential to 
keep intelligence alive. Animals are like people. They need 
to be able to do things for themselves." To say that man's 
most prized possession is freedom may be to use 
figurative language. But it may be worth noting that such 
an assertion is more often made with greater fervor and 
understanding of its import by those who have ex-
perienced bondage than by those who have never been en-
slaved. 
VII. Concerning Poets, Women, and Hens 
Are human beings responsible for what they do? 
What role does the self play in determining human con· 
duct? Or are all human acts prompted by forces ex· 
traneous to themselves, and is the term self merely a 
metaphor? We shall examine these questions in greater 
detail in a later section. Suffice it to say at this point that 
to em brace behaviorism is to accept the thesis that 
self hood is nonexistent. What we are accustomed to 
calling self is simply genetic endowment plus conditioning 
; 
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and has no e.xlstence of its own. Human beings are thus 
relieved of assuming any moral obligation for what they 
do, for instead of having chosen to do this or that, their 
behavior has resulted from factors over which they had no 
con trol. Neither saints nor sinners are responsible for 
their actions; hence moral acts are no more deserving of 
praise than are criminal acts deserving of condemnation. 
Nor are artistic accomplishments any more suitable Ob· 
Jec ts of admiration than are diabolical schemes flt objects 
of scorn. According to Skinner, " having" a poem, for 
example, is essentially no different from "having" a baby. 
Nor is it any different from a hen laying an egg. In each 
case it is simply descriptive of a natural phenomenon for 
which neither the pregnant woman, nor the "pregnant" 
poet, nor the laying hen is primarily responsible. The poet 
Is no more deserving of acclaim for having written his 
poem than is the woman for having had her baby or the 
hen for having laid its egg. "Writing a poem," says Skin-
ner, "is the sort of thing men and women do as men and 
women, having a baby is the sort of thing a woman does as 
a woman, and laying an egg is the sort of thing a hen does 
as a hen." We are able to discover the causes of our ac-
tions " by analyzing the genetic and individual histories 
responsible for our behavior ... . "" 
But suppose we were to choose a different cast of 
characters without altering one whit Skinner's line of 
reasoning. Suppose we were to say that committing 
crimes is the short of thing men and women do as men 
and women, becoming a prostitute is the sort of thing a 
woman does as a woman, and stalking prey is the sort of 
thing a wild an Imai does as a wild an Ima I. And suppose we 
were to add that, just as the poet had no responsibility for 
writing his poem, neither can criminals or prostitutes be 
held accountable for their criminal acts or prostitution. In 
the case of the wild animal, Skinner's explanation will suf-
lice. But this Is precisely the point. The wlld animal 
behaves as II does because it cannot behave otherwise; 
accordingly, II would be foolish either to praise or to 
blame it. It lacks developed powers of reflection, II lacks 
moral sensibility, it lacks ability to choose one course of 
action over another-and so condemning its behavior 
would be like condemning a tornado for its destructive 
force. Having committed the genetic fallacy, Skinner then 
proceeds to commit the fallacy of overgeneralization. To 
suppose that because man is an animal he is therefore 
nothing but an animal is to commit what the geneticist Sir 
Julian Huxley has called "the nothlng·but fallacy ," which 
results from an equation of all human traits with 
nonhuman animal traits. What we are being asked to ac-
cept is that, since nonhuman animals (or, to use Skinner's 
example, hens) are not responsible lor what they do, 
therefore human beings are equally nonresponslble lor 
what they do. The flaw in thi s sort of reasoning might 
become more apparent if the argument were reversed, 
resulting in the conclusion that, since human beings are 
responsible for their actions, therefore nonhumans are 
equally responsible, in which case a sow could be 
arrested and brought to trial tor the crime ol devouring her 
young. One argument has about the same amount of 
credibility as the other-which Isn't much. 
Arguments against the thesis that human beings are 
absolutely autonomous in all their thoughts and actions 
constitute child's play. No philosophic profundity is 
required to recognize that we are at all times engaged in 
interaction with some kind of environment-be it 
physical, psychological, religious, cultural, social or 
A 
whatever-and that previous experience plays a 
significant role in shaping present and future behavior. 
But II is one thing to acknowledge that prior experience Is 
taken into account, Is influential, becomes a contributing 
factor, or has a bearing in respect to our behavior, and 
quite another lo hold that it predetermines our behavior. In 
rejecting human autonomy, what behaviorists do, in ef· 
feet, is to substitute environmental autonomy. By casting 
the human being in a passive role of responder, they cast 
the environment (plus genetic history) in an active ro le of 
controller , overlooking the fact that abject submission on 
the part of one or autonomous control on the part of the 
other is virtually never the case. 
If we were to lall lrom an airplane without a parachute 
at a height of 16,000 feet, we would likely have lost control 
of our destiny, and the environmental field might be said 
to have taken over almost completely. In times of 
catastrophes such as cyclones, earthquakes and strikes 
of lightning, our powers of choice are temporari ly 
minimized; and we are said to be at the mercy of the 
elements. But such Instances are comparatively rare; they 
are far outnumbered by examples of man 's ability to con· 
trol the conditions under which he lives. Each time an 
engineer constructs a dam, each time a physician In· 
terv enes in the natural course of a disease, each time new 
and better means of communication and transportation 
are devised, human beings are playing an active role In 
shaping and controlling their environments. 
The concert artist who holds an audience enthralled, 
the conductor whose every gesture conveys subtle nu-
ances of interpretation to an orchestra, the writer whose 
literary genius captivates the reader, the actor or actress 
whose performance is acclaimed as brilliant-a ll are 
likewise in control of what they are doing, all are shaping 
and creating a special kind of environment. In such latter 
instances, the argument is not that they are absolutely 
autonomous, for they must enlist the co-operation ol fac· 
tors other than themselves. But they are nevertheless 
exercising a significant degree of autonomy in that they 
are creating, inventing, or bringing into being a different 
set of conditions than would otherwise prevail. Human 
beings both act upon and respond to their environments. 
The relationship between Individuals and their en-
vironments is transactional rather than unilateral. In fact, 
it Is this peculiar ability of humans to conceive and to ao· 
tualize modifications of their environments that con· 
stllutes their uniqueness as human beings and thus 
distinguishes them from other species. 
VIII. The Concept of Selfhood 
Throughout our discussion the role that self plays In 
this transactional process still remains clouded, perhaps 
for the reason that the terms self and self hood have yet to 
be clearly defined. Behaviorism would of course reject the 
notion of selfhood, just as it would discount the existence 
of free will. Rejection o f such terms as existences or en-
tities, however, is not equivalent to their rejection as con-
cepts. Behaviorism Itself is a concept In the sense that it 
cannot be pointed to as " existing" anywhere. Not· 
withstanding, little is gained by dogmatically maintaining 
that the self exists or that human beings have tree will, 
and letting It go at that, without bothering to clarify what Is 
meant when such assertions are made. What, then, does It 
mean to say that the self exists? To exist is, in familiar 
terms, to have weight and occupy space. Obviously, the 
self cannot be so classlfled. To say that to exist means to 
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have temporal-spatial d imensions doesn't help much 
either, for this wou ld require that the self be locatable in 
time and space. The edge that the behaviorists have on 
those who understand the sel f to exist in some 
autonomous sense Is that the notion of a hypostatized 
self is scien tifically Indefensible. And so the behaviorist 
confronts us with deciding between discarding the self as 
a discredited entity under the guise of scientific rigor, and 
holding on to it in the name of some sort of metaphysics. 
The fact is that we are not obi igated to settle for either of 
these alternatives. 
Just as water is not simply two· parts of hydrogen and 
one of oxygen but is a liquid exhibiting properties quite 
different from either of its constituent elements, just as a 
child evinces qualities quite different from those of the 
parents who produced him, so the self displays traits of i ts 
own that are appreciably di fferent from whatever forces 
may have contributed to Its creation. The emergence of 
consciousness, moreover, suggests degrees of self· 
awareness and powers of introspection that neither genes 
nor conditioning can account for. What is called self 
emerges from the act ive interplay of human organisms 
with their environmen tal f ields , and especially from the in-
teraction of human beings with their distinctively social 
environments. Self is neither a thing or entity possessed 
nor a mere metaphor; It is an emergent function, descrip· 
tive of the various ways in which humans both respond to 
and control the ambient fields in which they live, move, 
and have their being. Acc ord ingly , self may be defined as 
a conceptual term denoting an individual's peculiar 
awareness of his own existence in relation to the world 
about him, and especially of those unique traits that set 
him apart from others. 
Simil arly, free wi ll is not an entity or metaphysical 
substance; nor is i t autonomous in the sense that it exists 
in isolation from contexlual circumstances. It is simply an 
iii-chosen term that needs to be redefined as the power to 
choose without unwarranted restraint from among com-
peting alternatives. Si nee no choice deserves the name 
that is not freely undertaken, it carries with i t the burden 
of moral responsibil ity for the consequences to which it 
may lead. The fact that nonhuman animals give no in-
dication of acting in any moral sense but behave on the 
basis of Insti nct, habituation , or conditioning 
necessitates the conclusion that morality is a uniquely 
human construct. Nor can any human act be dignified as 
moral except as It Is an outgrowth of reflection, intention 
and consideration of the desirabil i ty of all its probable 
consequences. 
IX. The ls-Ought Dichotomy-A Backward Look 
Two final considerations are in order. The first has to 
do with an attempt to clarify the relationship between 
statements of fact and statements of value; the second 
concerns a neglected but much-needed distinction be· 
tween generic behavior and human conduct. Pace David 
Hume and latter-day British empiric ists and philosophic 
analysts, it has become fashionable to regard empirical 
assertions and valuational assertions as constituting 
separate universes of discourse-commonly referred to 
as the is-ought dichotomy. According to this view, factual 
(or synthetic) statements consist of assertions that can be 
empirically veri fied; furthermore, on ly empirically 
verifiable assertions may be considered to be 
propositions. The assertion, for example, "It Is raining 
today" is factually true in so far as evidence can be cited 
t.()VCATJONAL C01'\ 'SIO£R1\ 110NS, Vol. (>, No. 1. faJ!, 1978 
in support of it, in so far as what constitutes evidence can 
be agreed upon, and in so far as the evidence is public ly 
demonstrable. When such conditions are met, the 
proposit ion wou ld then "compel the assent" of any im· 
partial observer, i.e., it may be said to be true. A more 
technical assertion, like "E ~ MC2," would need to meet 
the same criteria, with the understanding, of course, that 
evidence in this case might be quasi-mathematical, and 
that "publicly demonstrable" would no doubt refer to its 
demonstrability to a community of qualified physicists. In 
neither case, however, could such propositions be judged 
as true on any such basis as intuition, feelin g or any other 
sort of nonempirical "aut hority." 
The corollary of this view is that statements of value 
are of an entirely different order and are traceable to 
emotion rather than rooted in fact. They are regarded as 
•·veiled imperatival utterances," which is to say that they 
are either direct or indirect exhortations to action. "Close 
the window" is an obvious exhortation to act in a specific 
way, and so is neither true nor false. Sentences couched 
in the indicative mood may pass as assertions of fact; but 
if they conceal a value. an "ought," or an imperative, they 
are said to be removed from the category of the synthetic. 
The judgmental assertion, " The welfare system of this 
country is in need of reform," appears superficially to be a 
statement of fact. It is phrased in the indicative mood. It 
omits the word "ought " and seems to be an observation of 
fact, of a particular state of affairs. But what is actually 
being asserted, It may be argued, Is not a fact but a 
feeling. What the assertion really says is, " I feel that the 
welfare system needs to be reformed," or, "The welfare 
system ought to be reformed, " or, more directly, "Reform 
the welfare system!" 
The judgmental assertion about the wel fare system 
is, like all other judgments, reduced to no more than an e*· 
pression of emotion. So conceived, truth assertions 
(propositions) are regarded as scientific and testable, 
while judgmental assertions (valuations) are regarded as 
emotive and untestable-and never the twain shall meet. 
In the words of A.J . Ayer: " , .. since the expression of a 
value judgement is not a proposition, the question of truth 
or falsehood does not here ari se.•• . . exhortations to 
moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or 
commands which are designed to provoke . .. action of a 
certain sort. According ly, they do not belong to any 
branch of philosophy or science. As for expressions of 
ethical judgements, we have not yet determined how they 
should be classified."' ' 
If philosophy differs from science in any cogent way, 
the difference lies In recognition of science as largely 
descriptive and phenomenological and of phi.losophy as 
Interpretive and judgmental. The phi losopher is, as it 
were, an I mpresslonist ; while the scientist Is a 
photographer. Although appropriate distinctions may be 
made, the mistake commonly made is to presume a gap or 
disparity between these two domains instead of viewing 
them as complementary. "How satisfying," says Mr. 
Gradgrind in Dickens' Hard Times, "is the possession of 
fact, which does away with any mystery surrounding our 
daily lifei"-forgettlng that to know all facts and possess 
no feelings is not to live at all. What does it mean? Is 
everywhere the paramount question. for no factual or 
descriptive statement has any significance except as It is 
interpreted in some way or assigned some kind of 
meaning. An out-of-context fact-i.e., a fact devoid of its 
bearing upon human intE?rests and human concerns-is 
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utterly meani ngless. Thus, the assertion that Sanskrit was 
the ancient Aryan language of the Hindus of India, despite 
Its factual accuracy, is infinitely less meaningful than that 
a close friend or relative has been seriously injured in an 
accident. 
Like the stimulus of our earlier discussion, a fact has 
no intrinsic meaning. II assumes meaning when we judge 
or interpret It in some manner, value or devalue It, assign 
Importance or unimportance to it, react to i t in a particular 
way- which is 10 say that facts are what they mean. To 
speak of a value·fr ee fact is to speak of a fac t with no utter 
significance, ror meaning consists In what Dewey has 
called " the emotion it stirs, the thought it sus tains." The 
assertion " II Is raining today" Is understood in terms of 
what it means as distinguished from what It merely in· 
forms. It may mean that a proposed picnic wlfl hav e to be 
canceled, or that crops wil l now have a better chance of 
surviving, or that an intended vi sit wil l need to be post· 
paned, or any of countless other things, each of which is 
likely to be fraught with pleasure or frustration. Even so 
apparently dispassionate an assertion as "E = MC2 " Is 
modified and takes on meaning by virtue of its affective 
content. II may simply mean that mass and energy are in· 
terconvertible and summon visions of the benefits to be 
derived from nuclear fission. Or i t may symbolize the 
atomic bomb, mushroom clouds, and the tragedy o f 
Hiroshima, and cause us to recoil in horror. All of this is 
another way of saying that the moral, judgmental or 
valuational content of propositions is not something 
apart; on the contrary, it is precisely what endows them 
with meaning, without which lhoy have no value or 
signi ficance. 
Equall y indefensible is the notion that valuationaf 
assertions are unrooted in or somehow disconnected 
from any empirically verifiable context, or that they in 
some way transcend experience. Judgments are properly 
rendered and valuations properly made only by taking into 
account existing situations, i.e., facts. What ought to be 
done in a parti cular circumstance depends upon what is 
the case. " Ou ght" assertions are thus subject to criticism 
as to their warrant in much the same way as are synthetic 
assertions. To say, tor example, that a street ought to be 
paved would be warranted onty If the facts indicate<! that 
Its present condition was unsatisfactory, that it had 
chuckholes that Interfered with safe driving. that It had a 
heavy llow of traffi c, etc. To say that a greater abundance 
o f food is needed In a given area wou Id be warranted only 
If the facts indicated that the particular area referred to 
was in short supply of food. That certain things are prized, 
valued and revered and that others are scorned, devalue<! 
and condemned Is not only itself a fact but it is derived 
from fact, i.e., It Is warranted by knowledge. Clean air is 
prized because of the fact that It is conducive to health, 
while pollut ion Is condemned because it is known to con · 
tribute to respiratory disease. The growing of vegetables 
Is va lued because of the fact that their consumption Is 
necessary to a balanced diet, while malaria-carrying 
mosquitoes are decried because they are known to be 
harmful to health. 
The traditional argument that an "ought" assertion is 
not deducible from an " is" assertion will no longer suf· 
li
ce, 
not because It is invalid bu t because it substitutes 
"slide-rule" logic for fruitful Inquiry. It represents a 
holdover from an Obsolescent syllogistic or Aristotelian 
sort of reasoning which is rooted not in human experience 
and human affairs but in not much more than esoteric in· 
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tellectio n. To argue that there is utterly no relationship 
between what is true and what Is va lued is not only un-
warranted but unt enable. As Dewey has observed, "The 
notion that valuations do not exist In empirical fact and 
that lherefore va lue·conceptions have to be imported from 
a source outside experience is one of the most curious 
beliefs the mind of man has ever entertained."" He goes 
on to say that 
. . . at the present time the widest gap In kn owledge 
Is that which exists between humanistic and non· 
humanistic subjects. The breach will disappear, the 
gap be filled and science be manifest as an 
operating unlly fn fact and not merely in idea when 
the conclusions of impersonal non-humanistic 
science are employed in guiding the course of 
distinctively human behavior, that, namely , which is 
Influenced by emoti on and desire in the framing o f 
means and ends; for desire, having ends·in·view, and 
hence involving va lua tions, is the characteristic that 
marks off human from nonhuman behavior. On the 
other side, the science that Is put to distinctively 
human use is that In which warranted ideas about 
the nonhuman world are integrated with emotion as 
human traits. In this integration not only is science 
Itself a value (since it is the expression and 
fulf illment of a special human desire and interes t) 
but it is the supreme means of the valid deter-
mination of all valuations in all aspects of human 
and social life ." 
Joining of the factual with the valuational is not 
without its educational import. Alth ough It may be argued 
that how learning occurs is a factual question, and that 
what Is valued is a philosophic one, the two become lnex· 
tricably interwoven when it is recogniied that what Is 
learned and how it is learned assume significance only in 
terms of ends or purposes. Of what value is such-a nd·such a 
learning? thus overrides the question of how a particular 
kind of lea rning occurs or how i t is best facilitated. Ex· 
perlmentatfon concerning the nature of the lea rning 
process may yield the conclusio n that, given a certain 
organism and a specific set of environing cond itions, this 
is the way learning occurs. But such an assertion leaves 
untouched the larger question of whether a designated 
learning device ought to be used, or whether what is 
learned by means of it ought to be lea rned at all. It is 
becoming ever more apparent that an ls·ought dualism is 
both tenuous and stultifying , suggesting as it does thal a 
fact need have no relevance to value and that a value need 
have no referent In fact. Dissolution of such a dichotomy 
would bring about recognition of the scientific and the 
valuatfonal as reciproc al rather than as disparate 
categories. II wou ld join science of learning with 
philosophy of education In common cause by utilizing the 
kno wledge that research supplies toward a real ization of 
ends that are ind ividually and socially defensible. It might 
even provide for the emergence of some sort of 
wholeness or coordinating principle that may enable us to 
regain our educational perspective. 
X. Generic Behavior and Human Conduct- A Needed 
Distinction 
It Is commonplace that everyth ing that exists Is In 
some sense unique. No two atoms, no two flo wers, no two 
snowflakes, no two sunsets, no two twins are precisely 
ldentlcal. In the animal kingdom It Is the unique charac· 
teristlcs that various organisms exhibit that enable us to 
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Identify them as belonging to a certain species, not. 
withstanding the fact that they may share many traits in 
coinmon with other species. By contrast, to say that every 
form o f life and matter engages in some sort of behavior, 
or that behavior characterizes all that exists, Is a loosely 
grandiose rather than a sharply definitive assertion. for II 
falls to account for any uniqueness among the entitles to 
which II Is applied. So used, the term behavior rs all· 
encompassing, ranging all the way from the actions of 
subatomic particles to those of galaxies , from the actions 
of amoebae to those of human beings. What Is probably 
being taken Into account in asserting that all things 
behave Is that movement of some sort Is everywhere 
present - be It the slow progression of a glacier or the 
speed of light. When the term behavior is thus used, no 
distinction Is made between behavior that Is a result of an 
object's being acted upon (as the case of a glacier) and 
behavior that Is self·in itiated (as in the case of human 
beings). Such a view fails to differentiate between reactive 
and creative behavior. If, in reply to asking what does not 
behave, we are told that nothing exists that does not 
behave, then the term behavior ceases to have any 
definitive meaning, for it cannot be distinguished from 
nonbehavlor. By way of analogy, if everything were wet, 
dry would have no meaning; or, if there were no darkness, 
light would have no meaning. Terms have meaning and 
thus are definitive only as they can be differentiated from 
other terms. 
Does this Imply that the term behavior should be 
restric ted to nonhuman forms of l ife and matter and that ll 
Is Inapplicable to human beings? Does ii mean that human 
beings do not behave? Does II d iscount the validity o f a 
science of human behavior? Not at all. Human beings, 
along with all o ther l iving organisms and physical entitles, 
dp act In ways that may properly be termed behavioral, If 
for no other reason than that they engage in movement. 
But whereas all engage In movement, and whereas many 
human activities may constitute no more than movement, 
all such activities fall within the rubric of noninitlated or 
responsive behavior. In response to nutrients in the soil, 
rainf all, and conducive temperatures, a plant grows and 
blooms; in response to proper training, a dog obeys Its 
master; as a result of the pressing of certain keys, a 
typewriter responds by producing typewritten woras and 
sentences; In noticing the changing of a traffic light from 
green to red , a motorist responds by applying the brakes 
of a car. All such behavior is responsive, and responsive 
behavior Is as characteristic of human beings as it Is o f 
nonhumans. But ll wil l scarcely do to conclude that 
because human beings engage i n responsive kinds of 
behavior, therefore all human behavior Is responsive, I.e., 
that human behavior Is Identi fiable in no other sense. This 
would be like saying that because machinery Is used In 
the manufacture or automobiles, therefore all machinery 
is so used and Is Identifi able in no other sense. 
Not long ago arguments about such Issues as tree 
will vs. determinism and heredity vs. environment 
dominated the educational scene. The unexamined 
assumption that exclusive attachment to one position or 
the other was our only option precluded consideration 
that a qualified acceptance of both positions was not only 
possible but reasonable. Inquiry is thwarted and 
dogmatism creeps in when it is supposed that only one 
point of view Is completely right and that any other is all 
wrong. The mistake that behaviorists make is to conclude 
that because so·called free will cannot be relfied, man is 
fAU, 197(1 
therefore not free, and so is Incapable of choice. What is 
overlooked is that to choose Is to engage in a kind of 
behavior, I.e., that choice has Its behavioral d imensions. It 
is crucial to add, however, that a "choice" that has been 
predetermined is not a choice at all, for to speak of a "con· 
ditioned choice" is to employ mutually contradictory 
language. Thus viewed, selective behavior is not choice i t· 
self, nor is it the whole of it; rather. It represents but the 
observable tip or overt culmination o f choosing. Whereas 
the existentialist would have us believe that we are always 
con fronted with choice, the behaviorist would have us 
believe that we are never tree to choose. Why not say that 
we experience some situations In which the possibilities 
for choice are virtually unlimiled and others where they 
are severely restricted? 
This suggests that in situations where individuals are 
relatively free to control, take charge of, or assume 
responsibility for their actions, the term conduct be used, 
and that the generic term behavior be applied in 
describing actions and movements that are merely 
responsive. One does not speak, for example, of atoms, 
worms, hens, dogs, trees or stars as in any sense con· 
ducting themselves, for their behavior is for the most part 
in response to forces over which they have virtually no 
control. Even here, however, It Is important to add that an 
object itself is as much a determiner or Its behavior as are 
external forces that play upon II. A marble and a wad of 
chewing gum may be placed on th e same inclined plane. 
Both are in the same gravitational field. Yet each responds 
differently. The marble selects to roll , while the wad of 
gum selects to remain in place. Such selectivity is, of 
cou rse, neither conscious, deliberate nor purposeful. It is 
simply il lustr ative that lhe nature o f an object itself is as 
much a selec tor of Its behavior as are the external forces 
to which it responds. Selective ability thus understood is 
characteristic of all forms o f matter; whereas choice 
represents that peculiar refinement of selective ability 
that renders it reflective and purposeful, and that makes 
possible a realiwtion of foreseeable ends. According ly, in 
so far as it suggests a significant degree of conscious, 
purposive self-regulation, conduct is a uniquely human 
trait and cannot be applied to any other form of life or mat-
ter. 
We are often misled Into denying the uniqueness of 
human beings by the argument that their biolog ical and 
physiological equipment is essentially no different from 
that of their nearest nonhuman relatives, all of which 
display varying degrees of intelligence. But this argument 
misses the poin t, for the distinctiveness of human beings 
lies not in their physiolog ical equipment but in the 
uniquely human ways in which they are capable of putting 
such equipment to use. As some geneticists maintain, 
human evolution in a stric tly biological sense has 
probably run its course, but human evolution in terms of 
the development of moral and social intelligence has 
probably just begun. Mastery of the forces of nature out· 
side us has outstripped our abili ty to master the forces of 
nature within us. We have succeeded to a terrifying extent 
in controlling our physical envi ronment, but we are only 
beginning to learn the importance of contr olling ourselves 
in a moral sense. This means, first. that man's future 
evolution will likely be in terms of developing and refining 
his intellectual, mo ral and aesthetic powers; and, sec-
ondly, that for the first time In human history the course of 
man's future evolution will be within man's collective 
power to control. This is neither an optimistic nor a 
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pessimistic observation, for i t opens up possibilities for 
both dire and beneficent consequences. Impartial ly It 
places the burden of choice in regard to the kind of future 
world man prefers to live in squarely on man's shoulders; 
it places man in charge of his own destiny. Whatever out· 
comes emerge will depend upon how human beings 
choose to conduct themselves, and how they choose to 
conduct themselves will depend largely upon the kind of 
education to which we choose to expose them. How, then, 
should education be conceived? 
To ask, What are the purposes of education? is to ask 
a meaningless question, for it assumes that purposes are 
ready-made, lying about, extant, waiting to be discovered. 
A better question to ask would be: In light o f past ex· 
perience, present condit ions and future posslbllilles. how 
shall we best formulate the purposes of education? This is 
a perennial question . It needs to be addressed again and 
again, for as conditions change and as further experience 
is gained, purposes will be correspondingly modified: and 
suitable answers for one generation may be unsuitable for 
the next. This Is not to advocate a wishy-washy relativism; 
nor does It mean that whatever ends have served us well in 
the past must be discarded simply because they are not 
new. On the contrary, i t means that no educational Ideal 
can claim exemption from periOdic review, and that en· 
during values may as often be found worthy of relentlon 
as innovations may be found wanting. Whether or not It 
reflects a paucity of educational thought, the fact Is that 
most recent educational Innovations have appeared in the 
form of teaching and learning devices. What is lost sight 
of when eduoa11on Is so narrowly conceived is that no 
teaching or lea rning device is worth its salt that divorces . 
ilsell lrom the ends It Is designed to achieve. Devices are 
by definition means , they are instrumentalities, and so 
they are not self·contained but are to be judged only In 
terms of whatever purposes they are meant to serve. 
Behavior manipulation or conditioning cannot be 
faulted on grounds that It doesn't bring resu lts. Massive 
evidence could be cited to refute such a charge. Indeed, 
much of human history is an account of the conquest for 
control of human thought and human behavior. But 
desired results need to be carefully d istinguished from 
results that are truly desirable. What is merely desired 
may be based upon no more than impulse, caprice. habit 
or tradition, to say nothing of self-serving interests; while 
what is In fact desirable requires enlistment of powers of 
reflection, Judgment and evaluation. Awareness of what is 
merely desired Is shared by humans and nonhumans alike; 
but formulation of what is desirable is characteristic only 
of human beings, for It demands choosing among alt er· 
natives in regard to their long.range individual and social 
benefits. 
Preoccupation with fads, devices and gadgetry has 
distracted us from attending to education's more Im· 
portant functions. Preoccupation with behavior 
manipulation has deflected our concern from the at· 
tltudes. values and ideals of the learner. As a result, we 
have prized not knowledge, reponslbillty, and un· 
derstandlng but a semblance of them; we have forgotten 
that to live without purpose is not to live in any human 
sense at all. If, with Dewey, we ho ld that "the ideal aim of 
education Is creation of power of self·control""-and If 
such aim Is taken seriously rather than as platitude-a 
shift from preoccupation with behavior to concern for 
conduct Is In order. Concern with reflection for its own sake 
divorces thought from its practical issue in conduct, while 
12 
exc lusive concern with behavior falls to provide for its 
being a culmination of reflection. Although all behavior 
may be regarded as in some sense controlled, that unique 
kind of behavior over which Individuals exercise self· 
control and that is not 11xcluslvely shaped by factors ex· 
traneous to themselves is precisely what is meant by C·On· 
duct. 
Use or the term conduct has the advantage or 
distinguishing thoughtful, purposive and morally sen· 
sitive activities from those that are merely accidental or 
habituated. Conduct requires acceptance of responsibility 
for actions deliberately undertaken as over against in· 
different and merely responsive kinds of behavior: it 
represents a conjoining of reflec tion with action. In so far 
as self-control is not Inborn, It Is a crucial task of 
education to create, nurture and develop it in individually 
and socially produclive ways. To learn Is to grow in 
powers of responsible decislon·making; and to educate is 
to foster utili zation of such powers in the intelligent con· 
duct of life. All skills and knowledge are necessary means 
to this end. 
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This article raises questions con· 
cerning the focus of research in 
teacher effectiveness. 
Research in 
teacher 
effectiveness: 
A case of 
mistaken 
identity 
by John Holton 
The Ohio State University 
A common sense notion in teacher education goes 
something like this: "to discover the things we ought to 
teach teachers, we need to discover those teaching 
behaviors which seem to make a difference in student 
achievement and student satisfaction and teach them to 
teachers." As Francis Fuller and Oliver Bown have It in 
their contribution to the 75th NSSE Yearbook, we need to 
discover "what kinds of interventions by what kinds of in· 
terveners in what contexts elicit what responses from 
what subjects."' 
These discoveries will be made by using the methods 
of empirical science. Empirical science, the wonder-
working steed, which has discovered so much about 
nature, will produce the necessary information about men 
and society. 
As Robert Merton describes them, the social sciences 
have as their goal the discovery of theory. This theory 
is defined as "clear, verifiable statements of relationships 
between specified variables."' The unspoken assumption 
in the search for theory in the social sciences Is that 
human enoeavors are similar to natural events and 
therefore can be reduced to the same sorts of laws and 
theories as natural events. The lynchpln of this analogy is 
the notion that human behavior, like the behavior of 
molecules and atoms, is determined by external forces. 
Once all of the requisite conditions are met to boil the 
water, there Is a high probability that the water will boll; 
once all of the requisite conditions are met for the student 
to learn, the studen.t will learn. The task for the 
educational researcher, then, Is to discover the requisite 
conditions for learning. 
14 
In teacher education, some researchers have been 
looking for those teaching behaviors which are associated 
with student gain and student satisfaction. One con· 
venient compendium of such research Is Dunkin and Bid· 
dle's The Study of Teaching.' In this work may be found 
discussion and summaries of some hundreds of ob· 
se
rvational 
studies of classroom teaching. While this 
book is a worthwhile conllibulion to the literature of 
teacher education, it suffers from the difficulties that 
seem to plague research in teacher ef · 
fectiveness-inconsistent results. It Is common to find 
entries like the following In the summary tables: 
1) Teacher's use of questions is unrelated lo f)upif at· 
tltudes, and, in contradiction, it Is also found that 
higher teachers' use of questions is associated 
with more positive pupi l attitudes.• (Dunkin and 
Bidd le, p, 139). 
2) Experimental treatment given to teachers is 
unrelated to the amount of pupil initiation. In con. 
tradiction it is also found that Experimental treat· 
ment given to teachers increases the amount of 
pupil initiation.• (Dunkin and Biddle, p. 141). 
3) Teacher indirectness Is unrelated to cognitive level 
o f classroom discourse. In contrad iction it Is also 
found that greater teacher Indirectness Is 
associated with higher cognitive levels of 
classroom discourse!(Dunkln and Biddle, p. 115). 
The general explanation given by social scientists for 
problems has two parts. Dunkin and Biddle describe the 
methodological problems-problems of sampling, research 
design and the like-and hope t at as more work is 
done, these problems will be lessened. The other part of 
the explanation is historical. We have not discovered 
Newton Ian laws for the social sciences as yet because we 
haven't been working at It long enough. In Merton's words, 
;'Between twentieth century physics and twentieth cen· 
tury sociology stand billions of man-hours of sustained, 
discip lined, and cumulative research."' 
It will be the purpose of this essay to suggest that 
some o f the contradictory results in research on teacher 
effectiveness are rooted not solely in methodologic al or 
historical factors. Rather, it will be suggested, the con· 
tradictory resulls have th eir origin in a conceptual muddle 
which will not be resolved by methodological 
sophistication or by more investments in man-hours. The 
suggestion of the muddle is based on the work of Richard 
Taylor In his book Action and Purpose.• It seems to me 
that Taylor provides us with a valuable Insight into the 
nature of human action and purpose. His Insights seem 
especially germane to discussions about teaching. 
The Muddle 
Science deals with facts. The theories of physical 
science exp lain relationships between facts. Heating a 
pan of water makes the water molecules move laster. (Or, 
when the pan of water Is heated, the water molecules 
move faster.) In order for the scientist to create his clear 
statements about the relationships between the specified 
variables, he must be able to translate the verbal descrip· 
lion into a factual description . Water becomes H20 and 
heat becomes degrees Celsius. A statement about H20 
needs less inference than a statement about water. Low 
inference statements mean that investigators can be more 
or less certain that they are dealing with the same c;uan · 
titles as other investigators. So much HCI (of a certain 
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standard of pufi ty and concentration) wi II react with so 
much CU (of a certain purity) to form so much H2 and so 
much Cu Cl and so much heat. 
The ability to reduce general statements to tangible 
quantities is crucial to scientific investigations. The social 
scientist who wishes to use the methods of empirical 
science must abide by its canons. Researchers in teacher 
effectiveness recognize this imperative. Investigators of 
" higher order questions" or " teacher indirectness" recog. 
nize that they must reduce these general statements 
to tang Ible quantities. The variables must become " low in· 
ference" variables. This is done by reducing the general 
statements like "higher order questions" to certain 
behaviors- to movements which signal "higher order 
question" or "teacher indirectness." In the Flanders In· 
teraction Analysis Categories system, for example, one 
category of indirect teacher influence is described as 
follows: "p raises or encourages students action or 
behavior. Jokes that release tension, not at the expense of 
another individual, nodding head or saying " uh huh?" or 
"go on" are included." ' 
Richard Taylor makes a distinction between human 
movements and human actions. Movements are events 
like the beating of a heart or the growth of hair. Such 
movements can obviously be reduced to tangible quan· 
titles. For example, it is known that the pH of normal blood 
ranges from 7.39 to 7.41. The C02 combining power 
(venous plasma) is 50·70 ml/100 ml of blood = 21 -
30mEq/L." Taylor distinguishes such movements from 
purposeful human action. Unlike movements, human ac· 
tions are goal directed. "My heart beats" describes a 
movement. "I am reading a novel" describes an action 
which is directed toward a goal-"1 want to read the 
novel." My movements to get a book are means to my goal 
but they are meaningless in and of themselves. Actions 
have intentions behind them. Intentions cannot be 
discovered by observing one's movements: 
They are notions that are read into a situation .. . and 
never concepts that are empirically derived from any 
situation. They are, In fact, derived entirely from 
one's own understanding of himself as a purposeful 
being. But one never observes-notes, notices, in· 
fers from signs-that he himself is trying to ac· 
complish something, that it is striving toward an end 
or a goal. He sometimes knows that he is, but not 
that way." 
Here then is the muddle. Events which may be pur· 
poseful-llke teacher use of higher order questions-are 
treated as though they are simple movements. When an in· 
vestigator reduces the concept of "higher order question" 
to its low inference movements, he misses the Intention. 
Indeed, it is impossible for him to discover the Intention 
no matter how careful he is to define and describe the 
movement. The contradictory results about higher order 
questions reported in Dunkin and Biddle might come from 
the undiscovered intentions of the teachers and the 
students in the studies. As recenlly as 1976, higher order 
questions were sti II giving i nvestlgators problems. Barak 
Rosenshine commented that " The lack of significant 
FAll, 1978 
results for complex or higher level questions has puzzled 
all the researchers, and has led us to conclude that we 
need to rethink what is meant by types of questions and 
their effects.'"' 
A more careful definition of "higher order" questions 
in purely behavioral te ms will never solve the problem o f 
what a " higher order" question is. Of all human en· 
deavors, language is at once the most hurnan and the 
most dependent upon the intentions of both speakers and 
listeners. While much language "behavior" is l itlle more 
than formulaic-we communicate with each other in 
unambiguous formulae- i t is difficult to carry on much 
communication that is interpretable in terms of pure for-
mula. A simple question wheo judged by its syntax (in · 
version of the subject and verb) may or may not really be a 
question. " Isn't it a nice day?" "Am I going to the store for 
a carton of milk?" Without an understanding of purpose or 
intentions on the part of the speaker (an understanding 
that does not come from empirical evidence), much 
language becomes an uncomprehensible verbal hash. 
- The shooting of the hunters was terrible. 
-My luve Is l ike a red, red rose. 
-His sins were scarlet but his books were read. 
The failure of translating computers perhaps exem-
plifies the problem of attempting to rely on purely 
behavioral information in the interpretation of language. 
Does intention really make a difference to the com-
mon sense notion set forth at the beginning of this essay? 
What difference does it make If we can identify certain 
behaviors that seem to be associated with student suc· 
cess if we don't perhaps know what the behavior Is? 
It makes a great deal of difference. If one is going to 
operate by the canons of empirical science, one must 
operate by them. Unless a general concept can be trans· 
lated into low inference behaviors, then it is impossible 
to know whether one has that behavior. So long as general 
conceptions about human behavior can only be partly 
translated (into movements rather than Into actions), it is 
impossible to know what one is observing. 
Consequences of the Muddle 
The danger in all of this is perhaps in the promise that 
someday teaching will be based on research of the sort 
reported in Dunkin and Bidd le. What if research continues 
to show no positive effects from higher order questions? 
Will colleges of education begin to teach their students to 
ask only factual questions (for which there is support in 
the research literature)? The focus of research in teacher 
effectiveness shifts over the years. In the 1960's research 
was looking for teacher effectiveness in terms of affect, 
indirectness and the like-the intentions of the time. More 
recently, research is "finding" .that the best teaching is 
direct and carefully structured. IS the research simply 
reflecting once more the shift in intention in a country in· 
terested in "back to basics" and accountabi lity? So lorig 
as we ignore human purpose, research becomes a mask .• a 
cloak, a way to make desires into facts-desires which 
may be pure or foul. Science becomes dogma. 
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There is evidence 
curriculum faces 
issues. 
that the study of 
newly-recognized 
Emerging 
foundations for 
curriculum 
theory 
by Paul R. Klohr 
The Ohio Sta te Universi ty 
Futurologi sts who attempt to project altern ati ve 
fu tures point to the poss ibil ity that our culture now faces 
a watershed situation that differs signi ficantly from the 
past Whether or not such a claim holds for all of culture or 
for education in general, there is Increasing evidence that 
the study of curriculum as a subfield of education does, 
indeed, face newly-recogn ized fo undational, or theory, 
Issues. A concern with such Iss ues calls for a re-
examination of some of the judgments made in the last 
ten years that the field Is either ahisto rica l, or dead, or 
both. 
In some respects, the situation has in it the strong 
possibility of a paradigm shift in a Kuhnian sense. To un· 
derstand what supports the assertion that such a shift 
might be taking place, we need to be aware of: (1) lhe state 
of the field of curriculum theory; (2) efforts underway to 
reconceptuallze the field; and (3) the significance o f these 
efforts for curriculum development In practical school 
situations. 
In 1971, In an essay for t ile Journal of Educat ional 
Research, James Macdonald surveyed the field of 
curriculum theory and made a functional analysis of work 
then underway. Typically, the conven tional wisdom of the 
field had been reviewed In a thematic approach. In con· 
trast, Macdonald iden tified three groups of curriculum 
theorists in terms of the functions they assumed their ef· 
forts might serve. 
The larges I number of ind ividuals, by far, viewed their 
work as guiding practical curriculu m development ac· 
tlvities by prescribing di rections such activities should 
take. Most curriculum textbooks, elemen tary and sec-
ondary, rest on this interpretation of an appropriate 
theoretical foundation. The widely used Tyler rationale Is 
an example of this approach. Tyle r raises four questions: 
What are the purposes of the school? What educali onal 
experiences can be provided to attain l hese purposes? 
EDUCA TIONAL CONSIDER/\ ll ONS. Vol 6, No. 1, f oll, '1970 
How can educatio nal experiences be most effectively 
organized? How can we evaluate? Tyler and others who 
use this approach common ly draw on three foundationa l 
sources: the nature of the individual; the nalure of society; 
and the nature of knowledge. A diagnosis o f needs 10 
arrive at the answer to the question o f purposes analyzes 
data from these sources. 
There are many modifications of this mode of 
theorizing, but in general, It lead s to a rather clear·cut set 
of steps to be followed. The his1or ical roo ts of this ap-
proach, as Klieb ard has pointed oul , run deeply into the 
curric ulum development processes projected by Bobbilt 
and Charters in the early 1900's, Fortunately for 
curriculum as a Held of study, lhoughtful criticism of this 
mode of curriculum theorizing has developed. The major 
point of the criti cism is that the approach is fundamenlally 
grounded in a 1echnological rationale that is neither 
phi
losoph
ic al nor scientific. Neverth eless, any survey of 
the state of l he field would still show this to be lhe 
dominant approach. In practice, it tends to raise a series 
of " how" questions. For example, practitioners who com· 
monly enroll in a graduate course In curriculum come to 
that field of study expecting to get rather specific answers 
to specific questions of how to do this or l hat In their 
classroo ms. A ce llu lar, "i nterc hangeable par ts" 
framework for curriculum is assumed. Cremin points out 
that historically this framework dates from the period 
following the Civil War. 
A second, much smaller group o f individuals Mac -
donald views as scientific curricu lum lhe orizers. This 
group follow s the canons o f science. In Macdonald 's 
words: " The purpose o f this theory Is primarily conceptual 
in nature, and research would be utilized for empirical 
validation of curriculum var iabl es and relationships."' 
Among the individuals who might be viewed as lune· 
t1on ing in this way are Mauritz Johnson, George 
Beauchamp and Decker Walker. At The Ohio State Univer-
si ty, Jack Frymier, James K. Duncan and John Hough 
work wi th a basic scienti fic model for curriculum and in· 
s truction. Frymier's ef forts with the Annehurst School' lo 
develop a curriculum classi flcali on system is a good 
example o f these individuals at work. 
Finally, Macdonald calls attention to a third even 
smaller group of theorizers- namely, those who " look 
upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual 1ask 
which lhey maintain should be nell her used as a basis for 
prescription or as an empirically 1es1a ble set of principles 
and relat ionships."' 
The interest of lhese individuals is to view curriculum 
phenomena in new and different ways with the ex-
pectation that such alternative perspectives will raise 
fresh sets of questions. In effect, they demon strale what 
Dwayne Huebner has called attention to many times: the 
tact lhat theorizing In a malure field ought to reflect a 
range of different modes of inquiry. However, lhe in-
fluence of this view, altho ugh significant, Is not 
widespread for there is still a predominant mylh. This 
myth holds that many of the fields drawing on the social 
sciences- the study o f curriculum for one-are passing 
through a kind of Dark Age, and that If we keep working 
hard to become " more scientif ic," we shall emerge with a 
clear-cut set o f laws that meet the crlleria o f physical 
science. All phenomena may then be quanti fied with more 
highly sophlstlcaled measures. 
This brief overview might lead one 10 believe that the 
cu rriculum theory field is largely constrained by con-
17 
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ventional approaches to theorizing drawing upon 
traditional c-OllCeptlons of foundations. Such a view might 
be warranted were i t not for some promising develop· 
ments which do, Indeed, suggest the possibility of a 
paradigm shift. In the view of some, these developments 
constitute significant breakthroughs. If there 1s to be a 
genuine shift, ii is likely to come from the efforts of those 
Macdonald has placed In the third category. 
Reconceptualizatlons of the Field 
Chief among the ellotts that have the potential f0< a 
basic paradigm shift has been a series of curriculum 
theory conferences and a curricu lum Jo urnal devoted to 
curriculum theorizing to be published In the autumn of 
1978. Involved in these is a loosely-knit group of in-
d ividuals who have been called the Reconceptualists. 
Whether or not that term continues to be used is of little 
Importance. One Is reminded of Peter Schrag's use of the 
"New Romantic Critics" to describe certain of the critics 
of education in 1968 who had certain Ideas In common 
despite their diversity. McNeil simply divides the current 
field Into "hard currlcularists" and "soft currlcularists.'" 
But this two-fold categorization seems overly simplistic, 
overlooking some significant distinctions among the in-
dMdual theorists. Whatever else is associated with the 
term reconceptualist, It seems clear that these Individuals 
intend to worK In the third realm that Macdonald Iden-
tified - namely, Individuals who conceive of curricu lum 
theory development as a creative intellectual task with no 
attempt initially to make a direct relationship to practice. 
The Reconceptual ists, it should be noted, have no 
formal organization as a group, and in 1978, there Is rather 
wide diversity among them. However, one can trace some 
of the events which have Influenced their work. Such a 
tracing might well start with the Rochester Conference of 
1973. One might also note some beginnings in the Radical 
Caucus of the Association tor Supervision and Curriculum 
Development several years prior to 1973. At Rochester, 
James Macdonald, Maxine Greene, and Dwayne Huebner 
gave papers along with several other relative newcomers 
to the field. These papers were colleoted and published 
under the title Heightened Consciousness, Cultural 
Revolulion, and Curriculum Theory (Mccutchan, 1974) 
which had also served as the theme of the conference. 
William Pinar, who called the conference at The University 
of Rochester, served as edi tor of the publication. He 
spoke o f this work as a "reconceptualization" of the field 
and viewed the efforts as an example of Macdonald's third 
group of theorists. 
The following year, 1974, Riordan Invited those who 
had been at Rochester to participate In a follow-up con-
ference at Xavier University In Cincinnati. A number of the 
Rochester Conference participants again presented 
papers, among them, Macdonald, Greene, Huebner and 
Pinar. Michael Apple of the University of Wisconsin also 
gave his views, making public a divergent approach which 
had been identified at Rochester but not fully developed. 
For example, the papers by Donald Batemen and William 
Pilder anticipate Apple's stance. 
Al so In 1974, Pinar edited a collection of essays titled 
Curricu lum Theorizing: The Reconceptuallsts which in· 
eluded works by Macdonald, Greene, Huebner and Apple 
as well as pieces by Kllebard, Cremin, Phenix and 
Mooney. Plnar recognized the divergence of views that 
had developed more fully since the Rochester and the 
Xavier conferences. In his organization of the book, he 
18 
Identified "politica l and methodological criticism" and 
"post crit ical" theory efforts. The autobiographical 
prefaces to the pieces written by Apple, Mann and Molnar 
also reflect a division. The question of which is critical 
and which is post-critical is not, in itself , significant at this 
~~- . 
The divergence is even more strongly underscored on 
the 1975 Yearbook of ASCD, edited by Macdonald and 
Zaret Schools In Search of Meaning in which the editors 
write'. "We felt we must call attention to political freedom, 
not simply existential freedom."' The content of the Year-
book underscores a conviction that most currlculum 
theori zing has "backed out" of significant political im · 
plications. Pushed all the way, this issue turns up to be 
one of the individual vs. the collective. 
Additional conferences were held In 1975 al Univer-
sity of Virginia, chaired by Charles Beegle. and the 
following year at University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee 
with Alex Molnar as chairman. In the autumn of 1977, Kent 
State University hosted a theory conference followed in 
the spring of 1978 by yet another at the Rochester ln-
stilute of Technology. In this latter conference. a special 
effort was made to refocus on some of the issues raised 
in iii ally at the 1973 Rochester Conference. 
As one reflects on these conferences and reads the 
papers presented, It would be easy to assume that a split 
ls Inevitable among those In Macdonald's third category, 
or in Plnar's terms, the Reconceptuallsts. Certainly, the 
1975 ASCD YearbOOk suggests such a split. In the realm of 
metatheory, the split often turns up to be one between 1he 
phenomenological mode of inquiry and critical Inquiry 
that draws heavily on Marxian or Neo·Marxian ideology. 
II ls too early to Know what wil l be the eventual out· 
come. but for this writer, two individuals seem to posit an 
alternative to such a split: Theodore Rosz.aK and Richard J. 
Bernstein. Both transcend the dualisms that characterize 
those caught up In polarized positions. It is beyond the 
scope of this writing to explicale in detail the alternative 
me1a1hoory of their respective positions. However, sO<ne 
aspects that underglrd what migh1 be viewed as promising 
" emerging foundations" for curriculum theory can be 
sKetched. These seem not to distort the basic tenets of 
those who take differing positions within the Recon-
ceptualist group. 
An Alternative Metatheoretlcal Base 
Theodore Rosz.ak's Identification of a thi rd tradition 
wh ich he calls ' 'the personal" suggests something of the 
direction a resolution to the issue might take. He posits 
this in contrast to the "Individual" and the "collective" 
traditions. This tradition, he asserts, draws on the thinking 
of Berdyaev and Meunier In Europe and men like Dwight 
Macdonald in America. He cites Macdo11ald's essay "The 
Root is Man" as a good example of the expression of Per· 
sonalist values. 
Rosz.ak stresses the significance of this theOreticat 
stance In rejecting the materialistic dialectics of Marx and 
the equally encapsulating constraints of a capitalistic 
culture. He views as crucial the fact that this view has not 
crystallized in10 a systematic ideology: 
Rather, they set themselves the task of being the 
Socratic conscience or revolutionary politics, a stub· 
born ethical sensibility that applied i tself to all 
systems, all ideologies. The core of their political in-
sight was this: that moral sensitivity will always be 
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obliterated by a moral indignation that loses itse l f 
among masses and class identit ies.• 
He develops, therefore. the idea of a mosaic of 
"situationa l groups" which are genuinely veh icles of "sel f 
discove ry." 
In this sense, the historian Roszak seems to support 
what Bernstein intends when he proposes a meta·theory 
that will cut·across the several modes we commonly posit, 
regardless of how we perceive them. He expresses the 
need this way: 
What is requi red is a fundamental re-examination of 
the very categories by which we understand human 
action, and seek to relate theory to practice. The root 
issues concern the most basic questions about what 
human beings are, what they are in the process of 
becoming, and what they may yet become.' 
If we take Roszak and Bernstein together, we can finally 
say with Bernstein that we are not confronted with ex-
clusive choices: either empirical theory or interpretive 
theory or critical theory: 
Rather, there is an internal dialect ic in the restruc-
turing of social and poli tical theory: when we work 
through any one of these moments, we discover how 
the others are implicated. An adequate social and 
political theory must be empirical, interpretative, 
and critical (italics in original).' 
If the ind ividua ls who are trying to reconceptualize 
the theory base for curriculum are to succeed, it seems 
clear some resolution of the issues which have arisen 
must be resolved. At this point, the proposals of Roszak 
and Bernstein offer a promise. But, one might ask, what 
does a possible resolution at the level of meta-theory have 
to do with curriculum-especially cu rricu lum develop-
ment In sc hool situations? In this wri ter's view, it has 
much to do with a newly-emerging foundations base for 
FALL. 1971 ) 
curriculum as a field of study. If such, indeed, can emerge, 
a fresh and dilferent set of questions regard ing 
curriculum wil l resu lt. These questions will differ 
markedly from the curriculum questions the conventional 
empirically-oriented theorist or the philosophical analyst 
have raised. Such questions will undoubtedly have 
significance for the applicatio ns we attempt in curriculum 
development. Much would remain to be done to bridge the 
theory-practice gap, bu t the rationale underlying what is 
done would rest on a more rigorous and defensible foun-
dation. 
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Are traditional foundational 
disciplines adequate to the 
educational experiences they 
analyze? 
Moral 
education 
and moral 
choice 
by George Dixon 
The Ohio State University 
A question of continuing importance for the foun· 
dations ol education is whether the traditional loun· 
dational disciplines are adequate to the educational ex· 
periences they help us analyze. Of course, this is not just a 
concern ol educators; researchers in foundational areas 
are also led, at least occasionally, to ask how adequate 
their methods are for the analy sis o l human experience 
generally. But the question seems more persistent and 
bothersome for educators who use the methods o f 
philosophy and the social sciences to understand 
educational experiences. Somehow the greater need lo 
connect theory with educational practice makes the 
question of methodological adequacy more immediate for 
the educational researcher. who can•t as easily push this 
con.cern into the background or wait lor another gen· 
eratlon of research before translating theory into practice. 
Certainly II is more convenient to push concern lor 
method into the background and get on with the research 
at hand, for such problems are perennially troublesome 
and usually tied into classical philosophical paradoxes 
that defy quick resolution. One such paradox that is 
especially lroublesome in education generally and par-
ticularly puzzling in moral educal lon is the In· 
dividuallcollective relationship mentioned by Professor 
Klohr in his essay "Emerging Foundations for Curriculum 
Theory." ' 
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Most people concerned with moral education are 
familiar with the individual/collective dilemma In terms of 
two beliefs that seem to work in opposl lion to one 
another. On the one hand. we assert that actions which 
can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily Invol ve in· 
dividual choice. As moral agents, we can be neither 
praised nor blamed If we have no degree of choice or con· 
trol over our decisions and aclions; one of the defining 
charac teristics o f ac tions that we call "moral " is just this 
fact of ind ividual responsibility. Ethical theories which 
focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty 
share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral 
decisions. 
Bu t there is obviously more to moral decision than in· 
dividual duty and private choice. We must also assert that 
moral decisions are Influenced by circumstances outside 
the individual, circumstances that are connected with the 
time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal 
factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated 
between past experiences and expectations for the future. 
Moralists of the utllilarian persuasion would, in fact, 
calculate just such factors to the point of explaining how 
an Individual is most likely to decide a moral question. 
Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the 
relationship aligns them rather clearly with the methods 
and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent 
conflic t between Kantian or formalis ti c eth ical theories 
and their uti litarian or naturalistic counterparts that we 
find one source of difficulty for the moral educator con· 
cerned with the foundations of his field. 
For example, if the moral educator looks to 
philosophy to clarify this relat ionship between Individual 
choice and social Influence, he finds that the problem 
gets worse before it gets better. Philosophers In this cen· 
tury, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral 
decisions as matters of private preference and individual 
fee ling. They have preserved the necessarily Individual 
aspect of morality, but only at the cost ol putting most 
moral queslions beyond reasonabl e discussion and public 
evaluation. The resu lt for moral educators has too often 
been one ol reducing their task to helping students clarify 
their individual values, and while this is a worthy vocation, 
It just begins to scratch the surface of the process of 
moral choice and value formation. For such clarification 
must Ignore the social nature o f morality: moral con· 
sensus becomes little more lhan the tabu lation of private 
interests. After individual value preferences have been 
clarified , the teacher must indeed be ready to move on 
quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern sub-
jectivist theories o f morality offer litlle help on the tough 
issues that logically lollow Individual clariflcalion. 
The moral educator can tu rn to the social sciences lor 
help in understanding how ext ernal factors condition 
moral choice. for the social sciences seem to concentrate 
on exactly those social or external factors that the values 
clarification approach tends to ignore. But that strength in 
explaining how and why people choose and act as they do 
comes to the social sciences al Its own high cost. For the 
conclusion that seems implici t In most social science 
research is that external factors determine Individual 
decisions and actions; the moral responsibility that 
educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion. 
From a social science perspective, actions can be ex-
plained and even predicted, but In the course of such 
research we seem to remove the action being studied 
from the rea lm of morality. That Is, we can hardly praise or 
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blame a person for " having made a choice" if that person 
has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has 
hadan egg.• 
So far in this analy sis I have stretched the opposing 
poles o f the individual/collect ive paradox, simpli fying 
each posi tion and ignoring those developments in 
philosophy and the social sciences wh ich have worked to 
miligate the split. Unfortunately, such developments tend 
to fall outside the mainstream of the various foundational 
disciplines, so that it is usually quite difficult for 
educators to get in touch with them. This seems to me to 
explain why those curriculum theorists called Recon-
ceptualists often look outside mainstream social science 
and sometimes to disciplines l ike l iterature and art for 
redirection ; they deliberately seek out researchers 
working on the fringes or crossing disciplinary lines In or · 
der to reconceptualize problems that have resisted 
traditional solutions. Thus we might say that even though 
some philosophers and social scientists have begun to 
address the individual/collective paradox and have un· 
covered some promising d irections for resolution, the 
paradox is still very much with us. And it proves to be 
especially debilit at ing In moral education, which has at i ts 
center the problematic relationship between individual 
choice and determining soc ial circumstances. 
One philosopher and social theorist whose recent 
work may be helpful lo moral educators is Jurgen Haber. 
mas. For a variety of reasons, his work is not generally 
known in this country, although ii is widely read in his own 
country of Germany and th roughou t Europe. 
Habermas ' work is admitted ly difficult, especially for 
those with a philosophical background in the Anglo· 
American tradition of empiricism. Moreover, those works 
by Habermas that have been translated Into Eng lish for 
the most part do not address educational questions di· 
rectly. His most widely known work, Knowledge and Hu· 
man Interests, is in fact a critique of posi t ivism. And the 
education-oriented essays o f Toward a Rational Society 
focus on problems of the German educational system 
during the 1960's and thus resist quick application to 
education al prob lems in this country. 
Bui perhaps ii is this very foreignness that makes 
Habermas· work significant to the problems of ethical 
theory and moral educat ion . For with his phi losophical 
roots in Continental phi losophy, especiall y in the works of 
Hegel and Marx, Habermas has been able to bring new 
light lo the individual/collective paradox that has defied so 
many Anglo·American researchers. This is not to say that 
Habermas avoids or rejects philosophers and researchers 
In our tradition; he has, in fact, been influenced by 
phi losophers as diverse as the American pragmatist 
Charles Sanders Peirce and the British analyst John L. 
Austin. He is also conversant with social science research 
from Max Weber to Jane Loevinger and Lawrence 
Koh Iberg. 
In fact the one translated essay by Habermas that 
directly addresses the problem of educational foun· 
dallons is a critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's 
theory of cognitive moral development.' That theory, 
which has gained some popularity among moral 
educators, posi ts six stages wh ich form a hierarchy ol 
qualilative ·dislinc t ways of deciding moral questions and, 
thus, of guiding moral action. On the basis of 20 years of 
investigation, Kohlberg has found that a child passes 
through a number of discrete and invariant stages of moral 
development, moving from an ego-centric basis for de· 
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cision through a lat er adherence to social conventions 
to a more reflective or "post-conventiona l" stage. (See 
Chart 1) As we might expect from Kohlb erg's labels, most 
people reach the th ird or fou rth stage of cognitive moral 
development and remain there for most o f their lives. Only 
a lew, Socrates o r Jesus or Mart in Luther King, lor exam · 
pie, seem to attain the broad universal principles of Stage 
Six . 
On the basis of this theory, Kohlberg has developed 
an approach lo moral education that pushes students to 
higher levels of moral development, pr imari ly through the 
use of ethical dil emmas. Thus, a student at Stage Two is 
presented in classroom discussion with a i iclional ethical 
s ituat ion that demands a more comprehensive analysis 
than is available within Stage Two reasoning. For exam-
ple, a student is asked to formulate a course of action for 
an impoverished husband who is tempted to steal the ex· 
pensive medicine his wife needs to survive. Such a fie· 
tional situation helps the student to realize that ind ividual 
needs and desires may compete with or be over-ridden by 
agreed-upon conventions. Kohl berg carefu lly sets up the 
terms of each f ictional di lemma so that the student is 
forced to look beyond his stage of moral development in or-
der to arrive at a satisfactory resolut ion. The student may 
be forced to move from an egocentric Stage Two decision 
to a Stage Three fear of punishment or towards a Stage 
Four refusal lo show disrespect for the laws against theft. 
Confronting these dilemmas and examining possible 
reso lut ions is supposed to foster the cognitive develop· 
ment of students in relat ion to these eth ical questions. 
We should note how Kohl berg defends this approach 
from the twin dangers of Indoctrination and subjectivism. 
First, his approach concentrates on the form of the moral 
judgment rather than the conten t; it also demands a 
classroom atmosphere of dialogue and mutu al respect. 
This emphasis on form and interaction among students 
and teacher lessens the l ikel ihood the teacher or the 
student's peers wil l impose their moral decisions on the 
individual student and thereby deny him the opportunity 
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to make his own moral choice. Secondly, Kohlberg con. 
tends that the greater comprehensiveness of the latter 
stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression 
In the structure if not in the content of ethical judgments 
and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or sub· 
jectivi ty of the values clarification approach, for example, 
Is replaced in Kohlberg's curriculum with a formal ob-
jectivi ty. 
There is much more to Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development, and much of it is helpful and convincing. 
But one quickly notices the Kantian emphasis in 
Kohlberg's theory, especially as it focuses on the 
cognitive factors involved in moral decisions and actions. 
Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through 
the various stages of moral development, but seems to 
ignore those factors that seem external and non·cognitive, 
factors that have been analy zed in great detail by the 
social sciences. 
Kohl berg's justi fication for proceeding in this manner 
is that the cognitive aspects of moral development are the 
most important factor we have so far d iscovered. He 
would admit that non·cognitive and utilitarian factors in· 
fluence mor al decisions, but he holds litt le hope for con· 
necting internal and ext ernal factors, or individual and 
social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now 
made in Cha.rt I. 
So, as valuable as Kohlberg's research and inter· 
pr~tations have been, we are still left with the unre · 
solved dilemma of ind ividual choice in a world that is un· 
avoidably social. We have not been able to approach the 
strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his 
analysis of Kantian ethics: 
... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires 
some coherent way of understanding men's actions 
both as causally determined. predictable, natura l 
events and as rationally initiated, poliCy·d irected ac-
tions. None of the famili ar dodges, relaxations of the 
conflict, or reinterpretations designed to disso lve 
the problem will do .... If any sense is to be made of 
responsibility and action, then one and the same bit 
of behavior which can be explained physiologically, 
pred icted statistically, and brought within the scope 
of a scientific theory must also be capable of being 
consistently understood as issuing from the 
autonomous action of practical reason.' 
But this Is precisely the challenge that Habermas 
takes up in his reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. He 
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adds to the developmental psychology emphasis of 
Kohlberg's work a sociological dimension , one that 
relates the six stages to the process of socialization . By 
thus drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and 
Talcon Parsons, among others, Habermas moves 
Kohlberg·s theory lrom a monologic basis to a dialoglc 
basis. Another way to describe Habermas' direction Is in 
terms of the social contract theory that underl ies o much 
of our social and politi cal thought. Habermas would pose 
two questions of the fami liar social contract theory that 
has its counterpart in Kohlberg's Fifth Stage: 1) How do 
moral agents entering into a social contract become 
responsi ble agents in the first place? and 2) How do the In-
terests o t Individuals combine to consti tute universa l prln· 
cip
les, 
that Is, how are ethical universal s formed? 
From a his torical perspective, both questions can be 
traced back to Hegel's cri tique o f Kantian ethics. Both 
point to the weakness in Kohlberg's theory, and in for· 
malist ic eth ics generally, namety, their s tatic and In· 
di
vidualistlc 
loundation. But what is most important here 
is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and 
social nature of moral development. He brings to 
Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights Into 
how we become aware ol ourselves as agents acting In the 
world, into how we come to see the interaction of In· 
tentions and consequences in our actions, and of how we 
graduall y recognize norms and the conditions for apply Ing 
those norms to our decisions and actions. 
Once again we must note that Habermas • recon· 
struc tion is a detailed and comp licated cri tique, as one 
can see from the various columns in Chart II. But his 
broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educators a 
better theoretical roundation for their work in schools, one 
that moves beyond a s tatic conception of alre ady·formed 
ind ividuals aligning themselves with already·es tablished 
moral principles or s tages. As a result , a s tudent's 
question about why he can't follow his private value 
position and cheat on the next test need no t create a crisis 
In the moral education curriculum. In fact, from Haber· 
mas· perspective, such a question would provide the op-
portunity to consider a number of important ethical 
issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could ad· 
vance the discussion by asking the student to consider 
the nature of conventional c lassroom rules against 
cheating, the tension that usually exists between private 
Interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher 
often fulfills In the classroom as enforcer of society's 
rules and regu latio ns. 
Adm itt edly, these topics may prove hazardous for the 
moral educator. In the lirs t place, the teacher's own role Is 
W UCA J /ONA/ CONSIDERATIONS, Vol. (•. No. ·1. F•ll, 1978 
likely to come under the scru tiny o f his students. Sec· 
ondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more 
puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the sup-
posedly neutral values clarilicatlon curriculum. The 
teacher might even find that simple questions, like those 
aoout cheating, lead finally to d iscussions concerned with 
things like the function of testing In the schools, a topic 
that seems complex no matter rtow advanced one's stage 
of cognitive development. 
This last example points, however, to an additional 
benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able 
to posit a Seventh Stage o f moral development, one that 
moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a 
basis in moral and political freedom. Th is base is dialogi c 
and social rather than monologlc and subjective. At th is 
stage, we have more than the for mal goa l of Stage Six to 
serve as an end point for our theory o f moral development. 
We can now consider the consequences as well as the 
form of our moral deliberations, we can take into account 
factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally 
add a certain degree of content and specificity to ethical 
theory and moral education. 
To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to con· 
sider social and external factors without reducing ethics 
to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to 
preserve individual choice without adopt ing the ab· 
strac tness of ethical for malism. His efforts certainly need 
greater development and application, but they do offer us 
a view o f moral education that avoids the subjective and 
inconsequential flavor of so much o f what passes as 
moral education. tn contras t, Habermas' reconstruction 
provides a basis for taking moral education seriously. It 
no t only offers us a compell ing exp lanalion o f the in· 
terac tive nature o f ethical un iversals and the in1e rplay be· 
tween individual autonomy and soc ial cons1rain ts, but it 
accounts for those conditions thal surround moral 
education and ul timately moral choice. 
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Moral education requires rigorous and 
extended thought, study, analysis. 
Values 
clarification 
and moral 
education 
by Eric H. Beversluis 
Capital University 
Columbus, Ohio 
Suppose you are a teacher, counselor, parent or 
friend and you have a student, client, child or friend who is 
having problems. Reflecting on those problems, you de· 
clde that they involve one or more of the following symp· 
toms: apathy, f lightiness, uncertainty or indecisiveness, 
inconsistency, drill, overconformity, dissentlousness or 
rote playing. How can you help the person? What ap-
proach would be appropriate? 
The Values Ctariflcalion movement olfers an answer 
to just this question.• In their book Values and Teaching, 
Raths, Harmin and Simon claim that people with these 
problems are often not helped as they could be. The 
reason Is that this set or disorders is neither Intellectua l 
nor emotional in nature. Most of our helping acllvi ties in -
volve ei ther counseling people with emotional disorders 
or teaching people who need to gain some form of 
knowledge. Raths, Harmln and Simon maintain that the 
cause of this set of problems (apathy, etc.) is neither an 
emotional nor an intellectual problem but a values 
problem. The reason people have these symptoms, they 
maintain, is that they are not clear about their values. In a 
world of change and future shock, in a world of competing 
value systems and pervasive relativism, in a world wit· 
nessing the breakdown of family and church, Raths, Har-
min and Simo n believe that many people suffer from the 
lack of a workable set of values, and that these symptoms 
(apathy, etc.) are due to this fact. Given this analysis, then, 
what is needed is neither teaching nor therapy but help in 
values clari fication. 
24 
To provide this help, Values and Teaching and other 
bOOks on values clarification (VC) offer (a) a theory of the 
valuing process and (b) many different acllvities, and 
guidelines for devising activi ties, which will help the 
teacher-parent·c ounselor-frlend engage In values 
clarifying activities with the person needing help (which 
may be oneself). 
I want to focus on the question of how values 
clarification should be considered in relation to moral 
education,' so I will give jusl a brief summary of VC theory 
and practice. What is important for VC is not the values 
one has but rather the process whereby one arrives at 
these values. In fact, values are defined as what one 
arrives at after going through a certain process. VC is both 
relativist ic and subjectlvlstic. It is relativistic in that it 
claims that there is no one set o f values which is true, 
valid or right for everyone in all situations. And it is sub· 
jectlvlslic in that it claims that there is no basis for 
evaluating standards ol right and wrong apart from what 
the Individual believes-1.e., right or wrong are a function 
of what the individual believes to be right or wrong.• VC is 
different from some subjectivisms In hold Ing that it is im-
portant that one follow the right process If one's values 
are to be valid . But, given that one has gone through the 
right process (values clarifying), whatever decisions one 
makes regarding right and wrong are correct. So all the 
emphasis for VC is on the valuing process. Essentially, vc 
involves activities designed to get people to follow the 
proper valuing process. 
That valuing process, according to VC theory, In-
volves seven aspects or steps. (These are discussed ex-
tensively in Raths et . al. and in many o ther VC pub· 
l icatlons.) To arrive at a "good" value, one should use 
a process that includes: Choosing freely, choosing from 
among alternatives, choosing after thoughtful con· 
sideration of the corisequences of each alternative, 
prizing and cherishing, publically affirming and acting 
upon our choices. Only if something satisfies these seven 
criteria is It a value.• VC then is a set of activities designed 
to get a person to engage in a certain form of decision 
making which, ii is claimed, will result In th e person's 
having clear values and thus become more "positive, pur-
posef u I, enthusiastic and proud" rather than showing 
those symptoms we noted at the beginning (apathy, etc.). 
Furthermore, VC is a theory aboul how values 
education ought to be carried out, and since values 
education includes moral education, it is also a theory 
about how moral education ought to be carried out. It is 
here that I find the most serious problem with VC. What I 
want to do in th is paper is to present a view of moral 
education which Is Inco nsistent with certain features ol 
VC and which, I will argue, can solve a problem which 
arises for vc but cannot be settled as long as one holds 
on to certain assumptions to which VC is committed. Let 
me first lay out that problem as it exists for VC and then 
show how a differenl view of moral education, one that 
rejects the subjectivism of VC, can solve the problem in a 
way that is consistenl with the basic objectives of vc. 
I will state a lalrly long quotation from the book 
Value~ ::md Teaching to Illustrate how the problem arises 
for VC and also Illustrate thal VC is in fac t concerned with 
moral education (so Its proponents cannot sidestep my 
criticism by denying that they are concerned with moral 
education). The interchange I will quote is one that might 
occur in a class where the teacher is committed to VC but 
also to enforcing certain behavior rules, in this case a rule 
£DUCA TIONAL CONSIDfR A I IONS 
26
Educational Considerations, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 12
https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol6/iss1/12
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1978
against cheating on tests. The tension arises between 
these two objectives because according to VC theory, the 
proper valuing process requires that one choose freely 
from among altematives. But how can the student choose 
freely from among alternatives ii some of the major alter· 
natives are ruled out ahead of time by the teacher? 
Teacher: So some of you think it is best to be 
honest on tests, is that right'? (Some heads nod af. 
f irmatlvely.) And some of you think that dishonesty 
is all right? (A few hesitant and slight nods.) And I 
guess some of you are not certain . (Heads nod.) 
Well, are there any other choices or is it Just a matter 
of d ishonesty vs. honesty'? 
Sam: You could be honest some of the lime and 
dishonest some of the time. 
Teacher: Does that sound like a possible 
choice. c lass? (Heads nod.) Any other alternatives to 
choose from? 
Tracy: You could be honest in some situat ions 
and not in others. For example, I am not hOnest when 
a friend asks about an ugly dress, at least 
sometimes. (laughter.) 
Teacher: Is that a possible choice, class? 
(Heads nod again.) Any other alternatives? 
Sam: ft seems to me that you have to be all one 
way or all the other. 
Teacher. Just a minute, Sam. As usual, we are 
firs t looking tor alternatives that there are In the 
Issue. Later we'll try to look at any choice that you 
may have selected. Any other alternatives, c lass? 
(No response.) Welt, then, let's list the four 
possibil ities that we have on the board, and I'm 
going 10 ask that each of you do two things for your· 
self : (1) see if you can identify any other choices in 
this issue of honesty and dishonesty, and (2) con-
sider the consequences of each alternative and see 
which ones you prefer. Later we will have buu 
groups In which you can discuss this and see If you 
are able to make a choice and if you want to make 
your choice part of your actual behavior. That Is 
something you must do for yourself. 
Ginger: Does that mean that we can decide for 
ourselves whether we should be honest on tests 
here? 
Teacher: No, that means that you can decide on 
the value. I personally value honesty; and although 
you may choose to be dishonest, I shall Insist that 
we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of 
your Ille, you may have more freedom to be dlshon· 
est, but one can't do anything any time, and In this 
c lass I shall expect honesty on tests. 
Ginger: But then how can we decide for our-
selves? Aren't you telling us what to value? 
Sam: Su re, you're telling us what we should do 
and believe in. 
Teacher: Not exactly. I don't mean to tell you 
what you should value. That's up to you. But I do 
mean that In this class, not elsewhere, necessarily, 
you have to be honest on tests or suffer certain con. 
sequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests 
without the rule of honesty. All of you who choose 
dishonesty as a value may not practice it here, that's 
all I'm saying. Further questions anyone? (Va lues 
and Teaching, pp. 114-115.) 
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The ctass may not have any more questions, but I cer · 
tainly do. Why do we and the authors tind this situation 
strange? Why do we all feel that 1t requires explanation? 
Well, clearly, because on the one hand we tell students 
that they must make their own value judgments and that 
these are valid, while on the other hand we tell them that 
those judgments are not valid (that the teacher will not 
respect them), in that, if they make the '"wro ng" choice, 
they will not be permitted to act on that choice in the 
teacher's class and will have to "su ffer certain con· 
sequences." While Raths et al. believe that they can 
dissolve the paradox by drawing a distinc tion between im· 
posing values and imposing " .. . behavior rules that are 
not defended as values, but meroty as devices for protect· 
Ing indivi uals and groups against pressure from o thers,"• 
I do no t believe that they are successful. 
I cannot now develop full y my reasons tor thinking 
them unsuccessful. Basically, I would suggest two 
reasons. First, the objective of VC is to recognize, in fact, 
to absolutize the autonomy and dignity of the person 
making the choices. II seems to me. however, that to im· 
pose rules without even trying to 1ustify them is to impose 
what's been called an "'arbitrary authoritarianism•· on the 
child and to fail totally to respect the child 's dignity. The 
second reason for not accepting the solution is practical: 
In tact, the teacher is telling the student what value to 
hold. By telling the student, "I'm going to force you to do 
this," one is sending a signal that the child receives as a 
signal about what is, in an objective sense, right. That is, 
to enforce behavior rules is, In effect, to contradict the VC 
commitment not to tell the young what values they should 
choose.• 
Thus vc theory is s tuck with a real paradox: Despite 
principled grounds for not imposing values on others, It 
must accept the common sense requirement that childr en 
cannot be allowed to do whatever they want or choose, 
and hence that sometimes the strong decide what the 
weak will do, which amounts to the strong telling the weak 
what values they should Choose. 
can VC solve this problem? I suggest that to do so ii 
must give up subjectivism but can maintain its objective 
of avoiding moralizing and indoctrination. To give up sub· 
jectivism will clearly require significant reworking of its 
basic va.tue theory. 
Let me begin my discussion with some basic distinc· 
tions among kinds of values. When we think about values 
(or, as I would prefer to say, about an individual's nor· 
mative principles, that is, principles or belie fs concerning 
what he ought to do), it Is use ful to distinguish two kinds. 
First. we can recognize "good lif e values." These are our 
beliefs concerning what It Is reasonable or proper to do in 
the pursuit of our own well being, our own sel f-interest. 
For example, t he fo ll owing bit of p ractical 
reasoning-reasoning concern Ing what one shou Id 
do-exposes one of Charlie's "good life values." Suppose 
Charlie decides to go out on a date with Linda because 
"he will have more fun with Linda than with anyone else." 
This line of reasoning reveals that one of Charlie's nor· 
matlve principles, one of his vafues, ls that ii is reasonable 
to do that which will give one the most tun. To state it 
more precisely, Charlie may believe something like this: 
"'Ceteris paribus, one is better off having more fun than 
less." Any such value, one which acts as a guide to the 
agent's own good life, I call a "good life value." 
Bu t not all values are o f thi s kind. Many normative 
principles do not tell us how to achieve the good life but 
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rather place limits, restraints, on our pursuit of our good 
life. They are "oth er-regarding " rather than " self· 
regarding ." Referring back to the previous example, sup· 
pose that Charlie is again considering whether to go out 
with Linda, but in this case he is married to Nancy. So now 
he may reason thus: ''I should not go out with Linda, even 
though I will have more fun with her than with anyone else, 
because I am married to Nancy." Analyzing this bit ol 
practical reasoning indicates that while Charlie is no t 
rej ec ting the normative relevance of the fact that 
· something will give him a lot ol fun, he finds that there is 
an overriding principle which pu ls constraints on his 
having fun. While the fact that ii would be the most fun 
continues lo be a reason to date Linda, the fact that he is 
marned to Nancy gives an overriding reason not to date 
Linda. We can state the normative principle involved, the 
"value," like this: "The fact that some action will vio late 
one's marriage agreement is reason against doing that ac· 
tion, even if doing it is in one's best self-interest." Such a 
value or normative principle. which puts a moral limit on 
one's pursuit of one's self-Interest, I will call a " moral 
value.'' 
Thus lhere can be said to be two kinds of values, 
those of self-interest, which serve as guides to a person's 
wellbeing, and those of morality, which indicate when and 
how rights of others limit one's pursuit of one's own 
wellbeing. It should be noted that these categories need 
not be mutually exclusive. What is best for me may be per-
fectly compatible with my moral duty. But in many cases 
moral values will function as higher order values, 
overriding those of self-interest. There Is nothing per se 
wrong with Charlie's going out with Linda; however, the 
reasons for doing so are outweighed In this case by the 
moral obligation which Charlie has undertaken in respect 
to Nancy. 
I want to use this distinction to get at the causes and 
cure of the paradox of VC. The paradox, to review, was 
this: VC maintains that it is wrong to tell the young what 
they should do, to impose values on them, yet it also 
recognizes the need to impose behavior rules which, 
however, turns out to be an arbitrary Imposition, given VC 
value theory, and which willy·nilly Involves telling the 
young what their values should be. Basically, I will 
suggest that the paradox arises because VC is mistaken In 
believing that moral values are subjective. If moral values 
are In some sense objective and rational, then they satisfy 
a necessary condition of their being teachable; if they are 
subjective, they cannot be taught. If they can be taught (as 
opposed to inculcated or indoctrinated), then we may 
legitimately do so; and if they are objective and grounded 
In good reasons, then we may even require students to 
follow them as behavior rules, even when they d isagree 
with or do not yet understand the reasons for them. 
I star! with the claim that moral values are not purely 
subjective, but are in some sense objective. This Is a 
major Issue in moral philosophy, and I can only outline my 
position here. Let me begin by granting what seems 
correct In VC value theory. There are many values whi ch 
are in some sense subjective. About these one can say, as 
does VC, that if one goes through the right valuing 
process, then the value that one has at the end cannot be 
considered Incorrect. For example, should I have beef or 
chicken for dinner? Should I work the day or evening shift 
(assuming my family obligations do not make a dif· 
ference)? Should I read novels or go to movies for en· 
tertainment? In many cases such as these, there is no 
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right answer other than what one would come lo after 
going through a carelul process of value clarihcatlon. 
These values might be called " pure procedural values," by 
analogy with Aawls's conception of pure procedural 
justice, for unlike other values, there is here no In· 
dependent criterion for the correct outcome.' 
But for most moral values there is such an In· 
dependent criterion. One ought to be honest on tests as a 
ru le. II one comes out to a different conclusion, even If 
one has clarified the value In the technical VC sense, one 
Is mistaken. One ought to refrain from killing people on 
the street in cases not involving possible exceptions such 
as war or sell-defense. II after the student has clarified 
herlhis values, she/he values killi ng people on the street, 
the student has made a mistake. In fact, not even all self · 
regarding values are pure procedural values. ti's quite 
possible for me to go through the proper values clarifying 
process and be mistaken. For example, I may decide that I 
should spend all my time in college playing basketball and 
not studying. But even ii I have clarified my values In the 
proper manner, this may be a terrible mistake. Thus I 
suggest that most values are not subjective in the sense 
that VC suggests but are rather In some sense objective. 
To explain this notion of objectivity, let me refer to 
the work of William Frankena. Frankena argues that 
morality is a social institution, something that exists prior 
to the individual and also continues on after the Ind ividual, 
but which also depends for its validation on the 
recognition by Individuals, as they become morally 
autonomous, that It Is a reasonable system, that one 
ought to take the moral point of view. Frankena says: 
Now morality ... Is, In one aspect, at leas t, a 
social enterprise, no t just a discovery or invention o f 
the individual for his own guidance. Like one's 
language, state or chu rch, It exists before the in· 
dividual, who is inducted Into It and becomes more 
or less of a participant In It, and i t goes on existing 
alter him . .. Morality ... Is also largely social in Its 
origins, sanctions and functions. As first en-
countered by the ind ividual, at any rate, it is an in-
strument of society as a whole for the guidance of In-
dividuals and smaller groups. It makes ·demands on 
Individuals that are, Initially at least, external to 
them .... If they come to disagree with the demands, 
then, as Socrates thought and as we shall see later, 
they must still do so from the moral point of view 
that has somehow been Inculcated into them. 
Having explained how morality is larger than the In· 
d lvidual, how it has Its base In society, Frankena goes on 
to explain how morality nevertheless Involves the 
autonomy of the Individual. 
However, morali ty • . . also has a more In· 
dlvidualistic or protestant aspect. As Socrates im· 
plied and recent philosophers have stressed ... , 
morality fosters or even calls for the use ol reason 
and for a kind ol autonomy on the part of the In· 
dlvldual, asking him, when mature and normal, to 
make his own decisions, though possibly with 
someone's advice, and eve n stimulating him to think 
out the principles or goals in the light o f which he Is 
to make his decisions. Even as a social Institution of 
l ife , mor ality is thought of as aiming at rational self· 
guidance or self-determination in its members. 
Thus morality, the system of moral controls in society, is 
objective both in the sense that it is a creation of the 
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society and not of the individ ual and in the sense that it 
depends ultimately on the fact that as members of the 
society achieve maturity, they come to recognize 
autonomously the validity of the system. 
While there may be different rules in different 
societies, this need not imply societal ethical relativism, 
and it surely does not imply ind ividual ethical relativism or 
ethical subjectivism. Since VC's subjectivism seems to be 
based on relativistic views of morality, a few words about 
relativism are in order here. Whether or not there are dif· 
ferent rules in different societies, the purpose of moral 
rules is the same, to provide a system for resolving con. 
flicts of interest. Differences among societies, like 
disagreements among individuals within the society, can 
be accounted for by (a) differing conditions and/or beliefs 
about the conditions, and (b) differing levels of insight into 
the principles of morality and the effects of different se ts 
of rules. 
(a) If one society beli eves that babies are healthier if 
nursed and another believes that they are healthier if bot-
tle fed, It may be thought right to bottle feed in the latte r 
society but thought wrong to do so in the former. But this 
disagreement does not prove ethical relativism. Perhaps 
because of other conditions, it Is health ier to nurse in one 
society but not in the other. Then, though on one level of 
moral rules we can speak of "cultural re lativism," this is 
not really accurate because at a more basic level both 
societies are using the principle, "Feed young babies the 
way that will make them most healthy. " Or it might be the 
case that one or the other society is mistaken about what 
mode of feeding makes babies the healthier. In that case 
also we do not have relativism but a situation in which one 
society's moral rules are based on mistaken factual 
premises. 
(b) Societies may have different moral ru les because 
of different leve ls of moral insight. Thus, segregation and 
other forms of racial discrimination were approved in parts 
of the United States until Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
others forced us to recognize that this could not be 
morally justified. Such a recognition would be impossible 
if relativism were true. Consider the approach of South 
Africans when criticized for aparthejd. They do not appeal 
to ethical relativism-they do not say that it just happens 
to be wrong In the United States but right in South Africa. 
They grant certain moral principles but then argue that 
conditions are different in South Africa, and thus different 
derivative moral practices are justified. Or, they maintain 
that racial discrimination is morally proper and that 
Americans are mistaken in thinking it wrong. Thus, we 
need not jump to ethical relativism, let alone ethical sub-
jectivism, when confronted with differences among in· 
dividuals or among societies concerning what is right and 
wrong. 
Next, if morality does in fact have this objective 
basis, it would seem that it can be taught and not merely 
imposed or indoctrinated into children. For as Frankena 
points out, morality must ultimately be based on the 
autonomous acceptance of it by the members of 
society-Le., they must rationally and freely recognize the 
basis of the morality and adopt the rules for themselves. 
Further, it is through this Individual analysis and ap-
propriation that moral progress must be made, as in-
dividua ls di cover discrepancies between the purposes of 
moral it y and the present rules and principles by which it Is 
expressed. So it does not follow that, if one has a definite 
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theory of morality in mind, one must fall into what the VC 
theorists fear, 
the heavy "moralizin g, incul cating, a d in· 
doctrinatlon" that dominated values education 
before World War II and, in its extreme form, led to 
the horrors of the Nazi regime.• 
The objective of moral education, then, must be to 
teach students (a} the current s tate of the art in one's 
society, the current beliefs about what is right and wrong 
and (b) the art i tself - how to criticize and evaluate the 
morality of society and develop one's own morality." The 
first objective shows the content of moral education: One 
does not ask each child to re· Invent the wheel, and neither 
does one ask each child to re-invent morality. The second 
objective shows the way In which morality respects the 
dignity and autonomy of the individual: One does not 
teach physics as a set o f revealed truths, but rather one 
aims to get the ~tudent to understand and validate the 
physicists' reason ing. Likewise, one aims to gel the 
student of moral ity to understand and val idale the moral 
reasoning of the society. 
Es tablishing that morality can be taught and not 
merely imposed or indoctrinated enables us to solve the 
paradox of VC. For the paradox arises in precisely the 
kinds of cases we are talking about: Cases such as that in-
volvl ng honesty on tests are cases in which "common 
sense" requires that rules of behavior be enforced, and 
they are also cases involving moral values. So I would con-
clude that it Is not common sense at all but really the In· 
stitution of morality which requires that these rules be en-
forced. And i f what I have said about moral values is 
correct, then we can avoid the paradox o f VC. If we believe 
that there is an objective basis for morali ty, that the 
demands of morality can be justified, then we can justify 
imposing the relevant behavior rules on the chi ld without 
arbitrary authoritarianism. For (a) if the rules are correct, 
then the chi ld ought to follow them whether he/she un-
derstands them yet or not, and we can tell the child that 
that Is why these behavior rules are being en forced. AM 
(b) if morality is in fact a social institution, then to fail to 
enforce it with children is to fail to discharge our respon· 
sibiiity to society. So once we recognize that morality is 
objective, we need not feel so sensi tive about imposing 
rules, e.g., against cheating on tests. We solve t11e 
paradox of VC by seeing that good theory does not ru le 
out imposing these rules. 
But these results take us beyond merely resolving the 
paradox of VC. For if they are correct (and what I have 
done is to lay out an alternative view of morality, not prove 
it), then a real form of moral education is possible. Moral 
education in the sense we described i t, teaching the 
young both the content and the rationale for the in-
stitution of morality, is impossibte for VC, since everyone 
must discover or create or arbitraril y decide to prefer 
her/his own set of values. But with the view presented 
here, we can have a real moral education, for we can teach 
the student what it is that morality requi res and also why 
this is required and how to evaluate criticall y and 
autonomously those requirements. 
ff VC does not recognize the nature of moral values, it 
will hardly be l ikely to dO a good job of teaching morality, 
except Incidentally. The school teacher and the parent 
must recognize this l imitation to VC theory and practice. 
One cannot be, In principle, nondirective and client-
centered'' if one is to achieve moral education, for there is 
a definite subject matter for the young to learn. It should 
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not be lef t to chance that the student wil l learn i t through 
values clarification. Nor should students be g iven the im· 
press ion, as vc would, that It Is totally up to them whether 
they should value honesty or dishonesty. Of course, it is 
up to them in the sense that Ir I am to respect their 
autonomy, I must not impose some normative belief on 
them. But it is not up to them in the sense that whatever 
they decide is equally correct. I have outlined a view of 
morality which I beli ev  is right and which fits our ordinary 
notion of morality better than does VC, as is shown by the 
fact that the non-subjectivistic view avoids the paradox o f 
vc. 
A word about the sense In which we say that it is 
possible that the individual can make a wrong decision: 
To say that it is logically possible that the Individual's 
decision is wrong or mistaken Is not to say that I or anyone 
can ever know Indubitably that the decision is wrong. It is 
lo say that if you think you have made the right decision 
and I think you have made the wrong one, one of us must, 
logically, be mistaken. 
Finally, this Is not to say that one cannot use any of 
the VC activities for teaching morality, nor is It to forget 
that there seems to be a set or "good life " values for 
which the vc emphasis on valuing process rather than 
specific outcomes seems to be appropriate. Many o f the 
VC activities are excell en t for raising issues and for 
stimulating the reflection that must take place. Insofar as 
the techniques provide a way to stimulate Interest, to 
reach students where they are, to broaden perspective 
and increase consideration of alternatives and con· 
sequences, insofar as the techniques encourage one to 
go beyond thinking to acting on and affirming one's 
values, they are valuable for moral education as well as for 
other forms of values education. But moral education 
must go much further. Moral education requires rigorous 
and extended thought, study, analysis." It also requires 
recognition of objectivity in moral values. Slnc,e VC 
provides neither or these, the moral educator who relies 
solely on values clarification will be making a serious 
mistake. 
Foo1no1es: 
t. Values clarification is very popular right now in 
American education. Its guru Is Sidney Simon, and 
among the high priests are Howard Kirschenbaum, 
Merrill Harmon and Leland W. Howe. The movement 
c laims apostolic success ion from John Dewey 
through Louis E. Aaths. 
Following are some of the basic sources: John 
Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: Univers ity of 
Chicago Press, 1939) is claimed to be the source of the 
value theory which VC adopts. VC theory Is most fully 
laid out in Louis E. Aaths, Merrill Harmon, and Sidney 
Simon, Values and Teaching (Columbus, Ohio: Charles 
E. Merrill, 1966). Other writings by main f igures Include 
Sidney Simon, Leland Howe, and Howard Kir-
chenbaum, Values Clarilica11on (New York: Hart, 1972); 
Sidney Simon and Howard Kirschenbaum, eds., 
Readings In Values Clarification (Minneapolis: Win-
ston Press, 1973); and Howard Kirschenbaum, Ad· 
vanced Value Clariflca1ion (San Diego, Ca.: University 
Associates, 1976). 
2. Many cri ticisms o f other aspects of VC have been wri t· 
ten. Some I Indicate here: Bruce D. Johnson and Bryce 
Nelson, " Values Clarification: A Critical Perspective," 
In Lindley J. Sti les and Bruce D. Johnson, eds .. 
Morality Examined: Guidelines for Teachers (Pr ince· 
ton, N.J.: Princeton Book Co., t977); A.C. Kazepldes, 
"The Logic of Values Clarification," The Journal of 
Educational Thought, XI (1977), pp. 99·111; Alan Lock· 
wood, "A Critical View of Values Clarification," 
Teachers College Record, LXXVll (September 1975), 
pp. 35·50; and John B. Stewarl , "Cl arifying Values 
Clarification: A Critique," in Phi Delta Kappan, LVI 
(June 1975), pp. 684·88. 
3. The term ethical subjectivism has a number of 
meanings. Sometimes it refers to the view that right 
and wrong are a function of some feeling of the 
agent-an action Is right if I feel a certain way about it. 
I will use the term In a somewhat different sense: 
Ethical subjec tivism Is the opposite of ethical Ob· 
Jectlvlsm; that is, It Is the view that there is no s tandard 
for determining right and wrong apart from what an In· 
dividual believes to be right and wrong - whatever an 
individual believes about the rightness or wrongness 
of an action is correct (true) because that is what he 
believes. 
4. There is, I beli eve, a serious theoretical difficulty here 
for VC: What is it that one has after these steps? What 
is It that satisfies these cri teria? Is It an attitude? a 
belief? a pattern of behavior? a feeling? However, I will 
not pursue this line of criticism in this paper. 
5. Merrill Harmon and Sidney B. Simon, "Va lues," in Kir-
schenbaum and Simon, eds., Readings in Values 
Clarification (op. cit.), p. 11. 
6. For elaboration of this point, see my paper, "The 
Dilemma of Values Clarification, " rorthcoming In 
Philosophy of Education 1978: Proceedings of the 
Thirty·Fourt h Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of 
Education Society. 
7. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Pres s, 1971), pp. 65·86. 
8. William Frankena, Ethics, Second Edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentlce·Hal l, Inc., 1973), pp. 6-7. 
9. Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmon, Leland Howe 
and Sidney B. Simon, "I n Defense of Values 
Clarification," Phi Delta Kappan, LVlll (June 1977), pp. 
743·44. 
10. See William Frankena, " Toward a Philosophy of Moral 
Education," Harvard Educatlonal Review, XXVlll, 4 
(Fall 1958), pp. 300·313; reprinted In Israel Scheffler, ed., 
Philosophy and Education, Second Edition (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1966), pp. 225·44. 
11. Alan Lockwood in "A Critical View of Values 
Clarif ication," (op. cit.), explores the similari ties be· 
tween VC and Aogerlan client-centered therapy. 
12. An Important technique of vc is not to s tay very long 
on any issue, to stimulate thought and reflection and 
then move on. Raths et al. say: 
Caution: many teachers do not end value-clarifying 
discussions soon enough. Cut them at the rirst s ign o f 
dullness. What Is usually. effec tive Is a few sharp 
Questions, some silence for students to use for private 
mulling, a few student comments, and then out. 
(Va lues and Teaching, op. cit. , pp. 115-116.) 
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Higher grades may not be synony· 
mous with higher ranking. 
The role of 
the school in 
reforming 
society 
structures 
by Walter P. Krolikowski 
Loyola University of Chicago 
E<lucational innovations continue to be In lhe news. 
As long as the American public voices its dissatisfaction 
wilh the progress of its children and as long as the 
American schools remain a uniquely effective vehic le for 
getting ahead, schoo l personnel will continue to ex· 
perlment. We have recently received reports on two such 
experiment s, and phenomenally ex1ensive and expensive 
one at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of 
Illinoi s and another on the progress of those studen ts who 
beat out Allan Bakke for admission to the medical school 
al Davis, California. Both are worth pondering. 
In October, 1977, Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver 
issued a summary report on special support programs at 
the Chicago Circle Campus. Since 1968, the University of 
Illinois has recruited and admitted over 5,000 minority 
stu<lents for spec ial programs: the Educational Assis· 
lance Program, the Native American Program, the Latin 
American Recruitment and Educational Services program 
and the Confederation of Latin American Students. 
Special orientation programs, advising and tutorial ser · 
vices and special course were specifically designed for 
these s tudents. In additional to the usual federal and state 
monies available to all needy studen1s, approximately $5 
million has been spent since 1968. Surely, a large scale ef· 
fort. 
WUCllflONAl CONSID ERAJIONS, Vol.(>. No. ·1. Fall, 1978 
In November, 1977, Donald L. Reidhaar, general coun· 
sel for the University of Calilornla, reported on the present 
status of the 16 studenls who had been admitted in 
preference to Allan Bakke In the medical school of the 
University of California at Davis. The experlmen1 here lay 
in admitting a special group of students, traditionally ex· 
eluded from medical schools , rather than In devising 
special aids for them.• 
We shall discuss these reports at the end of this ar· 
tic le. But i t is important that we lay a groundwork that will 
help us come to grips with lhese and other examples of 
s tructural reforms that extend far beyond att empts 10 help 
this or that ind ivldual. 
I 
Efraim Shmuel i has pointed out that liberal in· 
tellectuals may reac t In one o f two ways to lhe need for 
reform: they look for a change In social Institutions or in 
the individual : 
Historically the liberal intellectuals flucluate be· 
tween two orientations. The one Is directed toward 
perfection of man by eliminat ing the social, 
economic and political sources of evll. The in· 
tellectuals of this group are structure.oriented. The 
second orientation allempts to purify lhe human 
qual ities of reasoning and behavior by moral exhor· 
tation or other educalional techniques In the hope 
that the economic, social and political institutions 
will gradually becomo manifestations of universally 
accepted humane Inten tions.' 
The second group of liberals, o f course, wou ld say that 
changing individual men Is prec isely the way to effecl 
changes in society; many educators belong to this camp. 
We will begin by analyzing certain features of the con -
tention of lhe first group. There are several reasons fpr 
choosing lhis starting po int. The profound changes and 
the increasing rale of social change push social scientists 
and educalors to look for quicker and more efficient 
methods of bringing about, in a planned fashion, desirable 
social changes. 
Changing society is not li ke changing individual men. 
Society is more than the men who are its members. Since 
society consists of patterns of interlocking and in· 
teracting structur es, changing society entails changing 
the structures of society.• Now this is no easy task. Ii 
psychologists despair of changing the individual, social 
scientists despair of changing society. Most of society's 
s tructures have survived centuries o f efforl to abuse them, 
on the one hand, and to reform them, on the Olher. The 
origins of most instruments of society are hidden in 
prehistory; their continuing prosence is taken for granted, 
and they change with what Charles Sanders Peirce would 
call "se cular slowness." For all their variations, primary in · 
stitutions, like forms of the family, property ownership, 
subsistence economy and social mobility , have been ex· 
traordinarily impervious to change .• 
Changing society through changing social struc· 
lures, then, has been adopled not because such an ap· 
proach is Intrinsically easier than changing individuals. In· 
deed it seems equally, if not more, difficult. But it has the 
advantage of offering an alternative 10 personal reform, 
one which offers hope of greater effectivenss, simply 
because ot the scale on wh ich i t would operate, at a time 
when time itself is at a premium. 
Finally, this approach Is congenial to some 
educators. Educators, beginning with Plato, have been 
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tempted to be hyphenated kings. Academic people are of· 
ten tempted to think that one social structure in particu lar, 
the school, is precisely the best instrument to bring about 
these reforms, less risky and "dirty" than direct poli tical 
action and more likely to make an Impact than the writ ing 
of treatises.• 
For these and other reasons, the idea of the struc-
tures of society deserves close analysts. If educators are 
serious, and I think they are, confusion of thought and pur-
pose is to be avoided. " Full speed ahead!" is a legitimate 
cry only when goa ls have been clarilled and agreed upon 
and means are clearly ava ilable nd commensurate to the 
task. 
ff 
For educators, the idea of the reform of the structures 
of society can function in three different ways: as one 
among many objectives of the education al enterprise; as 
a criterion for choosing one set ol actions, possibly 
ed
ucational 
but possibly not, over another; or as a 
crllerlon for improving the educational enterprise. 
Historically, schools have purported to have and have 
had different objectives or goals. Sell -realizatoon, life-
adjustment, vocational preparedness, the cultivation of in· 
telligence, citizenship education and the reform of 
society - separately and in tandem these objectives have 
In fluenced theorists and practitioners alike. If the last of 
them is taken seriously as an objective, two presup-
positions are worth uncovering. It Is assumed that the 
school is an apt Instrument of reform, but It Is not 
assumed that the school itself needs reform. In other 
words, such a reformer might say: " The re is nothing wrong 
with schools; what Is wrong with society will ulti mately b  
corrected because the schools are preparing reformers o f 
society." 
When the Idea of reform functions as a criterion for 
choosing ooe set of actions over another, ditferent assump-
tions are operative. It is not assumed that the school is 
an apt instrument of refor m,• nor Is II assumed that the 
school itself needs reform. Let me explain. 
If we think of the structures o f society as the in· 
stltutio
ns 
of agriculture, business. government, Industry 
and intelligence; and If we ask ourselves how we can most 
effectively participate in the reform of society, we are 
asking which of these Institutions is in need of reform and 
what actions on our part will bring about that reform. We 
may say that agricult ure needs reform or business or 
several or ail of them. Further, we may ask whether our ac-
tion through one or more o f these Institutions is the best 
way to reform society . It may be that we will judge rather 
that personal action outside these structures will be the 
most apt instrument of reform. In all of these cases, we 
are asking, among other things, where we should stand in 
relation to these structures. Several alternatives are 
possible. Should we run for the Congress of the United 
States, accept a position with Inland Steel, work lor IBM ? 
Then we would be working toward reform within the struc-
ture itself. Should we seek a position on the staff of a 
national magazine, work for a lobbying group or a pressure 
group? Then we would be at some distance from the struc-
ture, and the reforms we advocate would have to come 
about through the mediation of an informed public or 
lngroup we had aroused. Or shall we operate within the 
framework of the school and attempt to form men and 
women who will be the agents of change? Then we are far-
ther removed from the action of reform itself, but 
ultimately we might have greater success than if we were 
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participating in the daily skirmishes. From this per-
spective, the idea of reform reduces Itself to the question: 
At what remove should we act? The answer may but does 
not necessarily Involve the school. 
Even If we decide that the schools offer the most el· 
fective point o f departure, there are still two possible 
tacks open to us. we can say we do not know what the 
future will bring and, therefore, that we do not know how 
the structures of society should be reformed. If we 
prepare young men and women well through the In-
strumentali ty of a general education, they wi ll know what 
to do when the time comes for adult action; and they will 
be eager to do it. Or. secondly, we can say that the struc-
tures of society need or will need this or that particular 
reform and we can prepare students explicitly to solve 
those particular problems. 
Let me offer examples of these two approaches. Marx 
and Engels' program In " The Communist Manif esto" Is an
example of the first. After nine points that refer most 
properly to the industrialization of the nation and the 
collectivization of agriculture, Marx and Engels add a 
tenth: " Free education for all children In public schools. 
Aboli tion of children's factory labour in its present form. 
Combination of education wit h industrial production, 
etc."' Although the program does not lack all speci· 
ficatlon, it is still quite general and, in the main, formal. 
An example of the second might be Lenin's plan, as 
described by Professor Pavel A. Kashutin, Rector of the 
Lenin Teachers' Training College In Moscow: 
Therefore, along with industrialization of the nation 
and collectivization of agriculture, Lenin's plan for a 
socialist socie ty advanced, as the third important 
task, the carrying through of a cultural revolu ti on. 
Lenin pointed out that in the given case the matter 
concerned a radical turn in the spiritual life of the 
masses: shaping up an attitude towards property as 
belonging to the people and towards work as not 
being forced, but o f being free and creative for the 
benefi t simult aneously of one's self and society: 
remoulding of the world outlook of the people. and 
instilling to a greater degree In their minds the 
psychology of collectivism , friendship and mutual 
assistance, and, finally, involving broad sections of 
the working people in running the state.• 
Lenin's program spells out objectives with a degree of 
specific ity beyond that of Marx and Engels. It is at least 
conceivable that similar objectives could be stated for the 
reform of the structures o f American society and that 
students' education could be planned In function of these 
objectives. 
Thus would run the second of three possible In· 
terpretatlons of the reform of the structures of society; 
reform would serve as a criterion for action, a criterion for 
selec ting one Instrumentality over others. But the concept 
of reform may al so function as a criterion o f seif-
improvement. Here too, assumptions are operative. It Is 
assumed that the school needs reform, but there need be 
no assumption that other structures in society require 
reform nor that the school is an apt Instrument for the 
reform of those structures. Here the reformer is Inward· 
rooking. 
From the perspec tive of the school as an ongoing 
structure of society In need of reform. we have al ready an-
swered the question of our distance from the structure. 
w e are within one of the structures, and we assume It Is 
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an important structure either in itself or in relation to other 
structures. We are no t asking about the school in relation 
to the reform of society, at least not d irectly. The 
question, " How can we improve school?" can be sub· 
sumed under the larger question, " How can we improve 
society ?" but i t need not be. Either question assumes that 
improvement is necessary. The status quo is to be aban· 
doned. New procedures must be devised and im· 
plem ented. Some experimentation Is, therefore; called for. 
Abandon ing the tried and true but inadequate is the 
very hallmark of reform, and It is simultaneously a 
justification lor experimentation. Since the concept of ex· 
perimentation Is as loose as the concept of reform. the 
possibility of compounding contusion is quite real. For 
this reason. a briel an alysi  o f the way the Idea of ex· 
perimentatlon funct ions in this context Is necessary. 
Ill 
I wou ld suggest that there are at least th ree different 
meanings of experimentation. First, an experiment can be 
institu ted to demonstrate on a small scale; and therefore 
as economically and prudently as possible. an im-
provement, which would then become the norm for prac-
tice generally. The whole intent of such an experimenl Is 
to replace what is presently being done. Inherent in such 
an experiment Is a note of threat to the established way of 
proceeding. 
Let me offer an example. The Chicago Public High 
School tor Metropolitan Studies, like Ph iladelphia's Par k· 
way School, Is such an experiment. Opening in February, 
1970, with aboul 150 students and presently enrolling 
about 350 students, Metro attempts to give a represen· 
tative group of Chicago high school students an 
educa11onal experience which explo it s the students' in· 
terests and abil ities and the learning opportunities 
available in the Chicago area. II attempts to furnish a new 
and flexible curriculum model; a new school ar-
chitecture-a "school without walls"; a new ad· 
mlnlstrative model - the democratically run school. II is at 
once a positive affirmation of the ways school ought to be 
operated and a polemic against the wa"f schools are 
presentl y run.• 
Other experimenters are Intent on a different catch 
with their nels . Present procedures may not be doing an 
effective job for a certain population. Some young men 
and women, let us conjecture, are incapable of profiting 
from the present program for academic, psycholo gical or 
financial reasons. An experiment could be laun ched, then, 
to help lh is group of students. For example, a group of 
sixth graders, who most probably would be unable to at· 
tend high school specializing in science programs, might 
be placed In an intensive pre·hi gh school program. This 
kind of experiment might benefit students otherwise in-
capabl e of going down a track of science studies.• • And ii 
does not threaten currently established programs in any 
way. 
Stil l other experimenters may simply be looking for 
interesting alternatives to accepted procedures. For 
exa mple, I play a sol it ai re game. Four cards are laid down, 
lace up. If there are two cards showing of the same suit, 
the lower of the two is discarded. Then four more cards 
are laid down. Winning the game ls exceptionally difficult, 
for the player must end up with the four aces alone. 
Recently, I have tried to lose rather than win, always, 
however, obeying the rules. I take the seemingly more 
unintelligent alternative when altern atives are available. I 
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have found that I do equally well, no matter how " in · 
telllgenll y" or " stu pidly " I play the game. For chance tac· 
tors are much more important than any other. Similarly, an 
experiment may show that an alternative is no better or no 
worse than the established procedure. What we may have 
thought of extreme importance turns out not to matter 
very much. In other words the null hypothesis is con· 
fi rmed. The net result may be that we loosen up and relax. 
Alt
er atives 
may turn out to be equally good (and equally 
bad)." 
Carl Berei ter, in a paper presented at the December. 
1970, meeting of the American Association tor the Ad· 
vancement of Sci ence, reported that he has been able to 
identify many unteachable areas of learning; by which he 
means that some things "are either not learn ed or are 
learned just as well with or without teaching."" It is his 
contention that productive thinking skills; concepts and 
principles, other than in science and mathematics; arilh · 
metlc reasoning or problem-s olvin g; reading comprehen-
sion; appreciation o l li terature, art, music, as distinct from 
knowledge and preference; composition skills , such as 
organization, clarity, and style , as distinguished from the 
mechanics o f writing; and citizenship or socialization to 
the prevailing norms-all are unteachable in his sense. In 
other words, young men and women wil l or will not learn 
these skills and attitudes no matter how much or how little 
the schools attempt to teach them. If his conclusions suc· 
cessfully resist criticism that will probably be proposed, 
they exemplif y the third meaning I am proposing for the 
word experimentation: al ter natives that make no dlf· 
ference. For whether the school teaches these materials 
or not, the student wil l have the same chance of acquiring 
them. Note too the implications o f this meaning o f ex· 
perimentation for reform: some reforms have, similarly, no 
positive or negative impact. They neither speed up nor 
slow down whatever changes are occurring. 
IV 
Bereitefs work offers a convenient transitional 
bridge to the constructive part o f the paper. Before at· 
tempting to show the relative worth for the teacher of the 
dlller lng meanings of reform, I shall essay an explanat ion 
of the fllCI, for which Berell er gives evidence, the " un· 
teachability" of certain skll ls. Explaining why what 
teachers do may sometimes make li tt le or no difference 
may prepare the ground for o ther and larger questions 
such as why "planned change" may on occasion be no 
more effective than unplanned change. 
I would hypothesize that the self-activity of students 
Is probably as important in the learning process as chance 
Is In my game of solitaire. Let me explain why I think such 
may be the case. 
Charles A. Curran has expounded a theory of 
teaching which turns the ordinary conception o l the 
teacher-student relationship around. 
The teacher in our vlewopint should be seen as a 
client . . . not as a counse lor. It is the student who 
must ac t as a counselor and who should understand 
the teacher i f learning Is to take place. The teacher, 
l ike the client, is in deep need o f being understood, 
and to be received and accepted by the student at 
the intellectual or emotional level of his struggle for 
creative communication. Reversely, the student Is 
not, in this conception, In the client-patien t role but 
rather in the counse lor-therapist role. The teacher 
who is creative is suffering with ideas that are welled 
l1 
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up within him and that he needs to express and have 
understood. It is the student who can be in the 
therapeutic position of understanding and genuinely 
relating to the teacher as he unfolds, often with pain-
ful intensity, the ideas that he is invested in. " 
The teacher comes to his s tudents like a c lient coming to 
a counselor. He, the client, speaks, and the students, like 
counselors, listen carefully, try to understand, nod en· 
couragement, refelct what he has been saying, ask 
questions and show their understanding of the teacher-
client. If he has been understood, the session has been 
successful. He goes away happy. 
This model of the teacher-student relationship is not 
unique to Curran. Although Israel Scheffler is by no means 
using Curran's metaphor of an inversion of the usual con· 
ception of the counselor-cli ent relationship, he is con· 
ceptuall y quite c lose when he wriles: 
To teach, in the standard sense, Is at some points at 
least to submit oneself to the understanding and In· 
dependent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for 
reasons, to his sense of whal constitutes an 
adequate explanation. To teach someone that such 
and such is the case is not merely to try to get him to 
believe it: deception, for example, is not a method or 
a mode of teach ing. Teaching involves further that, if 
we try to get the student to believe that such and 
such is the case, we try also to get him to believe it 
for reasons that, within the l imits of his capacity to 
grasp are our reasons. Teaching, in this way, 
requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and, 
by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and 
critlcism. 14 
If Curran's model and Scheffler's analysis are per· 
suasive, certain questions arise. Why do students put up 
with a teacher? Why do they accept him as their client? 
They are not being paid, as the ordinary counselor is. I 
conjecture that they accept him because they " love" him. 
Plato's insight into the erotic relation of teacher and 
student seems to me to point to a necessary condition for 
a flourishing teaching-learning situation." Out of love 
students are willing to sit long hours l ist ening to the 
teacher and trying to understand him. 
But why do students love the teacher? Perhaps the 
students love their teacher because he is attractive and 
compatible. Beyond these personal and unpredictable 
reasons, i would guess that students love their teacher 
because the teacher represents, indeed is, the adult 
world, the world out there waiting to be explored, the great 
beckoning unknown, the offer of infin ite riches. Curran, 
from his psychological point of view, conjectures that the 
teacher, by communicating himself In trust to others, is, in 
opposition to the death-wish, choosing and affirming 
lif e . .. Students are attracted to the llfe·chooser. There is 
an additional reason, too. The teacher offers some dis· 
lance from the adult world. He is a critic who sees that 
"world he is" in relation to an ideal of what the world 
might become; of what he, the worfd·embodying teacher, 
might become; of what the students before him might 
become.',. 
The normal end-result of the student-teacher relation-
ship is that students understand the teacher. They do not 
necessarily end up loving what the teacher loves, doing 
what the teacher does, even becoming the world that the 
teacher is. The basic reason th is condition prevails is that 
students are independent, self-activating beings over 
whom the teacher has no ultimate or even intimate con· 
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trol. What students accept from the world or accept of the 
ideal depends on themselves. Possibly for this reason the 
teacher and his methods make li ttle difference. How 
students come to understand the teacher depends on 
themselves, just as how the counselor understands his 
c lient depends on the counselor's ingenuity and patience. 
Just as the counselor does not imitate his client:s mode of 
life, so students do not necessarily imitate the teacher's 
mode of Ille. It is true that parents often feel un· 
comfortable sending their children to teachers of a social 
class, and with political and relig ious beliefs, different 
from their own. But should they? The name of the 
teaching game, well played, is fr.eedom. 
As a consequence, if the teacher is intent on reform· 
ing the structures of society in a pre-determined way, it 
is likely that teaching is a relatively ineffective way to 
bring about reform. If, on the other hand, the teacher is in· 
tent on reforming the structures of society but without a 
pre-determined ultimate plan or objective," teaching may 
be a relatively effective method of reform. 
v 
This hypothetical explanation of the relation of 
student and teacher has, then, led us to choose the Jess 
rigidly structured approach to reform. What further im,. 
pllcatlons can be drawn on the basis of this analysis? A 
review seems to be in order. 
Proposing that one of the objectives of the school is 
the reform of the structures of society assumes that the 
school ls an apt instrument of reform. If the self-activity of 
the student is as important as I have suggested, "apt in· 
strument" needs specification. The school's ef· 
fectiveness will be mediated through the autonomous, 
largely unpredictable (pace B.F. Skinner), and future ac-
tivities of the students. 
Second, the school as an instrument of reform is 
committed to working at a third remove from the struc· 
lures themselves. The universities as a moral community 
have had a measure of effectiveness in influencing 
political and community decisions, but the elementary 
and secondary schools to my knowledge have had little in-
fluence. The teachers, through their national and local 
organizations and through union activity, have, in some 
small measure, been effective, but teachers are not the 
schools. 
Third, It seems preferable, because more realistic, for 
the school to aim at general rather than specific 
preparation of Its students. Not only the autonomy of the 
student calls for this approach; the rapidity of change in 
the social Problemalik militates against specific 
preparations for specific problems. For the solutions to 
these problems, short-term ins truction In para· 
educational institutes or workshops seems likely to be 
more effective. 
Fourth, nothing that has been said would close out 
any of the three forms of experimentation. Each seems to 
have its own strengths and weaknesses. 
VI 
Let us now return to the two cases we began with. 
How successful have they been? Norman Cantor, a univer-
si ty vice chancellor for academic affairs and a noted 
medieval historian, summarized the findings of the report: 
"Groups of students with comparable ability made the 
same academic progress whether enrolled in special sup-
port or regular support programs at the University of 
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lllinors at Chicago Circle." In other words, the money was 
spent to practically no effect. Although the su.,,ey has 
been challenged by James Griggs, director of the minority 
group aid program and president-elect of Malcolm X 
College, the two statistical sociologist from Urbana Insist 
on the validi ty of their findings. 
Reporting on the Davis experiment, Donald L. 
Reidhaar used practically the same words as Norman Can-
tor but to quite different effect: "I don't think there is any 
sign ificant difference in the rate of their (the 16 minority 
students) success and that of non-minority students." 
On
e 
of the 16 has been named by his classmates "most 
l ikely to succeed" and won the Senior Class Award. At 
Davis, the 16 who were not comparable to the other 
students admitted on the basis of the usual traditio nal 
criteria, were comparable on the basis of their per-
formances In medical school. 
The contrast Is great. In the first case special efforts 
were taken, efforts that do not seem to have helped. In the 
second case no special efforts were made to offer extra 
help to those who were admitted because of their minority 
status, and no special help seems to have been needed. 
We are, as we frequently are in human affairs, In the 
presence of a paradox. Do something extra and ii does not 
help; do nothing extra and it helps greatly. 
The projects al the University of Illinois have brought 
about no great changes in society. It is not even clear that 
they were Instituted to change anything except the univer· 
sity itself. But surely these projects were begun because 
educators at the University of Illinois saw a great need for 
internal reform. As experiments they were preceded by no 
pilot study on a small -scale. They were full·blown projec ts 
Intended lo help a group of students traditionally con-
sidered unsuitab le for college work. But it has turned ou t 
thus far that the experiment Is empirically seeking no thing 
more than an attractive alternative to more traditional 
techniques. Nothing revolutionary has eventuated. In this 
Instance, the Berelther claJm seems substantiated. 
The new admissions policy at Davis has, however. tar-
reaching Implicat ions. Although not yet realized, great 
changes In lhe medical profession can be expected. A 
group of people tradllionally barred from a profession. at 
least in such numbers, have doors o f opportunity open to 
them. A reform in school policy may very well bring about 
substantial reforms in the professional sectors of society. 
The decision al Davis to open its doors to many more 
minority students on a quota-like basis led to an ex-
periment that has paid olf, an experiment whose im· 
plications have yet to be fully spelled out. One such Im· 
plication may very well be that the traditional criterion of 
academic excel lence is a needlessly exacting criterion. 
Students with lower achievement scores in academic sub· 
jects may be as successful in medical (and other 
professional?) sc hool as those with higher scores. Higher 
grades may not be synonymous with higher ranking. If this 
conclusion stands against the criticism it Inevitably in · 
vites, It will Indeed create not only a reform but a 
revolution In that social structure called the American 
school. 
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vironment. See Erich Fromm's article in Summerhill: 
For and Against (New York: Harl Publishing Co., 1970), 
pp, 262·263 . 
4. Cf. Carlton H. Bowyer, Philosophical Perspectives for 
Education (Glenview: Scott , Foresman and Co .. 1970), 
p. 235. For the term "primary Institution" which refers 
to institutions which are essentially durable in the 
midst of "secondary Institutions" which change more 
rapidly, see Abram Kardlner and Ralph Linton, The In· 
dlvidual and His Society (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1939), pp. 244·245, 326·327, 471-483. 
5. A classic account o f the relationship of education to 
the reform of society Is Wllllam 0 . Stanley's Education 
and Social In tegration (New York: Teachers College, 
Columbia University, 1953). 
6. For a recent statement on the school as a reinforcer of, 
rather than an agent of, social change, see Harold G. 
Shane, " Social Decision Prerequisite to Educational 
Change, 1975-1985," In The Future as an Academic 
Discipline. Ciba Foundation Symposium 36 (New 
Series) Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975), pp. 73·81. 
7. Emile Burns (Ed.), A Handbook of Marxism (New York: 
International Pu blishers, 1935), p. 46. 
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8. Pavel A. Kashutin, "V.I. Lenin and National 
Education," Convergence, 3 (1970). 80. 
9. Written material on Metro Is hard to come by. The 
January 19, 1971, issue of the Chicago Sun-Times and 
the September 28, 1975, of The Chicago Tribune con-
tain feature articles on Metro. The Chicago Board of 
Education issued in September, 1969 a report entitled 
"Ch
icago Public 
High Schoof tor Metropolitan Studies: 
Rationale and Program." 
10
. 
Some features of Metro are eKperlmentaf in this sense 
as well as in the first meaning. 
11. Mayer reports that in some learning si tuations there 
are " no significant differences in learning or posttest 
performance on retention or transfer" between groups 
who have learned materials In what would be con· 
sldered a normally intelligent sequence and those who 
have had the same materials presented to them in a 
"scrambled" way. See Richard E. Mayer, "The Se· 
quencing of Instruction and the Concept of Assim· 
ilatlon·to-Schema," Instructional Science 6 (1977) 
379. • ' 
12. Carl Bereiter, "What Is Teachable?" page 1 of a 
mlme0graphed abstract of the paper. For a more ex· 
tended treatment, see his Must We Educate? 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice·Hali, 1973). 
13. Charles A. Curran, Psychological Dynamics In 
Religious Living (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). 
pp. 116·117. For an earlier formulation, see Curran's 
Counseling and Psychotherapy. The Pursuit of Values 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 289·290. In his 
Religious Values in Counseling and Psychotherapy 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), pp. 211·227, Curran 
emphasizes a different relationship. He writes of the 
student who learns by finding, In the teacher's ac· 
cep
tance 
of himself as a total human being, a model 
for, and the resources for, accepting himself as a 
totality. 
14. Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education 
(Springfield: Charles c. Thomas, 1960), p. 57. 
15. See H.I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity 
(New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 50·62. 
16. Curran, Psychological Dynamics In Religious Living, p. 
116. 
17. It may be suggested that as a matter of fact children do 
not love their teachers. We hear much or the dlf· 
flculties compulsory schooling involves. Against their 
wills , children are compelled to go to school. Teachers 
are the masters; children, the slaves. A love-relation· 
ship between master and slave is simply a sick rela· 
tionship. 
It may be or some Interest to note Aristo tle's 
position that master and slave, so long as they love the 
same things, can be friends: 
The part and the whole, like the body and the soul, 
have an identical Interest; and the slave is a part or 
the master, in the sense of being a living but 
separate part of his body. There is thus a community 
of interest, and a relation of friendship, between 
master and slave , when both of them naturally merit 
the position in which they stand. But he reverse Is 
true (and there is a conflict of interest and enmity), 
when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely 
on legal sanction and superior power. 
Aristotle, Politics, 1255b (Ernest Barker translation). 
18. Obviously, this formulation does not mean to deny the 
possibility of a predetermined plan methodologically, 
only substantively. 
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The greatest danger to education is 
the threatened loss of professional 
freedom. 
Goal-digging 
by Arthur Brow n 
Wayne Stat e Un iversi ty 
Detroit, Michigan 
There Is a pathos that characterizes the current 
movement toward establ ishing uniform standards In 
education, be they tests for promotion and/or graduation 
in the schools or the proposed core curriculum for Har· 
vard undergraduates.' As with a Greek tragedy, the end is 
foreordained: what we are not certain about Is how the 
plot will develop. 
One can't help wondering why It is that Americans 
are so attached to the idea that the best way to cure a 
social illness is to set goals rather than eliminate un· 
derlying causes.' Perhaps we are victims of a history of 
almost unrelieved success in confronting challenges like 
a continent, Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, the moon. Con· 
temporary reflections of this national tendency to attack 
our demons head on are affirmative action goals to 
redress employment imbalances, a Humphrey-Hawkins 
bill' to put a percentage goal on unemployment and a 
"back·tO·baslcs" movement replete wllh specific 
educational goals. 
The difficu lties associated with implementing 
promotion or graduation requirements based on stan· 
dardized tests have become almost immediately apparent. 
Witness the outcry when nearly half of Florida's high 
school seniors failed a graduation test this past year and 
when a proposed New York State graduation exam was 
rejected as far too easy and, therefore, of no academic 
significance. As one might have guessed, an examination 
of some rigor would prove to be politically unacceptable, 
and one politically acceptable would be viewed as 
academically impoverished. A Catch 22! 
Nonetheless, it may be too much to expect politicians 
not to respond with legislation In order to appease a 
public they perceive as full of resentment about economic 
pressures and the Increased difficulty of "making it " in a 
world of decreasing opportunity and affluence. And 
perhaps it is too much to expect the man In the street, 
whose own education left much to be desired, to be 
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sophisticated about such matters as education for life in a 
democracy, the dismal history of efficiency movements in 
education, the relationship between means and ends and 
the distinction between test performance and com-
petence. But those directly responsible for educational 
policy and curriculum development should know better. 
What is especially sad about the performance objectives 
and accountability movements is the number of their sup· 
porters to be found among school administrators, 
curriculum directors and professors of education. No 
doubt some of this support is politica lly inspired, but 
some of It derives from a sincere belief that these 
movements wi ll serve the cause o f education. 
I propose in this short essay, therefore, to question 
the three principal benefits which proponents claim for 
standardized testing and accountability systems, viz., (1) 
efficiency, (2) the development of competence, and (3) a 
greater sense of responsibility on the part of students and 
teachers. At the risk of seeming contentious, if not per· 
verse, I should like to argue instead that the systems may 
well be inefficient, produce incompetence and result in a 
lowered sense of responsibility. 
Efficiency 
The argument that the educational system should be 
made more business·like or ··scientific" is intriguing to 
many critics of education. Education has been labelled 
America's largest " industry." The costs per annum are in 
the neighborhood of $140 billion. It Is understandable that 
a public nurtured in a business climate and accustomed to 
the visible fruits of scienti fic inves tigation and technology 
should seek some proof that it Is "ge tting a dollar's worth 
of education for a dollar spent." That the difference bet· 
ween producing an Apollo and "producing· · a moral agent 
should not have occurred, however, to so many enamored 
of the business or science models is difficu lt to com· 
prehend. However that may be. It might be of some value 
lo examine some of the myths associated with business 
efficiency and to say something about the history of el· 
ficiency movements in education. 
Business efficiency is ordinarily associated with a 
centralized, hierarchical , institutional structure, where 
decisions from the top are Implemented by subordinates 
who have little or no role In the decislon·making process. 
This model of human organization has, of course, many 
historical precedents, including the Church and the 
military. its most pristine form is the factory system. Many 
critics of education look with d ismay on the relatively 
decentralized character of the educational structure with 
extensive power in the hands of local school boards and 
with curricular decisions largely made by individual 
teachers. It is no surpri se, therefore, that state depart· 
ments of education are growing more powerful . And it is 
no surprise, given political rea lities and a traditional 
business mentality, that legislatures and even mayors like 
Koch of New York and Young of Detroit should seek 
greater control in running the schools. Education, ap-
parently, has become too important lo leave to educators. 
There is, however, a considerable body of literature 
which puts into question the assumption that the hierar· 
chical, central ized, institutional model, even for business, 
let alone for education, is "efficient." Much depends, of 
course, on the definition of the word. But if we should ac· 
cept the criteria of business efficiency to include such 
matters as productivity, quality of product, absenteeism 
and employee turnover, it would appear that the evidence 
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indicates that the decentralized, participatory model of In-
stitutional organization may be more efficient. For sup-
port, one can point to the studies of McGregor. Hertzberg 
and Schumacher, as well as those frequently cited in 
Working Papers and the Worl d of Work Report.• 
As for education, we should have learned from 
Callahan's Education and the Cult of Efficiency about the 
inefficiencies that attend applying traditional business 
management techniques to education. Nevertheless San-
tayana's warning that an ignorance of history dooms us to 
repeat it goes unheeded. As an accountability atmosphere 
moves In to education, a noticeable increase is occurring 
in administrative costs both in terms of the amount of 
t ime expended In non-productive activities on the part of 
teachers and the personnel costs incurred in the attempt 
to satisfy those who contro l the purse that monies are well 
spent. In Detroit, for example, the recent decrease In 
enrollment has been shown to correspond with a decrease 
in the number of teachers but an increase in the number of 
administrative and ancillary personnel. And The Chronicle 
of Higher Education reports a similar state of affairs In 
higher education.• Those of us engaged in the educational 
enterprise are, of course, not surprised. My own stock 
joke is that teachers will soon spend 50 percent of their 
time accounting for the other 50 percent. · 
In addition to the question of institutional efficiency, 
there Is the matter of educational efficiency. Proponents 
of standardized testing are, of course, hopeful that its im-
plementation will ensure satisfactory levels of attainment 
for most students, particularly In so·called basic skills. 
This problem has been the subject of much speculation. 
There is no need to go over lhat ground. However, history 
should tell us something. And if the English experiment of 
the late 1800's with a model similar In many respects to 
that which is being put Into place in almost every state of 
the union Is any Indication, we can expect what Alan Sma ll 
has described as a " disaster." Although the English plan 
called for paymen ts to teachers based on pupil 
achievement, a kind of performance contracting system, 
which has fallen Into bad repute in this country, Its em· 
phasis on uniform testing for specific objectives and 
some sort of accountability was almost identical to that 
currently advocated. Quoting J. Kay-Shuttleworth, an 
education critic of the day, Small notes: 
The (system) has constructed nothing; it has 
only pulled down. II has not simplified the ad· 
ministration ... It has disorganized the whole 
system of training teachers and providing an el· 
fic ient machinery of instruction for school. These 
ruins are Its monuments. It has not succeeded In 
being effic ient, for it wastes the public money 
withou t providing the results which were declared to 
be its main objec t.• 
Competence 
The foregoing discussion of efficiency leads 
naturally to the subject of competence. I might say first 
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that the appropriation of the term "competence" by ad· 
vocates of "performance-based" education will go down 
in educational history as a brilliant strategy. By opposing 
the standardized testing movement, one Is automatically 
labeled a foe of competence and a friend of all that is 
wrong with education. A 1am1llar political device-but el· 
fective nonetheless. 
In human affairs, situations rarely repeat themselves, 
and "right" answers are contingent. Therefore, com· 
petence-what Dewey cal led "executive el· 
ficiency" -rests principally on such qualities as 
theoretical understanding, objectivity and independence 
of judgment, and i ts deve lopment Is Influenced much 
more by the methods used in education t han by predeter· 
mined goals. Insofar as an educatio nal program focuses 
on a set of objectives to be satisfied as efficiently as 
possible, it limits the use and development of Intelligence 
on the part of both teacher and student and, therefore, is 
productive not of competence but, rather, of in· 
competence. 
Objections are raised to this Idea on the assumption 
that means and ends are separate matters, that any num-
ber of methods might be employed to arrive at particular 
objectives. But one cannot have it both ways. If the at· 
tainment of certain goals defines educational success, 
and if efficiency is an overriding concern, methods 
become prescribed: methods employed will necessarily 
be those which most efficaciously produce the goals 
regardless of their impact on competence. That fixed 
educational standards may be deleterious to the develop-
ment of competence was repeatedly pointed out by 
Dewey and no more eloquently than in the following 
passage in Experience and Education: 
What avail ls ii to win prescribed amounts of in-
formation about geography and history, to win abili ty 
to read and write, if In the process the individual 
los
es 
his own soul; loses his appreciation of things 
worthwhile, of the values to which these things are 
relative; if he loses desire to apply what he has 
learned, and, above all, loses the ability to extract 
meaning from his future experiences as they occur?' 
Responslblllty 
Much of the literature on uniform standards is 
devoted to the problem of making teachers (and students) 
more efficient and competent through some form of ac· 
countability. Whether the accountability system takes a 
contractual form, where teachers are to be held ac-
countable for certain performance levels on the part of 
students, or whether it takes a co nsensual form, where 
teachers become part of an "ecosystem,"' a total 
educational community, Is o f l i ttle consequence. In either 
case, the professional freedom of teachers is restricted. 
The classroom door Is to be kept closed no longer. 
Teachers must be prepared for Inspection. Such a 
situation makes Bertrand Russel l 's view about the 
necessary independence of the teacher almost quaint: 
The teacher, like the artist, the philosopher, and 
the man of letters can only perform adequately if he 
feels himself an Individual directed by an inner 
creative impulse, not dominated and festered by 
authority. 
The greatest danger to education posed by the 
current performance movement Is the threatened loss of 
professional freedom. Not only, as I suggested earlier, will 
restrictions imposed on teachers by a standards program 
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tend to make teachers less competent by virtue ol the con-
straints applied 10 the use of their own intelligence as well 
as that of their students, but such a program will also tend 
to make teachers less responsible. That an accountability 
system should depress rather than enhance responsible 
action may appear lo be an anomaly, particularly since the 
terms "accountable" and "responsible" are so frequently 
used synonymously. But there Is a crucial dilference be· 
tween the terms, and recognition of that facl can have a 
significant Impact on educational policy. 
In ordinary discourse, we mean by accountablllly the 
holding of someone to account for the fulfillment o f cer-
lain standards, a rendering unto Caesar whal is Caesar's. 
We are accountable to someone for somelhlng. On the 
other hand, responsibility is predicated on sallsfylng per-
sonal slandards, rationally arrived at, to which one has a 
commitment. One may be said to have a sense of respon· 
sibility, but It would be odd to say one has a sense of ac· 
countability. Responsible action is intelligent action; ac· 
lion taken to satisfy the demands of others is unintelligent 
action. As Plato observed, to the degree a person does 
another's bidding, he is a slave, and, therefore, acting 
unintelligenlfy. 
Insofar as unintelligent action is irresponsible action, 
we can expect an accountability system to lead to various 
forms of Irrational and antisocial behavior, parlicularty 
lying and cheating.• And, in fact, this is exactly what has 
been occurring. In order to protect their flanks, teachers 
leach for the test, they ask academically slow studenls 
nol to appear on lhe day tests are to be given, they fudge 
test resull s, and they spend time almosl exclusively on 
what they will be held accountable for. All this should not 
be surprising, any more than it is surprising lhal malprac· 
lice suits are forcing physicians to practice defensive 
medicine wllh its altendant medical and economic lnef· 
ficiencles. Any society or social organization which 
depends on surveillance inev itably corrupts its members, 
and an educational accountability system designed to 
enhance competence will in tact do just the opposile: It 
w ill kill the one quality that ensures competence-a sense 
of responsibility which when present makes ac· 
countability unnecessary and when absent makes ac-
countabllily impotent. 
Footnotes 
1. For an interesting description of the Harvarcl proposal, 
see lhe Saturday Review, April 1, 1978. 
f,\(l, 1976 
2. I have often lhoughl goals are lhe oplale of the people. 
One of my favorite quotes wilh regard to the emptiness 
of goals is a stalemenl by R.S. Pelers: "The Puritan and 
the Galholic both though! they were promoting God's 
kingdom, but they lhoughl it had to be promoled In a 
diflerenl manner. And the dlflerenl manner made ii 
quile a differenl kingdom." See Authority, Respon-
sibility, and Education (New York: Ather1on Press). 1966, 
p.95. 
3. For an interesting analysis, see the editorial, "The Cruel 
Hoax of Humphrey-Hawkins," New York Times, Feb. 21 , 
1978, p.30. 
4. See, for example, Douglas McGregor, The Human Side 
of Enterprise and The Professional Manager; Frederick 
Hertzberg, Work and the Nature ot Man; E.F. 
Schumacher, Small Is Beaullful. The World of Work 
Report Is a monthly published by the Work in America 
lnstitule, Inc. 
5. For a litlle humor on lhe subject, see Donald C. 
Freeman, "Higher Educalion's Malthusian Multipliers," 
The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 9, 1978, p. 
56. 
6. Alan A. Small, "Accounlabllity In Viclorian England," 
Phi Delta Kappan, March, t972. pp. 438-39. 
7. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: 
Collier Books). p. 49. Echoing Dewey, Roger Farr, 
Associate Dean, Research and Evaluation, School of 
Education, Indiana Unlversily, writes in connection with 
the recent drop in SAT and ACT scores: " It might ... be 
appropriate to couple the concern aboul SAT and ACT 
scores to a concern aboul whelher the recent emphasis 
on the basics at the lower grade levels is slarving out 
the kind of conceplual teaching of reading that the 
college entrance exam measures at the higher levels 
... " See " Is John's/Mary's Reading Geltlng Worse?," 
Educational Leadership, April. 1977, p. 526. 
S. A term used by John Goodlad in The Dynamics of 
Educational Change: Toward Responsive Schools (New 
York: McGraw·Hill), 1975. 
9. I am reminded In this connection of an inlerview wilh a 
defecting Russian mathematician which was reported 
in the Humanist several years ago. To the question, 
"What ls the prevailing ethic in Russia," he answered, 
" Lying. Everybody lies." 
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If present-day dissidents are to 
reclaim the belief that values are best 
conceived empirically, they should 
begin by considering the imposition 
controversy as a possible dispute over 
the means to be used in schooling. 
The politics 
of values 
by P.L. Smith 
The Ohio State University 
The period of the 1930s was one of extreme tur· 
bu lence In American life. Capitalism seemed to be Im· 
potent In the face of massive economic collapse. Even 
democracy was being challenged. It looked to many as if 
personal freedom were incompatible with the demands of 
equality. The realities of the twentieth century were forc-
ing the American tradition of liberty to give way to group 
conceptions of human rights and responsibilities. Mallers 
appeared even worse with the loss of faith in reform. The 
1920s had shown the futility of the earlier progressive 
movement and revealed liberalism as an ally of the status 
quo. For those who rejected the established order and 
wished to hasten Its passing, radical action was the only 
acceptable response.• 
Such was the atmosphere in which the founders of 
progressive education were forced to confront a long· 
standing anomaly in their thought. Can virtue be taught, or 
must It somehow be imposed? Progressive educational 
thinkers were never quite clear or consistent In trying to 
answer this question. On the one hand, they recognized 
that values were important and that education must foster 
the good, but, on the other hand, they did not think that It 
was ever wise to force others to accept a parllcular value 
orientation. 
The Normative Thrust of Progressive Education 
More precisely, the founders of progressive 
education revered democracy as a way of life and saw 
deliberate education as the most effective means for trans-
mitting democratic values in an urban industrial society. 
When asked why they so revered democracy as a way of 
life, progressive thinkers had a ready answer. They 
believed that It supplied the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for scientifk: intelligence, or, put In negative terms, 
for non-formalist thinking. And what was the value of 
non-formalist thinking? Progressives believed It was two· 
fold, both Instrumental and intrinsic. It was Instrumental 
In solving practical problems and thereby contributing to 
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human survival. It was intrinsic in contributing to human 
welfare and improving the quality of life. This belief in the 
inherent value of scientific Intelligence is rarely un-
derstood or appreciated by the critics of progressive 
education. But those who conceived the movement were 
convinced that the ultimate value In non-formalist thinking 
and, thus, in democracy itself , as a way of life, was found 
in the fact that it created and developed the capacities to 
think and to experience human emotions. Without these 
capacities human bel ngs are essentially the same as other 
living things. But with them, they are unique; they possess 
the necessary tools for deliberately converting the hOstile 
forces of nature lo human advantage. And of even greater 
signifi cance, these powers of mind have intrinsic value 
because they provide the source of human culture and the 
foundations of human dignity. Progressive thinkers were 
humanists by Inclination and naturalists by philosophy. 
Given their convictions and their belief that the realizat ion 
of human mental potential was tied to democratic living by 
empirical necessity, it is easy to understand the normative 
thrust of progressive education. 
However, acoompanying this thrust was abhor· 
rence of indoctrination. Regardless of motivation, 
progressive thinkers eschewed all forms of imposition. 
Here, too, they had a reason. Indoctrination or imposition 
was seen as contrary to democracy. In so being it stilled 
the growth of scientific intelligence. And this, in turn, had 
the dual effect of decreasing the chances of survival and 
detracting from the quality of li fe. By itself, the rejection 
of indoctrination or imposition In the educational en · 
terprise of schooling may not seem Incompatible with the 
acceptance of a normative thrust in schooling. But there 
was a kicker in thi s mix. 
Progressive educational thinkers rejected the 
Aristotelian idea of development from within. They were 
unanimous in the belief that the cultivation of human 
nature was not enough. On the progressive view human 
nature Is virtually created by natural forces; and if it Is to 
be created intelligently, it must be understood and con· 
trolled by the only source of Intelligence there Is, man 
himself. But ii there is no guarantee, if, Indeed, it is 
unlikely that human beings will develop in desirable ways 
without human control of the process of development; 
and if the individual or individuals being educated cannot 
be expected to possess the capacities to understand or 
control this process, at least at the start, as vi rtually 
everyone, including progressive thinkers, will admit, how 
in the world can indoctrination or Imposition be avoided; 
assuming, of course, we shou ld all develop in desirable 
ways? 
Progressive Education in the Limelight 
The failur e of progressive education to provide a clear 
and decisive answer to this question represents a serious 
soft-spot in its theoretical posture. So long as 
progressives were on the offensive, attacking the enemy, 
"traditional education " or "formalist educational 
thinking," this soft-spot was hard to detect, and was easy 
to avoid even when recognized. Supporters believed that 
the opposition had a strong ideological hold on public 
thinking, and that this hold had to be broken before the 
progressive alternative could be completely spelled out. 
But by the 1920s the victory was pretty much won. 
Traditional education was In considerable disrepute, at 
least theoretically. The Immediate effect was to produce 
an intellectual vacuum. Theoretical Issues were simply 
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not seen as Important. People were intellectually free to 
think pretty much what they liked. So long as they were 
doing something and claimed guidance from some 
rationale, they were effectively left alone to function as 
lhelrown philosophical critics. 
But the press of events soon brought this period to an 
end. And the 1930s were to change the ro le of the 
progressive tradition in American life. Eyes were no longer 
solely on the opposition. There were real and serious 
problems to be faced, problems that threatened the 
welfare of everyone. If what had been accepted 
theretofore could not provide solutions to these 
problems, people were ready to consider alternatives. The 
mooo was at least congenial 10 tho practical examination 
of new ideas. Where old ways would not work, new ways 
would be encouraged. What could be better for the type of 
education that was founded on the philosophy of ex-
perimentalism? 
But with this newfound status came critical 
examination, and, more specifically, self-examination by 
proponents who were at last put on the spot to produce on 
their promise. If their theory of education was to be finally 
accepted, It would have to meet the test, theoretlcally as 
well as practically, supplied by the reali t ies of the 
depression. Progressive education was finally on the hot 
seat. If it had weaknesses, they would soon be apparent. 
And once apparent they could not be ignored. Progressive 
ed
u
ca tioflal thinkers began to polish up their Idea in order 
to present a defensible, unified and effective front to a 
beleaguered and eager, but still demanding, public. 
The Official View on Imposition 
The progressives were soon to discover that on the 
question of imposition they could not present the type of 
front they desired. Indeed, there arose a controversy that 
revea led the aforementioned soft-spot or anomaly in their 
thinking. There was, it should be said, an "official 
position" on this Issue, but it could hardly be described as 
acceptable to everyone, or even acceptable to the majority 
of those who shaped opinion in progressive education. 
The official view was the one given by John Dewey 
and supported so admirably by Boyd H. Bode and William 
H. Kilpatrick. Dewey claimed that education need never 
rely on Imposition, even when concerned with life's basic 
orientation. He agreed that education must wor1< to trans-
mit the values of democracy, and must thereby foster 
particular dispositions about and towards reality , but he 
insisted, nonetheless, that school learning could be 
purely experimental. Teachers could avoid indoctrination 
and sti ll be effective. 
Indeed, indoctrination was seen as an obstacle to ef-
fective schooling in a democratic society. In a democratic 
society effective schooling provides a democratic orien· 
talion to life. Indoctrination either fai ls to give any orien· 
talion at all, or else brings about an orientation that is 
Inherently undemocratic. Accord ing to this offlclal view, a 
democratic orientation to life can only be provided by 
means that are themselves democratic. Indoctrination 
was believed to be anti-democratic. It was said to hinder 
personal development and destroy the roots of genuine 
community. With this position, there was virtually no hope 
that schooling under indoctrination could effectively 
foster understand! ng and acceptance of democratic 
dispositions. 
Why were supporters of this official view so adamant 
in relating educational means to educational ends? The 
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answer is not hard to find, although it Is amazing how few 
have found it. In the first place, they justified a democratic 
orien tation because it contributed to mental development. 
If In the process o f acquiring a democratic conception of 
reality there was no advancement o f mental capacities, as 
there surely would not be under conditions of in-
doctrination, then supporters of the official view would 
have been less enthusiastic about democracy as a way 
of life. But In the second place, and more Importantly, 
they did not believe that a democratic orientation could 
be acquired save through Intelligence. Democratic 
dispositions were said to be founded on intelligent self -
selection. While they may contribute to mental develop-
ment, they also presuppose Intelligence in both their un· 
derstanding and acceptance. With a democratic orien· 
tali on we can roster mental growth; but only by reaching a 
certain point In mental development can we acquire a 
democratic orientation . 
Dissenters from the offic ial view saw this position as 
paradoxical. But supporters would say that it only appears 
paradoxical if we assume that things exist prior to 
relatlons, that os, only if we presuppose that intelligence 
and a democratic orientation must exist independently 
and before they are interconnected. But in fact, sup-
porters would say, this is simply no t so. Both come about 
as a result of an evolutionary process wherein the reality 
and character of each is a result of its transactions with 
the other. Here, democratic values and mental capaciti es 
are assumed to be mutually dependent. Each Is a 
necessary condition for the other. As we become more In· 
telllgent, we are made increasingly aware of democracy as 
a way of life, and as we come to see democracy as a way o f 
life, we are, by that very fact, made more Intelligent. Each 
Is instrumental for the o ther as well as being an end In ft. 
self. A democratic orientation creates an atmosphere 
essential for mental growth. But mental growth must at-
tain a minimum plateau before a democratic orientation 
can be had. 
Dewey was not at all bothered by this apparent con -
flic t. He saw the process of transmitting a democratic 
orientation as necessarily rational. In being rational ii 
fosters mental growth. A person is required to engage in 
practical action , that is, action with a practical purpose, 
and to undergo the consequences of his own behavior. Ex· 
periences are to be more or less unbridled. Imposition or 
Indoctrination o l any sort was seen as a retarding agent. 
Indeed, it was in great measure because of its reliance on 
the authority o f the teacher that progressives were op-
posed to traditional forms of schooling. Imposition and in-
doctrination stifled educational aims. They suppressed 
mental potential and made it Impossible to foster 
democracy as a way of l ife. Progressives holding the of· 
flc lal view were surely not going to allow it in their own 
educational scheme. 
The Dissenting View on Imposition 
Other progressives saw i t dif ferently, however. They 
believed the olficial view was mistaken for the same 
reasons liberalism in pol itics was mistaken. It assumed 
that rationality could be a fundamental force in the world, 
that progress was directed by the human mind step by 
step, and that the advancement o f Individual and social 
welf are was gradual and requi red no quantum leap of 
faith. 
Having been thoroughly radicalized by the 1930s, 
progressives who criticized the offlclal view simply did not 
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believe that the recognition of goodness, or what was 
most desirable, was a process that was characterized by 
rationality. And later in the decade, when they witnessed 
the rise of fascism, they had further confirmation they 
were right. There were limits on rationality in the 
educational enterprise of schooling. Dissenters con· 
eluded from this that the normative thrust of the 
progresslve's educational plan cannol always rely on in· 
telligence. In order to achieve his aim the progressive 
teacher must sometimes employ tactics that are not them· 
selves congenial to rational student choice. 
Progressives like George S. Counts and John L. 
Childs saw the process of understanding and accepting 
an orientation to life, including a democratic orientation, 
as requiring something like religious insight. And when 
the process represented a change from one orientation to 
another, It required something like religious conversion. 
But Jn neither case is intelligence enough by itself. Basic 
democratic truths, l ike basic truths generally, can only be 
seen through faith, at least in the beginning. 
Take the propositions that define the democratic 
outlook. We say, for example, that people are politically 
equal, that every adult person should have one. but only 
one vote. And we say this because, among other things, 
we believe people are equal morally as well, and that the 
poli tical realm is one wherein moral considerations must 
bear. Counts and Childs saw these beliefs as much like 
church dogma. They were true, and every democrat could 
see why they were true, l:>ut they could not be demon· 
strated or empirically established as formal arguments or 
scientific judgments, especially to the young or the im· 
mature. To be committed to them morally and emotionally, 
even to understand them intellectually, we must somehow 
transcend rationaflty. While it may In fact be rational to ac· 
cept a democratic orientation and to reject any orientation 
that is not, the acquisition of democratic dispositions is a 
complicated extra-rational affair, It Is rarely Itself rational. 
The pedagogical distinction l:>etween what we accept 
rationally and what is rational to accept is the same as the 
distinction some say is part of the philosophy of science, 
the distinction between the context of discovery and the 
context of verification . Once we see that a proposition is 
true or false, we can set about to formulate a rational 
demonstration. But the recognition or Insight Itself cannot 
be explained In procedural or rational terms. 
The progressives who dissented from the official 
view believed that the problem of education was to get 
students to understand and accept democracy as a way 
of life, and that this was a process of discovery which 
went beyond the bounds of Intelligence. They valued 
rationality and thought it impartant f0< education to foster 
mental capacities, but they believed rationality would be 
valued and mental capacities would be fostered after a 
democratic orientation was established, not before. 
Acquisition of the orientation, they said, did not require 
rationality, and Indeed, was sometimes hindered by an 
overemphasis on reflection and choice. How, then, was 
education to fulfill its normative thrust? Through im· 
positron, of course. That is, by a process that recognized 
the complicated extra·rational factors that bear on our 
conceptions of reality and our acceptance of basic values. 
The Controversy as a Bogus Dispute 
Progressive educational thinkers never fully resolved 
this dispute. And it remains something of a soft·spot In 
their theoretical posture. Must it remain a soft.spot 
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forever? I, for one, do not think so. In the first place, It 
looks to me as if the dispute were more apparent than real. 
Those who supported and dissented from the official view 
can easily be seen as talking past one another. And if they 
were, they might well have been in agreement and not 
known ii. In the second place, the official view rests on a 
naturalistic conception of value, such that the official view 
Is correct if and only ii this conception is sound. The 
theoretical posture of progressive education can be freed 
from vagueness and contradiction so long as its con· 
ception of value can be presented as a clear and defen· 
slble 
philo ophical 
doctrine. 
On the first point, could we not say that neither party 
to the dispute fully understood the other? Moreover, 
might we not account for this failure by the fact that the 
contending sides did not fully understand their own 
position, or at least were unable to enunciate it clearly? 
But, of course, we cannot say either of these things 
unless we know what it was each side meant to say. 
From our present vantage point, however, it seems rather 
obvious. However difficult It was to lormulate or eKpress 
their ideas in the original situation, it looks now as if one 
side to the dispu te, those holding the dissenting view, 
wished to discuss what we should teach and the other 
side, those who advanced the official position, wanted to 
talk al:>out how we shOuld teach. In most cases the two 
concerns are quite d istinct , although, admittedly, the 
more one pushes at their di fferences the harder it is to tell 
them apart. We all know, for example, that the way we 
teach affects what we teach; our instructional techniques 
have consequences too. By teaching In a certain way, we 
may foster attitudes like tolerance or Intolerance, and 
these are surely legitimate curriculum concerns. 
Unquestionably, It was because progressive 
educational thinkers were reluctant to make a separation 
between curriculum and Instruction that the parties to the 
Imposition controversy continually talked past one 
another and failed to formulate their particular views In a 
clear and decisive manner. In refusing to make the distlnc· 
lion absolute, they were making a conceptual point that 
was far in advance of the thinking in their times. But In 
sometimes acting as If the distinction could never be 
made, they fell victim to an Internal dispute that cost them 
dearly in public support. They were unable to present a 
unified front. Instead of an Intellectual perspective that 
could be linked to educational practice, people saw the 
eKtremes of emotional slogans like those they associated 
with political confrontation. 
For this reason It Is unfortunate that progressives 
seem never to admit a distinction between the ideas of 
curriculum and instruction. Although it may always l:>e 
relative, it is still quite clear within its limits. What we 
teach is one thing, how we teach is quite another. We 
might explain the imposition controversy as an un· 
successful effort to deal with both concerns at once. 
Dewey and other supporters of the official view usually un · 
derstood imposition, and alw ays understood In· 
doc trination, as having to do with how we should teach, 
with instruction or manner of Instruction. Dissenters from 
the official view, like Counts and Childs, understood these 
Ideas in terms of what we should teach, with curriculum, 
or the aims of education. 
Supporters of the o fflclal view would sometimes 
make a distinction befween Imposition and indoctrination. 
They would define imposition as the normative thrust of 
education and indoctrination as a strategy, albeit inef· 
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fective, one might employ to realii,e this thrust. Thus, they 
would admit that the former was unavoidable and consider 
it desirable when conceived as a curriculum theory aiming 
to provide a democratic orientation, and they would 
repudiate the latter as a scientifically unsound and 
morally undesirable theory of instruction. As a theory of 
instr uction they would say that it cannot transmit a 
democratic orientation, and, furthermore, that i t retards 
mental growth. 
On th is analysis Counts was right to say that Im-
position was unavoi dable, but wrong to conclude that the 
choice of what to impose is the only educational choice to 
be made. For the conditions of imposition, or how we Im-
pose, makes all the difference in the world. Whether II be 
restricted or generous, authoritarian or free, whether facts 
and values be instilled dogmatically or explained and sub· 
mltted to the independent judgment of students makes 
the difference between what is and is not taught. ' This is 
not to deny that it is often hard to distinguish in practice 
between what and how we impose, and thus to separate 
the ends of curriculum from the means of instruction. But 
still there is a distinction at work here. And the occasional 
reluctance of some progressive educational thinkers to 
equate imp0sitlon with Indoctrination was a recognition 
this distinction must be made. 
Nonetheless, II Is true that supporters of the official 
view generally saw this distinction as Counts saw ii, I.e., 
as a d istinction wi thout a difference. Progressives were 
easy 10 convince that the point at issue lacked practical 
significance and was, therefore, unworthy of intellec tu al 
support. We can see this reluctance to separate ends from 
means, curriculum from instruction, as a source of con· 
fusion ln progressive education. And as a source of con-
fusion It can be seen as an explanation of the imposition 
controversy. This is not to say that the parties to the Im· 
position controversy were insensitive or unsympathetic lo 
each other's concerns. It is simply to say that the official 
• view on Imposition was a view of instruct ion, and that the 
dissen ting view on imposition was a view of curriculum; 
and that the means-ends doctrine subscribed to by both 
parties made It difficult lo specify their respective con· 
cerns. The confusion that came about made it hard for the 
two sides In the dispute to communicate clearly, or , for 
that matt er, for each side to fully understand its own 
position. 
We need to be clear here ourselves. This is no t lo say 
that there Is anything wrong with the means-ends doctrine 
In progressive thought. Undoubtedly, it is one of the more, 
if not the most, significant philosophical Insight of our 
times. But the doctri ne only claims that the separation o f 
means and ends is relative and not absolute. II does not 
deny the distinction itself. Participants in the Imposition 
controversy seemed often to forget the difference be· 
tween a relative distinction and no distinction al all. But is 
it not obvious from what we know of their work as a whole 
that these progressive educational thinkers held to a 
distinction between curriculum and instruction, albeit a 
relative one? To insist they wanted to abolish the dlstinc· 
lion altogether simply does not make sense. To say, as the 
progressives d id, that decisions of the one sort affect 
decisions of the other sort , or even that decisions of the 
one type might en tail decisions of the other type, is not to 
assume that the decisions are one. 
The imposition controversy was by and large a bogus 
dispute. Those who argued for the official view did not 
mean to Imply that teachers should be neutral on critical 
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questions of the day. They recognized that neutrality 
would deny the normative thrust o f progressive education. 
Surely no one could show they were indifferent towards 
the inculcation of values, or lacked a commitment to the 
promotion of a democratic orientation through formal 
education. It may well be that they saw a democratic orien-
tation, like happin ess, as best achieved if not directly pur · 
sued. And in this there might have been a genuine dl f· 
ference with their critics. Their critics wanted to do the 
good by the most direct means. They proceeded im· 
mediately to teach democracy and hoped to foster mental 
capacities indirectly as a by-produc t of democratic living. 
But with the official view there was a tendency to begin by 
fostering mental capacities and ·th en 10 teach democracy, 
or even to let democracy leach Itself as a resu lt of exer-
cising intelligence. It was as if supporters of the official 
view believed that doing well, or achieving excellence or 
perfection in conduct or In practical actions was a more 
worthy goal than doing the gooo, at least as a proximate 
objective. Doing well, or doing a goOd job, as opposed to 
doing the good, seemed lo be held out as a more reliable 
gu ide for achieving moral perfection than that supplied by 
the motive to do what was morally right.• But this em· 
phasis on mental capacities does not deny the ac· 
ceptance of a democratic orientatoon as a moral ideal. It 
only indicates the strategy adopted by those who ac· 
cepted the official position. One Is no less committed to 
democracy as a way o f li fe simply because he believes it is 
most likely to become a reality If pursued by a roundabout 
route. 
Correspondingly, dissenters from the official view did 
not want to claim that education was merely a process of 
shaping beliefs or conditioning behavior. They accepted 
restrictions on manner of teaching. The normative thrust 
of education must employ moral means. Although they 
emphasized teaching a democratic orientation over the 
develo pment of mental capacities, they accepted the tat· 
ter as a goal of equal prominence, at least. Their em· 
phasis, too, was one o f strategy, not moral priority. They 
simply did not believe that education could realize mental 
potential in a decadent society, and that education for a 
democracy must temporarily precede individual develop · 
men I. But they never meant this lo be interpreted as a lack 
of respect for personal in tegri ty. After all, they accepted 
the means- ends doctrine too. They acknowledged the in· 
trinsic value of mental life, and knew the manner by which 
it was fostered could never be Ignored altogether. And 
they agreed with supporters of the o ffic ial view that in or-
der to be Justi fied. a democratic orientation to life must 
have instrumental as well as Intrinsic va lue. And, fu r-
thermore, they believed that In a just society we must all 
be able lo satisfy our spiritual as well as our material 
needs. By maintaining this belief. they recognized that the 
quality of life was as Importan t as life Itself. They, as well 
as supporters of the offic ial view, wanted to foster in· 
lelligence. And why was intelligence valued? Not simply 
because it provided the mechanism for self-direction and 
control, but because i t was a source of enjoyment as well. 
In the end, both sides 10 the imp0sltion controversy ac· 
cepted the same educational goal-to tree the mind from 
the forces of nature that created it. 
The Commitment to Ethical Naturalism 
There is one last matter to discuss. In many respects 
it represents the most important Issue o f all. Undoubtedly, 
ii deserves considerable attention, more than we wil l give 
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it here. Slill, enough can be said In brief to Il lust rate the 
essential point. On Its face, it is simple enough. Even If the 
imposition con troversy was more apparent than real, It did 
demonstrate the commitment of progressive educational 
thought to ethical naturalism and to the theory of value 
inherent In ethical naturalism. 
Dewey and the supporters of the official view were 
quite clear on this. They argued that values were objective 
natural properties and that they could only be known 
through the intelligent analysis of experience, that Is, 
through reason and empirical Investigation. This bears on 
education in a most crucial manner. For i t Implies literally 
that students cannot acqu ire and/or understand a 
democratic orientation to life unless they engage in prac· 
tical action and reflect on their resultant experiences. 
At times dissenters from the official view d id not 
seem to recognize this requirement. Where they expressly 
repudiated it, the on ly explanation can be that they failed 
to recognize, or would not accept, the theory of value 
which underlies ethical naturalism and defines its basic 
tenets. They sometimes, perhaps inadvertently, took a 
subjectivist's position. They would say, In effect, that 
values have no referon ts at all, that they are a creation of 
the human will or a function of perception. At other times 
they would presuppose the first tenet of ethical 
naturalism, that values are objective natural properties, 
but deny the second, that they can only be known through 
the intelligent analysis o f experience. 
In either case, however, imposition is essential, not 
only in regards to curriculum, but In regards to instruction 
as well. Since values are defined as having no source, no 
referents, other than human will, there is no role for in· 
telligence to play in their detection or justification. They 
are arbitrary, and if the educator wants to transmit them to 
students, he must use the means of imposition. Where 
subjectivity reigns, Intelligence has no place. The 
teaching of subjective reality requires no n-rational means 
of instruction. 
Even if subjectivity is denied, even If the first tenet 
which underlies ethical naturalism Is assumed, non· 
rational means of instruction must still be employed so 
long as the second tenet is not also accepted. For even If 
we assume that values are objective natural properties, we 
severely limit, or even exclude. the role of Intelligence in 
their acquisition if we deny the capacity of the individual 
to know them through practical action and reflection on 
resultant experiences. It is necessary to use imposition as 
the means of education whenever and wherever we wish 
to teach something to someone who, for any reason what· 
soever. cannot grasp or understand what we want to teach 
through the exercise of intelligence. Values lhat cannot 
be understood through intelligence would be like con· 
cepts, postulates or axioms that the student was not 
mature enough to understand. It they are to be taught, 
they must be imposed by non-rational means and only 
later, perhaps, be seen by the student as rational or 
necessary. 
On this point the official view on Imposition, and any 
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view implied by It, can only be correc t If the theory of value 
which underlies ethical naturalism is a sound 
philosophical doctrine. Otherwise the view supporting Im-
position as a theory of Instruction as well as a theory of 
curriculum would represent a necessary condition for er. 
fective teaching. But if the theory of value which underlies 
ethical naturalism was unsound, it would do more than un· 
dermlne progressive education. It would pretty much 
d iscredit progressive thought generally, because 
progressive thought itself Is based on this theory of value. 
Progressive education would be inherently defec tive 
because progressive educational theory would be Inher-
ently defecti ve . And progressive educational theory 
would be inherently defective because lhe philosophy on 
which it was based would presuppose a false conception 
of value. On the other hand, II this conception of value was 
sound, progressive education would receive, perhaps, its 
strongest support. 
Suppose we were to look at the imposition con· 
troversy as a d ispute over the means of education. In fact 
it was not, but It could have been. And If It had been, it 
would have represented a genuine and profound 
d isagreement. The controversy would not have been 
limited to educational or political di fferences, but would 
have included a philosophical dispute over the ontological 
and epistemological features of values. Whether the of· 
flclal view, or any view implied by it, could have won out 
would have been contingent on the merits of pragmatism 
itself. Without being fully aware o f It, dissenters from 
the official view issued a challenge to the whole ol the 
progressive movement. During this century ethical 
naturalism has been constantly on the defensive. If 
present·day dissidents of the progressive lradltion are to 
reclaim the belief that values generally, and moral values 
in particular, are best conceived empirically and most 
readily acQuired through experience and intelligent ac· 
tion, they would be well advised to begin by considering 
the Imposition controversy as a possible dispute over the 
means to be used In schooling. If they can show that 
progressive education brings out the best in people 
without relying on imposition, they will reestabl ish, and 
not just reaffirm, the la Ith of their intellect ual ancestors. 
Footnotes 
t . Richard H. Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams. 
New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 1·95. 
2. Israel Scheffler, The Language of Educati on. 
Springfield, Illinoi s: Charles C. Thomas Publishing Co., 
1968 printing, p. 99. 
3. This distinction is, of course, an old one, dating back at 
least to the time of Aristotle. But Its application and 
force in this context was made apparent to me by my 
friend and collea gue John B. Hough; but here again, 
only after considerable effort on his part. Perhaps, the 
same could be said of the distinction between 
cu rriculum and Instruction Itself. 
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We should rethink accountability in 
terms of what the student needs as a 
person. 
Some 
characteristics 
of being 
accountable 
by Louis E. Barrill eaux and 
James C. Carper 
Tulane Unive rsity 
Few proposed "reforms" In education have been as 
voluminously written abou t, frequently spoken about, or 
as intensely debated as the subject of acco untabili ty. 
Cr
itics 
condemn the concept as " inhumane," while 
zealots proclaim it as the latest "panacea.'" 
A salient feature of the recent movement has been 
the lack of general agreement on the meaning of "ac· 
countability." Indeed, the term Is freq uently used in a 
highly abstract manner that suggests a poli tical purpose. 
For instance, advocates assert that the " public" Is the en· 
tity to whom the educator is to be held accountable. This 
"public" is presumed to have a common point of view, 
value system and set of expectations. The concept may 
not be as clea r as its advocates claim when im· 
plementation is to occur In a plur alistic community.' Th is 
results in misguided expectations, unreasoned resistance 
and unanticipated consequences. 
People working in the field of human services need to 
know more about the use of accumulated knowledge. But 
to follow current thought in a mechanical way would 
destroy the sense of caring, empathy and genuineness 
which our work in human services has shown to be 
valuable. So rather than adding operational prescriptions, 
the writers speak to the issues that observations, studies, 
and experiences have raised about accountability. 
1. To what extent is the distinction between 
education and sc hooling important? That there Is con-
fusion between "education" and "schooling" is obvious. 
As Americans, counseled by professional educators, 
heaped many and varied expectations on the schools over 
the past one hundred years, there emerged a tendency of 
view most learning outcomes as a direct result of formal 
Instruct ion.• This phenomenon has escalated the con-
fusion between "education" and "schOoiing." Important 
informal learn ings were assumed to be outcomes of 
schooling. 
~spite current questions concerning the validity of 
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this assumption, the escalation continues. So let i t be 
fully recogni zed that today both public and private In· 
stitutlons of schooling represent the aspirations of people 
who hold increasing concerns for outcomes over which 
the schools have marginal influence and control, such as 
moral development, political sensitivity, and economic 
success. 
Some essential learnings occur only outside the for-
mal structures; schooling Is st i l l not all of education .• As a 
possible necessary precondition for clarifying sc hool ac· 
countabilities. Is it not appropriate to first articulate 
realistic social policy for education? The Issue for our 
society becomes, ''Who Is accountable for education?" 
2. To what extent is accountability consistent with 
the work culture of simple, absolute institutions? Long 
ago, McGregor disUngui shed between the X and Y assump. 
lions which one may hold about the basic nature of the 
"average human being.'" With the set of X, one assumes 
that people inheren tly dis like work; they prefer to be di· 
rected and closely supervised while avoid ing respon· 
slbll ity . Research does not support the se t of X assump. 
lions. Even in under-developed regions, these assump-
tions are largely Ineffective tOday.• 
Can we avoid using accountability concepts as 
though they were strong frameworks put up to help weak 
and dependent people to function effectively? We ask our-
selves, "How can we avoid, in the practice of ac-
countability, the enhancement of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
In which there are lwo kinds of people: the elite with in-
telligence, ambition, psychological matunty, creativity 
(l ike us) and the masses who are lazy, Irresponsible, in,. 
terested only in money, needing di rection and 
psycho logically ill?"
The principles of inst i tutional ccountabili ty are now 
extending beyond fiscal and legal connotations to include 
intellectual, attitudinal and other aspects of schooling. In 
this context, Is holding an Insti tution accountable the 
same as holding an individual acco untable? How can con-
ditions for complex ethical choices be salisfied by a 
collection of people? Given the charge that "School s have 
failed ," is the accountabillty movement an attempt to 
avoid individual responsibility by assigning It to an in-
stitution as a surrogate conscience? If accountability in· 
eludes an ethical component and only individuals are 
capable of ethical choices, can an insti tution be held ac· 
countable?' 
3. To what extent are participants in the " schooling" 
enterprise accountable for resu lts? As professionals In 
the field of human services, we cannot assume respon· 
slbili ty for the behavior of our subordinates, clients. or 
students but only that we have behaved with them in ways 
I hat are defensible. 
We desire responsiblll ty for the things that we do. On 
the basis of research, theory and experience we assume 
responsibility for being increasingly able to give reasons 
why we do what we do, and we must be even more per-
sonal iy responsible for our own behavior. Of ourselve s, we 
ask, " How can we somehow guarantee our professional 
services with greater specificity and presumptions of 
'goodness· without digging ourselves Into a hole of 
guaranteeing results-the equivalent of assuming respon-
sibili ty for the behavior of others?" 
No one in a helpi ng profession Is lik ely to assume 
responsibility for a result over which he has no contr ol. It 
is ludicrous to attempt holding him answerable for a result 
If he is unwilling to assume responsibility. 
•3 
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While it Is possible to extend, give, or delegate 
authority to others, an Individual cannot be made respon· 
sible; he must be willing to assume it. The establishment, 
then, of what service an individual agrees to be an· 
swerable for is perhaps the logical conclusion of the 
acountabillty process. The fundamental issue may 
become, "What kinds ol controllable results can we ex· 
peel participants in the 'practice of schooling· to be dis· 
tinctlvely answerable for?" 
4. To what extent does the movement sharpen the 
destructive conflict between humaneness and &C· 
countability? Clearly, there are two conflic ting 
philosophical positions now operating and directing 
demands on schools. Whi le aders are being called on to 
make an accounting tor the time, money and energy 
poured into their institutions, there is an opposing force 
to make schools more humane with great stress on spon· 
tanei ty, tlexibllily and creative experience. All participants 
in the schooling enterprise are demanding more 
autonomy for themselves-consistent, of course, with a 
work culture characterized by increased ambiguity and 
recognition of the importance of developing lndepen-
denlly strong people. 
In schooling, one alternative over the other os unac· 
ceptable. The execution of skills alone is empty, while 
"l
ove" 
and neo·humanism alone are not enough. How can 
we assist In the resolu tion of the accoun tability-
humaneness forces? Is this conflict our base of OP· 
portunity as mature human service professionals? 
May we begin by rethinking accountability in terms of 
what the student needs as a person, rather than what it Is 
the public wants-which is often defined in self-serv ing 
economic and social terms? The principles and 
techniques that are now being heralded as new are 
derivatives of those that captured education during tho 
early decades of this century, al tho ugh the labels have 
been updated. The consequences of those early 
procedures are well-documented.• 
5. To what extent Is the accountability movement and 
the condition of schooling an appropriate pairing of 
solution and problem? In education, practitioners tend to 
deal with " solutions" first; minimal attention is given to 
the analytical aspect ol solving problems. This inability to 
find lunctlonal problems and communicate them to others 
Is a serious obstacle to improvement. 
Educators have a reputation of being a source of an· 
swers. The pub I le demands a close correspondence be· 
tween questions and answers, and schools are general ly 
not al lowed or (equl red to adop t a problem l lnding stance 
to obtain resources for Improvement. Consequently, li ttl e 
or no relationship may exist betwee n what reformers say 
needs to be done and the problem as perceived by those 
who must Implement an "improvement" program.• 
The Interest In accoun tabilit y, as it is currently ex· 
pressed in the quantifying of outcomes, might lea d to 
disastrous effects. Those whO most enthusiastically 
promote accountability as a lever for improvement are ac· 
customed to mechanistic models which have been useful 
to engineers, economists and business firms. Some 
school problems do yield to mechanistic analysis. Bui 
when i t is people with whom we deal, and when the goals 
we seek are complex human attributes, mechanistic 
models may be of less help. 
How can we, then, account for our greater aims in the 
current movements? Can we avoid the small scale 
suggestions of mechanistic models? In fact, are we suf · 
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ficiently 
secure about the nature of the fundamental 
problem to adopt the accountability model as the wise 
solution? 
6. To what extent are we able to speci fy the necessary 
preconditions under which accountabili ty might be a 
viable process? The following is o ttered as a beginning:" 
a. The special function of " school ing" is agreed upon 
and objectives are clear. (This assumes the larger 
task of identifying the components of the 
" educational" configuration.) 
b. Schooling outcomes are within the power of the ac· 
countab le persons to cont rot. 
c. Individuals and groups negotiate the conditions 
and results for which they agree to be held an· 
swerable. 
d. Standards for quality are clear and measurable. 
e. Particular plans of action are focused upon the 
achievement of particular students. 
I. Professionals at all levels of the schooling hierar-
chy are accepted as experts In the various phases 
of the learning and management process. 
As the current advocates of accountability be<:ome 
genuinely concerned, they wllt talk more about the 
problems of recruiting intellectually mature peopte into 
the field of teaching, the kind of education that teachers 
need to be culturally li terate and the kind of preparation 
and continuing support that educational managers need. 
And we would, therefore, hear less about fearf ully 
monitoring teacher performance, aud iting student out -
comes, and technological aspects of the movement. 
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